

The Communist Organization in Singapore:
Its Techniques of Manpower Mobilization
and Management, 1948-66



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
Growing out of an interest stretching back several years, Mr. Lee Ting Hui's study of the communist organization in Singapore, particularly its *modus operandi* with regard to manpower mobilization and management, is not only timely but should be of considerable interest to all students of communist affairs. Accordingly, let us hope it will circulate widely and stimulate further discussion and analysis of the subject in both Singapore and elsewhere in the region. In the meantime, while wishing Mr. Lee Ting Hui and his work all the best, it is clearly understood that responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in the study that follows rests exclusively with Mr. Lee and his interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or policy of the Institute or its supporters.

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Director
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References are made in this study to 'detainees and ex-detainees'. This term is intended to include those who were held pending enquiries under the provisions of the Internal Security Act.

I: INTRODUCTION

Communism in Singapore, as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, came into being and developed as a part of the international communist movement.

A major purpose of communism is to bring about the downfall of what are commonly known as the capitalist societies. In the view of the communist thinkers, this could be achieved in a number of ways. The first method, as thought out by Karl Marx, founder of the faith, was to incite civil wars within the capitalist societies, with workers pitted against the so-called capitalists, or, in theoretical terms, the proletariat against the bourgeoisie. This approach was feasible, so Marx explained, because the proletariat and the bourgeoisie were fundamentally in deep conflict with each other since the latter lived off the fruits of the labour of the former, in parasitic fashion.

For quite a long time, however, this technique of political change did not bring about the results as expected. V.I. Lenin, a disciple of Marx, then inquired into the cause of the lack of positive results of the communist effort. He put forward the explanation that uprisings within the European capitalist societies could not achieve success because the bourgeoisie had acquired colonies and dependencies overseas from which much wealth was derived, a part of which the bourgeoisie had allowed to be transferred over to the proletariat for its benefit, thereby lessening the intensity or sharpness of the conflict between the two classes. As a corollary to this thesis, Lenin therefore stated that the way to wreck the capitalist societies was to detach from them their overseas acquisitions.

The Marxist and Leninist formulae prevailed for some time until the mid-1950s when Nikita Khrushchev (foreshadowed by Joseph Stalin in what he said) advocated that the path to victory against the capitalist societies or the "West" lay not in calling upon the proletariat in such societies themselves to rise up in arms, nor in starting fires in the backyards of the bourgeoisie, that is, their colonies and dependencies. A more fruitful approach would be a determined effort to demonstrate to the world that the communist system was superior to the capitalist system and thus by example to cause the world to adopt communism. Khrushchev suggested

the new approach because by this time nuclear weaponry had become the chief means of waging potential global wars between the capitalist and the communist societies. A continuation of the old course as laid down by Marx and Lenin would logically bring about a mutual and total destruction of both the communist and capitalist camps.

The Khrushchevian innovation, upheld by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, however, did not gain acceptance with Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party. This resulted in a momentous split in the international communist movement.

The thrust of communism into Southeast Asia, as elsewhere in Asia, began with Lenin's advocacy of revolt in the colonies. Lenin captured power in Russia in 1917. Two years later he established an organization called the Third International or the Communist International, whose Council was called the Comintern. The purpose of this was to wage international warfare against the capitalist societies. The Comintern soon became active in Southeast Asia. It lasted until 1943 when Stalin, the successor of Lenin in Russia, dissolved it in an effort to present an image of sincere co-operation with the Allied Powers in the common war effort against Germany.

After the war, however, the expansionist effort was revived in the form of a Communist Information Bureau or Cominform, in 1947. This instrument was used up to 1956 when it was discarded by Khrushchev, seeking then to implement his theory of peacefully outrivalling the West.

For a while the communist parties in Southeast Asia went along with Khrushchev, but after the 1960s those of them which had still not yet gained power nor formed governments crossed over to the side of Mao Tse-tung.

In the meantime, the communist parties in Southeast Asia had gained valuable experience. In order to organize resistance behind the Japanese lines, during the Pacific War, the Allied Powers helped to arm some of the communist parties and other organizations, which had themselves begun guerrilla warfare against the Japanese in the conquered territories. This development was of crucial importance to these communist parties. It gave them an opportunity to acquire modern weapons, tactical knowledge and military strength generally. After the war was over, they contended for power with the established authorities.

With regard to Singapore and the Malay Peninsula, communism arrived in the 1920s. In the year 1930 the Communist Party of Malaya¹ formally came into existence. Singapore and the Peninsula in those days were not separate territories but lived under the one and common administration of the United Kingdom. Finally it was only in 1965 that they became separate sovereign states. Therefore, communism in the island republic has to be understood with reference to both the island itself and to the mainland. In the course of this study, whenever the term "Malaya" is used, it is deemed to cover both the island and the mainland.

According to what the Malayan communists say themselves, their ambition in those days was no less than the total eradication of the British colonial administration in the two territories which were then planned to be turned into a "Soviet Republic of Malaya." Toward this end, they initiated a campaign of political warfare against the British administration. This gained strength as the years went by. The forms of action resorted to were strikes, rallies, demonstrations and similar activities, with worker, student, and intellectual participation. All the agitation, however, did not lead to a seizure of power by the communists. But significantly it did lead to an increase in the membership of the Party.

During this period of the history of the CPM it waged a struggle not only against the British authorities but also against the Japanese. The Japanese had begun military encroachments upon China in 1931, which culminated in an all-out attack on that country in 1937. A high proportion of the population in Singapore and to a substantial extent also in the Malay Peninsula, was, and still is, of Chinese ethnic origin. Capitalizing upon the anti-Japanese sentiments of this section of the population in the two territories, the CPM generated and developed an anti-Japanese campaign. By seizing this opportunity the Party created a situation

1 The party was known as the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) until the 1960s when the authorities came to call it the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM). The latter acronym, CPM, will be used throughout this study, regardless of the time period. Both variants - MCP and CPM - are only English translations of the original name in Chinese which is "Ma-lai-ya Kung-ch'an Tang" (馬來亞共產黨). This name has never been varied by the Party itself.

which resulted in a spectacular growth of the communist movement in terms of membership and popularity.

In 1941-42, the Japanese overran the two territories. This event meant two things to the CPM. First, it caused that Party to forego temporarily its enmity against the United Kingdom, and instead to form a common front with the British colonialists against the Japanese. Secondly, it gave the Party an opportunity to build up an armed force. This was achieved with the assistance of the British by way of training and equipment. During the Japanese occupation, the CPM conducted guerrilla warfare against the Japanese, and in 1943 it stated that its main aim at that time was the destruction of the Japanese presence and the establishment of a "Democratic Republic of Malaya."

The Japanese lost Singapore and the Malay Peninsula in 1945. The postwar development of the CPM saw it once again taking up cudgels against the British administration. Later on, after the British had granted independence to the two territories, the communists began a fight against the indigenous elected governments.

This period of history of the Malayan communist movement, from the viewpoint of the method of struggle it employed in its attempt to achieve power, may be divided into four phases. The first phase was 1945-48, the second 1948-54, the third 1954-66, and the fourth can be said to be from 1966 until the present day.

During the first and third phases, the method of struggle used was political manoeuvring, that is, the staging of strikes, rallies and so on, much as in the days before the Second World War. During the second and last phases, the method used was military confrontation, that is, engagement in the battlefield.

The communist movement in Malaya was an important part of the communist upsurge in Southeast Asia. Therefore, it has attracted the attention of a large number of writers, particularly foreigners. Actually the subject can be conveniently divided into three aspects. The first concerns the social and economic policies, and platform of the movement. The second covers the confrontations it had with the established authorities. The third deals with its organization and organizational methods. The social and economic policies of the movement lay at its root. The

confrontations it had with the established authorities were the results of its attempts to implement its long-term policies, whilst its organization was the vehicle with which it carried out the confrontations.

All the three aspects of the subject should have an equal claim to scholarly interest. However, to date, research efforts on the different aspects of the problem have been quite unbalanced. Foreign scholars have tended to focus their attention on the aspect of confrontation with the established authorities. The confrontations were armed as well as purely political, the most dramatic of all the various aspects of the overall communist movement.

Numerous works have been published on the military struggle with the British administration with which the movement got involved after the year 1948. Of these, more than a dozen can be described as serious attempts to study the problem. Of the dozen the following four are good examples: G.Z. Hanrahan, *The Communist Struggle in Malaya*; Edgar O'Ballance, *Malaya: the Communist Insurgent War, 1948-1960*; R.L. Clutterbuck, *The Long, Long War: The Emergency in Malaya, 1948-1960*; and Anthony Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*.

There is another work of a similar kind on the 1945-48 post-Second World War phase of the Malayan communist movement. This is *Industrial Conflict in Malaya: Prelude to the Communist Revolt of 1948* by M.R. Stenson.

R.L. Clutterbuck wrote another book on the theme of confrontation between the Party and the established authorities, *Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya, 1945-1963*, in which he made a comparative study between the two methods of combat, namely the political and the military methods, employed by the Party to further its struggles.

Besides confrontation, largely speaking, neither the long-range social and economic policies, nor the organization and organizational methods of the Malayan communist movement have apparently evoked the curiosity of scholars. The only work with a bearing on the organization issue is Lucien Pye's *Guerilla Communism in Malaya*.

The purpose of this study is not to investigate all those aspects of the Malayan communist movement neglected or ignored by previous writers, important though these may be. Rather, its purpose is to examine a question which

is of crucial importance to the central problem of how the communist movement is organized. This aim can be realized if we focus in detail on the topic which we shall call the communist movement's techniques of manpower mobilization and management. The key issues involved will thus be those revolving around the communist organizational framework, and its utilization of available manpower resources.

The interrelationship between "organization" and "manpower" can be summarized thus: organization was the way in which manpower was managed in the communist movement, and manpower in turn was the substance which filled up the organization. Manpower was crucial to the movement.

The framework of "organization" in the movement consisted of the CPM itself and various subordinate bodies related to it. There were, in the first place, two kinds of such subordinate bodies, one military in nature and the other civilian. The military was the armed force of the Party. The civilian institutions were further divided into two types, one closer to the Party with the other type more peripherally placed as far as the Party centre was concerned. The first type which was closer to the Party was generally known as the satellite organizations. Those further removed from the Party were known as the front organizations, and these included the openly operating political parties, under communist control, influence or manipulation.

The CPM itself, except in the brief period 1945-48, was never permitted by governmental authorities to exist. In other words, throughout most of its existence it has been an illegal, underground movement. Its armed component and the satellite organizations were equally of a clandestine nature. Its front organizations were, however, acceptable to the law. The front organizations were privileged thus because they were in their activities not as antagonistic towards the authorities as were the satellite organizations, the armed component or the Party itself.²

It is proposed in the present study to find out several things about the manpower system in the Malayan communist movement. The first is to find out how the movement attempted

2 See Appendixes A and B for lists of the satellite and front organizations known to have existed in 1948-66.

to reach what the communists themselves called the masses. These masses were the people or, in more common language, members of the public. The importance of the masses to the movement was that they were the sources of manpower to the movement. For such a clandestine movement to reach out to the masses needed considerable organizational effort and skill. The main thing to do in order to reach the masses, in the minds of the communists, was to establish contact leading to the cultivation of friendship ties, and additionally to fully exploit whatever existing friendships and other personal links available. Friendship and personal ties were to be the bridge between the Party and the masses. Therefore, the use of the factor of friendship was the first problem in the question of manpower mobilization in the Malayan communist movement.

The purpose of the Malayan communist movement in establishing new friendships and exploiting existing ones with the masses was to create a situation so that it could absorb suitable personnel from the masses into its fold.

It is to be understood that the phenomenon of absorption in the Malayan communist movement was not a "once-and-for-all" affair, but a continuous ongoing process. After a person had been first drawn into the movement through the friendship which the movement's representative enjoyed with him, he would, if he fulfilled the necessary conditions, be uninterruptedly drawn deeper and deeper into the movement until he reached the very inner circles.

After the initiation and consolidation of the "friendship" phase, the absorption of personnel from the masses into the movement was the next stage in the process of the building of the manpower system.

The reasons why human resources were needed in the movement were to have them put to use to further the ends of the movement. The third aspect of the manpower system of the movement was therefore the usage or deployment of this manpower.

In order that the manpower which was deployed could become more effective, its quality had first of all to be improved. This could be done through training. The subject of training would be the last feature of the manpower system in the Malayan communist movement which this study will attempt to analyse.

Divided into six chapters, this study, after the introduction, examines the question of exploiting friendships for recruitment purposes, then focuses on the process of absorption of personnel into the movement, before giving attention to the question of deployment of human resources for the movement, followed by an analysis of the training processes involved, and concludes in the final and sixth chapter.

In connection with the above plan of inquiry, two things have to be said. They concern the limitations of the plan. The first limitation is that account is taken of the problem only in so far as it concerns the front organizations, the satellite organizations and the CPM itself, and not of the armed component. The reason for excluding the armed force from consideration is that this study pertains only to Singapore and does not include the Peninsula. At no time in its history did the Party station any of its troops on the island. Therefore, a discussion concerning the armed force is not relevant to the purposes of this study. The second limitation of this study is that in time span it is confined to only the years between 1948 and 1966. It would have been ideal if the whole history of the movement could have been covered. This was impossible, however, because for the years prior to 1948 no data are available for consultation. For the years after 1966 information is highly classified. Thus, this study is restricted in its scope to only the phases of military and political struggle during the period 1948-66.

On the subject of data, the picture of communist activities that emerges in this study is based in the main on one major source of information. This source is the unpublished statements to government authorities about their own activities made by communist or procommunist ex-detainees or detainees held by the Government of Singapore. In addition, this study has also benefited from a number of subsidiary sources, of which the following are the most important: first, interviews with a number of government officers who are experts on communist activities, second, documents and publications of the communist organizations themselves, and third, several governmental studies of certain sectors of the communist movement. These sources, too, where they are in writing, are for the most part in unpublished form. As far as can be ascertained, much of the foregoing material has never been systematically utilized by any scholar up to now, and the present study

is the first one of its kind to be based on this unique collection, particularly the statements of ex-detainees and detainees.

The statements of the ex-detainees and detainees are an indispensable source for a proper understanding of the communist movement in Singapore. This is so because the communists operate with maximum secrecy. One example will perhaps make clear the importance of this class of data. During the phase of political struggle from 1954 to 1966, individual members of the CPM infiltrated into the People's Action Party, which thereby was transformed into one of their front organizations, to further their aims through the party. In 1961, however, a split between the communist and noncommunist members of the People's Action Party occurred. The communists felt that their position in Singapore had become insecure. Through the course of the next few years, a considerable number of them withdrew to the safe haven of a neighbouring country. But after a while some of them began to return to the island. The reason for the action was that the CPM was implementing a new line of struggle, that is, armed struggle once again, and they had been ordered back to Singapore to undertake various operations. As to be expected, some of these persons who stole back fell into the custody of the government. It was from the statements made by these captured persons that a more complete picture was built up of the communist deployment, including the earlier evacuation from Singapore of selected personnel. This information was in fact gleaned from a mass of documentary material dealing with other aspects of the movement.³

However, the statements as sources of information suffer from certain defects. These defects lie in omissions, and misinformation. These shortcomings arise because those who provided the information realized the significance of what they said and consequently tried not to be truthful or helpful as far as possible.

Therefore, when one is using this otherwise excellent source of information, one has to use it with some care. Fortunately, there are a number of ways whereby uncertain facts can be verified. These ways are, firstly, to check

3 Statements of LIM HOCK KOON, CHAN HOCK WAH and CHIA SIEW TIN, *passim*.

the internal consistency of any particular statement, secondly, to check the veracity of one statement with another or other statements, and, thirdly, to match this main source of information with the subsidiary sources.

In the case of the necessity to check the internal consistency of a statement, there is the example of a certain person who had talked about his superior in the movement as being promoted to become a member of the Singapore Student Committee, an organ subordinate to the Singapore Town Committee. He stated that this promotion took place in the middle of 1949. However, at another point of his statement, he said that during the period from September or October 1948, till the end of the year, the man was already functioning on the said committee.⁴ A certain number of errors can be detected through this method of straightforward checking for consistency of subject matter.

There is another kind of shortcoming about the statements of ex-detainees and detainees. This shortcoming, however, is a defect only with regard to the special focus of the present study. This study, it will be recalled, is concerned with the manpower system in the Malayan communist movement, the four aspects of which were friendship with the masses, absorption of personnel from the masses, and the deployment, and training of such personnel. The primary interest of the statements, on the other hand, was not in these things. Their focus of attention was the location of personalities, how these personalities were connected with one another and what each of them did. Because of this emphasis of interest, the statements contain only a small proportion of material which is directly relevant to our research. To give a rough estimate, the data of use to this study are not more than 20% of the total available. If it had been possible to gain data from the ex-detainees or detainees by another method, namely the questionnaire-and-interview method, the situation would be somewhat improved. However, this approach was not feasible owing to the sensitive and delicate personal circumstances of the individuals concerned.

The subsidiary sources of information, as already stated, are used for the purpose of verifying the reliability

4 Statement of WONG MAU CHOONG, para. 17, and Appendix (A) No. 51.

of the main source. There is, however, another use as well for the data from these sources. This is to fill in the gaps which occur in the data from the main source.

Subsidiary sources, such as the oral data supplied by governmental experts and governmental studies of the communist movement respectively, sometimes also suffer from certain defects. Inaccuracies in the former are due mainly to failure in memory, and in the latter due to inadequate information. The method of verifying the statements of these sources is to cross-check these statements with relevant data from the other sources. For instance, one of the governmental studies provided some information on the Deputy Secretary General of the CPM during the Emergency. There were inaccuracies in this information. These inaccuracies were discovered by checking this information against data supplied by the government officers, and by communist documents and publications themselves.

However, despite the shortcomings of the various sources of information described above, it is still possible by careful piecing to build up a fairly comprehensive picture of the manpower system in the communist movement in Singapore during the period 1948-66. As stated earlier, this manpower system was an important aspect of the movement. A proper understanding of this system, and its functioning, will contribute considerably towards a better appreciation of the movement.

In this study, a considerable number of quotations has been extracted from the statements of ex-detainees and detainees, and used to illustrate the workings of the various aspects of the manpower system in the Malayan communist movement in Singapore. The reader will find the quotations written in English partly ungrammatical and frequently inelegant in expression. These statements referred to were originally given in the Chinese language to government officers by the detained persons and were subsequently translated into English. Translation work was carried out by translators more concerned with accuracy in meaning than elegance in style. No attempt has been made in any way in this study to tamper with the quotations used.

II: EXPLOITING PERSONAL TIES AND CULTIVATING FRIENDSHIPS

It has already been stated that the first object of the present study to find out about the manipulation of manpower in the Malayan communist movement is the examination of the Party's methods of reaching the masses. Much of the system of manipulation devolves around how it could successfully reach out to the masses so that the people can be drawn into the movement. It has also been explained that reaching out to the masses was absolutely necessary for the movement because the masses constituted the source of manpower for the movement. It has further been pointed out that, to communists, the way to reach out to the masses was to enjoy relations of friendship with them. Let us, then, explore the question of this technique of exploiting personal ties and friendships and its place in the manpower system in the Malayan communist movement.

There were two categories of friendship which were recognizable in the manpower picture in the Malayan communist movement during 1948-66. The first was what could be called "existing friendship" and the second "created friendship". Existing friendship was the friendship already existing between a member of the movement and a member of the masses which could be immediately utilized to involve the latter in the movement's interests. Created friendship, on the other hand, was the type which was not already in existence but which had to be created or brought about before it could be utilized for communist ends.

Existing friendship could arise in a number of circumstances. The first circumstance would be when a member of the movement and a member of the masses happened to be persons who had familial relationship with each other. The idea of family is here conceived in the broadest sense. It is taken to include not only husband and wife, parents and children, brothers and sisters, but also uncles and aunts, cousins, in-laws and so on. Even lovers and engaged couples are included in this definition. The second circumstance in which existing friendship would occur would be when the two sides concerned happened to be occupied in the same place of work. A place of work could be a shop, a factory, a farm or an office. Friendships arising between classmates or schoolmates come under this grouping. The third circumstance in which there could possibly be existing

friendship was when the two persons concerned are neighbours.

It was always possible that persons who were members of the same family, of the same place of work or in the same neighbourhood had not even a nodding acquaintance with one another. This was an event in which friendship, if it had to be utilized, had to be created. The other situation when a member of the movement and a member of the masses would have no relationship with each other at all would be when they were not members of the same family, and when they did not work or live in the same place. These were examples where there were no existing ties, but provided potential for the creation of needed ties.

Viewing the situation as a whole, it was the norm for a member of the movement to have no prior relationship whatsoever with a person he wished to cultivate for the purposes of the movement. In the event when friendship had to be created, two problems had to be resolved. The first problem lay in how the task was to be undertaken or, in other words, what technique was to be used to obtain the required result. The other problem was to develop as many opportunities as possible so that the task of creating contacts leading hopefully to friendships would be facilitated.

The technique which the Malayan communist movement utilized to bring about friendship with the masses was simply to render service to them. The communists conceived the masses to have two main types of needs. One type was described as material and the other type recreational. Catering to the material need could be called welfare operations. The second type of need was met by organizing recreational operations. At all times, the communists would expend a great deal of effort and energy on these activities in order to attract the masses. Some examples of welfare activities would be giving financial aid to needy students, teaching illiterate workers how to read and write, and helping villagers to repair their huts and attend to their farms. Recreational operations could be divided into two varieties, those for the benefit of the mind and those for the benefit of the body. Examples of the former would be music, literature and related intellectual activities, and of the latter, sports and games.

The communists frequently combined welfare and recreational operations with propaganda or indoctrination. While rendering assistance to the masses they would at the

same time utilize the opportunity to speak up against the ruling authority and preach the communist ideology. The two types of effort should always be viewed together simultaneously.

It is to be noted also that very often the communists would seek to cultivate useful relationships with the masses directly through propaganda or outright indoctrination alone, without pretending that it was anything else. This is recognized as the direct propagandistic and indoctrinatory approach.

To maximize opportunities for befriending operations the communists built up as many organizations as possible. The thinking was simply that if the net was cast wider, the more fish would be caught. During the phase of military struggle, that is, in 1948-54, the communists had very few such organizations in the island. Progress was to that extent limited. There was the Party itself which was one unit. There existed effectively only one satellite organization which was called the Singapore People's Anti-British League, and a handful of front organizations in some of the Chinese secondary schools. The Party was always to be only one - for purposes of unity - but the satellite and the front organizations were to be made as numerous as possible. However, British action inhibited the communists from realizing their goals concerning the multiplying of related organizations.

During the subsequent phase of political struggle, 1954-66, however, the situation improved considerably for the communists. There continued to be only one satellite organization which the communists of their own accord dissolved in 1957, but front organizations mushroomed all over the island. The reason why there was so much room for the front organizations was because the British administration implemented a programme of restoring power to Malaya by constitutional means, and for this purpose it was necessary to allow public organizations to make their appearance. The communists fully exploited this opportunity. Therefore, regarding the question of developing contact with the masses, the communists made much greater headway during the phase of political struggle than during the phase of military struggle.

A fuller list of the satellite and front organizations in the movement during the two different phases of struggle is to be found in Appendixes A and B.

What has been explained can be described as the principles of exploiting existing friendships and developing new ones with the masses by the Malayan communist movement. Let us now see how they worked out in practice.

First, the utilization of existing friendships.

A certain student of a certain big school in Singapore got involved with the communist movement in 1950, but in the early 1960s he gave up his involvement in the movement. Sometime after he had abandoned this activity, he surrendered himself to the authorities and gave an account of how he came to be converted, what he did while he was a communist and so on. In his explanation about the origin of his involvement, he put the blame squarely on his sister. He said that it was his sister who got him into trouble, and if he had not had such a sister he would have remained throughout an innocent person. As his story was rather typical of the way the communists made use of familial relationships to recruit persons into their organization, it is worthwhile quoting this man:

I really regret for all that I had done while I was made a tool of the Communist in the past. I was dragged into the Communist whirlpool because I was then young and ignorant and had been misled by my elder sister and influenced by "A". If I do have such a sister, I believed all this thing would not have happened to me.¹

What his sister and "A" did was to preach to him the glory of the Chinese anti-Japanese war which led him to develop an interest in communism. And eventually it was his sister again who invited him to join the Singapore People's Anti-British League (SPABL).

1 Statement of LEONG K.S., paras. 9, 10, 37. These paragraphs read exactly in the statement as they are here cited. Throughout this study, the writer does not propose to correct anything which may be faulty with the language of the statement. Subsequent quotations from statements of the ex-detainees and detainees cited in this study will be treated in the same way, that is, without alteration even in cases of bad grammar.

Examples like the above notwithstanding, the instances of people taking up the communist cause as a result of persuasion by a colleague, a classmate, a teacher and so on are apparently more common than instances of utilization of familial relationships.

The Naval Base of the British armed forces in those days was a place heavily infiltrated by members of the Singapore People's Anti-British League or the CPM itself. Very often recruitment took place among the local personnel who worked there. Such a thing happened for example in the years 1949-51. It was the case of technicians getting one another into the brotherhood. The event was as follows:

Sometime in March/April 1949 a friend of mine named "A" who was working as a carpenter in the S.C.E. Dept. at the Naval Base came to my house one evening. He was talking to me about the affairs of the Singapore People's Anti-British League and it was through his influence that I became a ... sympathiser ... moreover "A" advised me to try to recruit some of my friends as sympathisers. Thus I managed to cultivate 2 S.P.A.B.L. members: "B" and "C".

Towards the middle of 1951 I managed to cultivate another S.P.A.B.L. member named "D" ...

I further cultivated one more S.P.A.B.L. member named "E".²

Thus a place of work was utilized by the communist movement as a recruiting ground.

Neighbours were also apparently easy targets to work upon. In 1951 a member of the Singapore People's Anti-British League was instructed by his League superior to try to draw others into the organization, especially his neighbours. The person said himself of the instructions given to him:

² Statement of LEOW FATT, paras. 6, 9 and 10.

Sometime in the first half of 1951, not long after I became an A.B.L. [SPABL] member, I was instructed by my superior, "A" to cultivate some sympathisers among fellow students. He told me that we should concentrate our activities on cultivation ... "A" told me to try and cultivate some of my friends ... especially those who were my neighbours.³

The person did as he was told, and very soon he had a small flock under his care.

In the case of created friendship, it will be shown how operations were carried out first during the phase of military struggle, and then during the phase of political struggle.

In 1948 there was a student who studied in Junior Middle Three in a certain Chinese secondary school. He was backward in his lessons. He said that one of the other students in the class became friendly with him during that year and assisted him in his studies. After some time, he added, his friend discovered that he was good enough material for recruitment or absorption into the communist movement, and he subsequently was taken into the Singapore People's Anti-British League and later into the CPM. This was a case of using the welfare type of method to build up good relations with a possible target. Many years after the event, the man who was cultivated recalled the incident in a brief but succinct account:

... it was in 1948 when I was studying in Junior Middle Three that my class-mate "A" began to cultivate me. At the beginning he became very friendly with me in class and assisted me in my studies, as I was rather backward in my school-work ...

... I became a sympathiser of the Malayan Communist cause.⁴

3 Statement of CHAN YEAN FOCK, para. 14.

4 Statement of CHAN YEAN FOCK, paras. 9 and 10.

Although the two persons were classmates, their relationship was not close before the recruiter began to work on the student.

The example just cited to show the welfare operations of the movement was one which occurred in the context of a school. There is now one example which took place in the context of a rubber plantation. The residents in or near the plantation were either workers or farmers. What happened was that a certain student, who was trying to escape from the police, took refuge in the estate. After having stayed there for a while, he began to make himself useful to the people living in the neighbourhood. What he did, in his own words, follows:

While staying at Ah Kow's house, I voluntarily tutored a group of about six to seven ... children who had no opportunity to go to school I tutored them for about six months.⁵

The young man did not also say whether or not the parents of the children became pleased with his service, but he did say that later on one of the fathers gave him a daughter in marriage.

In dealing with recreation as a means of "friendly" contact with the masses, the communists most frequently used the picnic for the purpose of befriending the masses. Accounts of it abound in reference materials on communism in Singapore. There was a report that the students in the Catholic High School were fond of it at one time. The report stated:

... "A" instructed "B" and me to organize some picnics for Catholic High School. He said such activities could promote the liaison and friendship among the fellow students "B" and I organized three or four picnics for Catholic High School within three months "A" prepared the picnic programmes for us. The main contents of the programmes propagated the achievements of the Chinese Communists'

5 Statement of CHAN HOCK WAH, para. 23.

revolution in the mainland of China and introduced the Chinese Communist songs and dances to the schoolmates⁶

Students in other schools conducted this kind of activity as well.

The picnic was also used as a magnet to attract workers. There is a very long account of this happening to a certain radio mechanic in about the year 1952, which reads:

... when I was still very young, being 20 years old, I was ... working as an apprentice radio mechanic at Lee Radio Service ... I used to mix up with some of my neighbour's children Together with them I used to go outings, play games, swimming, cycling etc. During one week end I remember we have decided to join in one of the picnic outing ... the picnickers assembled outside Majestic Theatre. There were lorries ... to convey the picnickers, numbering some 50 to 60 of them, to the picnic site The picnickers were not school children ... they looked like workers, comprising of males and females Upon arrival at the picnic site, we were given the opportunity of free activities After lunch we were instructed by some organizers (?) to form into a big circle where we played many types of games: catching the leader; blind-man's bluff; blowing the balloons and many others. We were also conducted to sing songs during the games After that some organizers (?) came up to tell stories during which they introduced topics on world events. They concentrated mainly on the events and revolution on China. After the organized activities, we were again allowed free activities which dragged on to the late afternoon

After having attended the first picnic, I became interested and began to attend more picnics of this nature. During that time there were a lot of those picnics at the week end

6 Statement of PANG TOON TIN, para. 9.

I remember during one of the picnics, I came to know someone by the name of "A" ... we became good friends and began to move closely He also encouraged me to attend more of the picnics and he said by doing so I would be able to broad-look and knowledge and to know more friends During one of the picnics, he introduced the following friends to me:

- (1) "B"
- (2) "C"
- (3) "D"
- (4) "E"

After knowing them we became very thick friends.⁷

The picnic was very successful in achieving its aim with this worker.

It is to be noted that the examples of the recreation effort just quoted were not solely recreational but included indoctrination activities simultaneously. As has already been explained, besides being paired off with welfare or recreational operations, propaganda was very often fed directly to the masses. During the years when fighting between the communists and the British administration was bitter, the former made it a practice to flood the schools and the streets with pamphlets, posters and the like.

A case of a student being influenced by reading indoctrinating materials is as follows:

... when I first joined the Chinese High School in 1950, I was still very reserved Soon after my admission ... I had access to pamphlets issued by the Malayan People's Liberation Army. The contents of such pamphlets were mainly news regarding the army's battles in the Malayan jungles. The pamphlets also contained Communist propaganda. Such pamphlets were usually found in the students' drawers in the early morning. I have no idea as to who

⁷ Statement of CHENG YUIT TUNG, p. 1.

distributed them. Like most of the students, I usually read these pamphlets first before handing them over to the teacher. After reading many such pamphlets, I became sympathetic towards the Communist's cause.

As a result of my interest in reading the pamphlets, "A" became very friendly with me. We used to play games together⁸

To all intents and purposes, it was probably "A" who put the pamphlets into the drawers of the students. Friendship was successfully cultivated with students.

In February or March 1950 the committee of the communist organization in Singapore which was in charge of labour matters established an underground organization called in literal English translation the "Singapore All Races, All Trades General Labour Union". To mark the occasion it was proposed to issue a manifesto, to paste up posters and hang up red flags in the streets. It was also planned to burn a tyre factory. All these were to be done on the 18th of March, which was the eightieth anniversary of the Paris Commune. On the date decided, the planned activities were all carried out. The section of the committee which controlled all shop assistants in the city gave a detailed report on the work it did in this connection:

... the manifesto and the posters were distributed and pasted up at the following places: North Bridge Road, Rochore Road, Malay Street, Middle Road, Beach Road Market, New Bridge Road, Queen Street, Liang Seah Street, Purvis Street, South Bridge Road, New Market, Merchant Road, River Valley Road, Havelock Road, Telok Ayer Street and Cross Street. The two ... flags were hoisted ... at the Hong Eng Market and New Bridge Road respectively⁹

8 Statement of ANG ENG CHONG, paras. 7 and 8.

9 Statement of GAN SIEW THAM, pp. 8-12.

It was not recorded what impact all these things had on the general population in the city but a similar kind of programme was repeated less than a month and a half later, on Labour Day, also for the purpose of celebrating that occasion.¹⁰ These are examples of efforts to inform the masses that the Party existed for their benefit.

This effort to create friendship with the masses during 1948-54, though impressive, was dwarfed by what took place after 1954.

It will now be shown how the different types of operations aimed at developing the goodwill of the masses were carried out by the many different kinds of organizations which proliferated and took the stage during this phase of political struggle. The narration will begin with the political parties, continue with the student bodies, proceed to the trade unions, then deal with the cultural associations, finally focusing on the peasant organizations.

As listed in Appendix B, hawker unions and a women's federation were also active along with these other organizations at the time, but the narrative will have to leave them out because data about them were not available for the purposes of the present study.

The political party which first became the major instrument of the Malayan communists in their operations in Singapore in the furtherance of the political struggle was the People's Action Party. Accounts of the activities of this organization occur in the student field, as well as with the trade unions and in the rural areas of the island. Of these accounts, the one about activities in the rural area is the fullest. Nevertheless, on the whole, what has come down in the documents still remains very slim. However, what little could be culled from the sources is sufficient to show the effort the communist movement devoted to establishing liaison with the masses.

The account on fighting for the interests of students, using the People's Action Party as the instrument, reads as follows:

¹⁰ Statement of GAN SIEW THAM, pp. 13-14.

... the P.A.P. had supported the students in their struggles against the colonial government as can be seen in their support of the Chinese Middle students at the time of the closure of the Singapore Chinese Middle School Students Union (S.C.M.S.S.U.) and the subsequent Hock Lee Riots¹¹

The Singapore Chinese Middle School Students' Union was the largest student organization at the time, but it was deregistered by the government in 1956. The Hock Lee Bus Riots were disturbances perpetrated by bus workers but also involved the students. The assistance given to the students by the People's Action Party earned the goodwill and gratitude of the students, who later returned the gift by rendering support to the party in the General Election which took place in 1959.

Many communists who had become leaders of the People's Action Party at that time were also leaders of trade unions. The labour line of the party consequently was very pronounced. The sentiments the workers held towards the party were:

Since P.A.P. stepped into power, the left-wing unions became very lively. Everyone was of the view that the victory of a pro-workers party would be favourable to the development of the left-wing union movement and it would be the right time to seek improvement in the workers' livelihood¹²

The People's Action Party drew its strength from two main sources, one of which was the workers. The other source was the students.

A communist became the Secretary of one of the rural branches of the People's Action Party after it had come into power in 1959. Soon after assuming the post, the person drew up a plan on how he would conduct mass work in the area under his charge. This plan showed clearly the principles of reaching out to the masses through looking after their interests and through propaganda. His plan ran as follows:

¹¹ Statement of CHIA SIEW TIN, para. 78.

¹² Statement of TAN BANG KIAT, para. 69.

... Contact with the villagers was a more important task. I held the view that it was by maintaining proper contact with the masses, getting deeply to understand their difficulties and demands that a concrete method could be found to serve them

... It was essential to launch literary [literacy?] and educational activities because by capitalising on the brilliant victory scored in the general election and taking office and with the people's support and all favourable conditions, launching of literary and educational activities on a big scale would attract more masses to come to the branch and participate in all kinds of study so that the branch would become virile and flourishing

... The masses should be made to understand further that it was only "the leftist movement" which could genuinely serve the people's interests, and that they should always support it and unite within its fold.¹³

It is interesting to note that the kind of welfare activity which could most suitably be blended with propaganda was literacy and educational activity.

The Secretary next went on to talk about the implementation of his plan:

... I frequently accompanied the Assemblymen for this ward ... visiting the villagers, helping him to record some of the villagers' petition and helping them to solve certain difficult problems like settling disputes and making general enquiries from government departments for them.¹⁴

He said nothing about the literacy and educational activities which he had wanted to sponsor, but it could perhaps be assumed that he did also attend to this part of his scheme.

13 Statement of CHIA YAM FEI, para. 101.

14 Statement of CHIA YAM FEI, para. 103.

In actual fact, literacy and educational activities were very widespread throughout all the branches of the People's Action Party. They were not limited to any one branch. There were reports, for instance, of a literacy class in the same year, that was 1959, in the Kampong Chai Heng Subbranch, and night and dressmaking classes in the Ang Mou Tan Kay Subbranch.¹⁵

Welfare activities of this kind did bring the masses and the communists closer to one another. The Secretary of this particular branch of the People's Action Party did not say what impact he made on the villagers whom he worked upon, but another communist who engaged himself as a teacher in the night class in the Ang Mou Tan Kay Subbranch did record that he was very successful in cultivating the good feelings of those whom he came into contact with. In this case, the communist taught and visited his students in their homes at the same time, and after less than half a year he had become so popular with the villagers that the officials of that particular subbranch of the People's Action Party considered that he should become an official of the subbranch too, so that he could help to strengthen the hold of the subbranch on the villagers and increase the influence of the subbranch. He was subsequently elected head of the education and propaganda section of the committee which managed the subbranch.¹⁶

The communists were purged from the People's Action Party in 1961. After that they founded another political party, the Barisan Sosialis. The pattern of activities established by them in the People's Action Party was repeated in the new party.

Political parties were organizations of a general nature. The result was that they did not limit their activities to any one professional group or one special section of the population. The other organizations, like the student bodies, for example, on the other hand, were more narrow in scope, and catered to the interests of only one type of person.

15 Statement of KOO YONG, paras. 52, 53 and 56.

16 Statement of KOO YONG, para. 55.

During the years 1954-66 there were many student organizations, but, as has already been said, the largest was the Singapore Chinese Middle School Students' Union (SCMSSU). This, however, had an existence of only two years, from 1955 to 1956. During the somewhat short span of its life, it carried out a great number of activities and many of them on a very large scale. One of the most characteristic activities it engaged in was to help students in their school lessons. What this organization did was not something new. Earlier in this chapter, mention was made of a student in a certain school being helped by another student to improve his school work. What the union did was to organize the effort on a more systematic basis and on a larger scale. An account of what one of the students could remember about tuition sessions run by the union follows:

In 1956, I was in the Junior Middle Two Class ... during that year I have participated in the Revision Sessions held by the S.C.M.S.S.U. In fact, nearly the whole school student population in the school participated in such sessions conducted by the union. During these sessions, some senior students would help my classmates and I to revise our school lessons Our Revision Sessions were conducted openly twice a week During such sessions, besides teaching us school lessons, the senior students also lectured to us current affairs¹⁷

These tuition classes were popular and possible for two reasons. The first reason was that there were always students who were deficient in one or some of their school subjects. The second reason was that parents would not exercise restraint on their children regarding participation in such activities, since such activities seemed not at all harmful but indeed beneficial to their children.

Next to the political parties and student bodies, the communists sought to expand their influence through trade unions. Demands for better wages and other working conditions were activities which most characterized the

17 Statement of TAN BOON CHAI, para. 6.

trade unions. There was an instance of a union being able to portray itself favourably in the minds of workers it was organized to help. It also was able to go one step further to absorb many of such workers into its membership because it was successful in resolving a dispute between a group of such workers and their employers which took place in 1961. The following was the event:

... "A" said that since the S.C.R.H.E.U. [Singapore Coffeeshop, Restaurant and Hotel Employee's Union] joined us, our prestige had been further enhanced. But he pointed out there were still many restaurant workers who had not joined the union. He suggested that we should avail ourselves of this opportunity to recruit these workers. This, he said, should be done through the "Union Bulletin" of the propaganda and educational section, and the organizing section should mobilize the S.C.R.H.E.U. workers who had just joined the union, to encourage other restaurant workers to join our union

... The organizing section firstly mobilized 6 Diamond Restaurant employees who were formerly S.C.R.H.E.U. members to persuade workers of that restaurant to join our union. Following this we found that the treatment of workers in that restaurant was very poor. Therefore the executive committee ... submitted demands to the Diamond Restaurant for better working conditions After a few negotiations with the management, the dispute was successfully resolved. On account of this victory, workers of other restaurants applied to join our union, thereby increasing the membership by another 300¹⁸

Other than periodically engaging itself in getting better treatment from employers for its members, this union also ran a language class to improve the educational level of workers in the trade. In 1960, this effort, together with other factors, again not only gained friendship for

18 Statement of TAN BANG KIAT, paras. 124-125.

the union but also brought about an almost twofold increase in the membership of the organization.¹⁹

For a while during the time when the communists managed a great number of organizations in Singapore there was one which catered for people living in the rural areas. This organization was called the Singapore Rural Residents' Association. This association was very active among villagers, and the tactics which guided its actions were much the same as those which were explained by the person who became the Secretary of one of the branches of the People's Action Party whose case was mentioned earlier. The association often held training classes for its activists, and in one of the classes the following advice was given to these people on how they should conduct their work:

... mass education was most important. When we visited the villagers to collect monthly subscriptions, we should pay special interest to their personal lives, and the difficulties they met, and we could seize the opportunity to discredit and condemn the government. We should blame the government for not supplying water and light to certain villages for not solving the health problem in the villagers and many other bad living conditions. He asked us to help the villagers in their application for water and light, in building a pig sty, chicken pens and other things²⁰

And the instructions concluded by adding,

... In this way we could win the support of the people and this would enable us to succeed in our struggle.²¹

Like the political parties, the student organizations and the trade unions, these peasant associations also organized educational programmes as an attraction for its

19 Statement of TAN BANG KIAT, paras. 88-91.

20 Statement of CHANG JOO PHONG, para. 9.

21 Ibid.

targets. Thus, it was stated that kindergarten and night classes were organized in one of the offices of the Singapore Rural Residents' Association in the early 1960s. The night classes consisted of the different standards of elementary, intermediate, advanced, cultural I and cultural II. It was said that the purpose of running the kindergarten classes was not so much for the sake of the children but to take advantage of the relationship, established through these classes, between the association and the parents of the children. This was in order to carry out propaganda among these adults to win them over to the side of the association. It was known too that in a cultural class which was held in a different office of the same association, the students were taught current affairs and politics, and learnt how to pick up quarrels with the government.²²

The cultural organizations naturally devoted their attention primarily to cultural activities. It seemed that some of them had at times also engaged in running related activities such as kindergarten, literacy and language classes.²³

Coupled with the welfare activities of the Malayan communist movement in the 1950s and the 1960s were recreational activities. They were as widespread and intensive as the other activities.

As in the case of welfare operations, all the different kinds of organizations engaged in some recreational efforts. The records pertaining to this aspect of the system are, however, scanty, except for the cultural groups. This is not surprising because a main aim of the cultural organizations was to develop recreational enterprises whereas the function of the other organizations was not to concentrate on such recreational activities.

We shall now deal with the part played by the political parties in providing amusement for the masses. In 1955, the

22 Statements of TEO TECK SOON, paras. 42-45; and CHANG JOO PHONG, paras. 7 and 8.

23 Statements of PUNG PEK SONG, para. 19; LIM GUAN TUN, para. 4; and CHNG YONG PAR, paras. 14 and 77.

People's Action Party established a branch in Farrer Park. Immediately after its formation, the branch launched, among other things, a programme to widen its influence over the masses in its neighbourhood and to increase its membership. The recreational activities initiated towards these ends were "... a mouth organ group, [a] choir [and a] dancing group" According to the records, the activities seemed to have been popular.²⁴

It was reported that in 1957, there were also singing and dancing groups in the Church Street branch of the People's Action Party. In 1958, chess games were begun in the Chua Chu Kang office. In 1959 again, a dance group and a badminton team were started in the same place, and in 1960 the sub-branch in Ang Mou Tan Kay sponsored all kinds of sports. It was stated as well that in 1961, the branches of the Barisan Sosialis all practised group singing of leftist songs.²⁵

As to the student organizations, the Singapore Chinese Middle School Students' Union, for example, was in the same way very active in teaching students how to play games and to amuse themselves. Thus a student of the Chung Cheng High School said that in 1956 he participated, among other things, in the collective games organized by the union in the school. Later on he also joined in a picnic which was attended by 300 people. At the picnic, as usual, he said, the group carried out tests on current affairs, sang procommunist songs and played group games.²⁶

As to the efforts of the trade unions in the recreational field, there are statements made that the union of restaurant workers referred to earlier in the discussion of welfare operations managed a choir in 1960. Another union, not mentioned earlier, carried out "activities"²⁷ and sponsored picnics at the seaside. The choir in the former

24 Statement of CHAN CHONG KEEN, paras. 65 and 66.

25 Statements of LEW YONG, para. 4; CHNG YONG PAR, paras. 58 and 75; KOO YOUNG, para. 56; and CHIA YAM FEI, para. 150.

26 Statement of EE CHING SENG, para. 6.

27 Undefined in the original source.

organization was, along with the language class it sponsored, supposed to have gained many friends for, and attracted new members into, the union.²⁸

The peasant associations also sponsored cultural activities. It was reported, for example, that there was a singing group in the Changi/Bedok Branch of the Singapore Rural Residents' Association. This group was popular with the young people in the area, including children, and among the songs they sang were "My Fatherland" and "The Song of the Rubber Estate."²⁹

There is a fair amount of information on the activities of cultural associations especially the old boys' associations. Like in the other organizations, singing and dancing seemed also to be the most popular form of activity sponsored by them. We shall see here what was done in one of these associations, the Chong Cheng Association. The year is 1957.

... at first I became a choir member and later also joined the Dance Section ... choir practices were held in the evening once a week. There were some 40 male and female members The songs sung by the choir were mostly leftist, for example,

[The] Broadway Song
Selling Newspaper Song
Wharf Workers
Songstress under the Iron Hoof
Praising the Yellow River
Our Mother - the Rubber Estate
The Waving Wheat Song
The Mountains Standing on the Clouds

... The dances we learnt were mostly communist dances, such as,

[The] Camp Fire Dance
[The] Chop-Stick Dance
Looking After the Sheep Dance

28 Statements of TAN BANG KIAT, paras. 47 and 88; and LEW YONG, para. 5.

29 Statement of CHANG JOO PHONG, paras. 5 and 6.

Tibetan Dance
 Miao Tribe Wedding Dance
 Bamboo Dance
 Indian Folk Dance
 Snatching the Bride Dance
 Group Dance 30

The association had also an athletics section, but it was not said what kind of athletics was practised.³¹

When the person who narrated this first took part in the activities of this association, he was not yet a member of the association. But friendship with him was established by members of the association through these activities, and he later joined as a member.

Like the organizations in the phase of military struggle, those in the phase of political struggle also utilized propaganda *per se* to approach the masses. This was in fact practised on a very large scale. Such direct propaganda was carried out by the spoken word as well as through the written word. Spoken propaganda was exactly the same as what took place in the welfare and recreational operations of the various types of organizations which have been described. Written propaganda was carried out mainly through the publications of the various organizations. Pamphleteering was also significant.

Most of the organizations in the years following 1954 brought out papers, bulletins, leaflets and books. However, records regarding these are very scanty. What data there are about them concerns only the newspapers or party organs of the political parties, and one or two of the many student bodies. There is also some information on a bulletin of one of the many trade unions. However, the picture of the propaganda effort can be seen clearly enough from just these few fragmentary entries which are available to us.

In 1960 the Partai Rakyat in Singapore brought out a party organ, *Suara Rakyat*. It was a communist, who had

30 Statement of PUNG PEK SONG, paras. 5-8.

31 Statement of PUNG PEK SONG, para. 9.

become a member of the Central Executive Committee of this party, who proposed that such a paper be produced. What was recorded from him about the publication deals with the purpose of its production and its readership. On the purpose of its production, the communist recounted,

In early 1960 at a Party Rakyat Central Executive Committee Meeting, I proposed, ... that in order ... to promote our prestige among the masses and for the convenience of our future development work, it is necessary for us to publish an organ that represents our party³²

The paper was brought out in two languages, Chinese and Malay, and circulated both in Singapore and the Malay Peninsula. Regarding its circulation, the communist said:

As at that time, there was no sale of left-wing Chinese newspaper[s] in the Federation, our "Suara Rakyat" sold well in the Federation. Its main readers were the local leftwing masses The sale of every issue was about 15,000 copies.³³

Judging from what is stated here, the impact of the publication on the readers in the Malay Peninsula was great. But the reaction of the readers in Singapore towards the paper is not mentioned. It could perhaps, however, be assumed that the paper did not do any worse in Singapore than in the Peninsula.

Student publications which were mentioned in the documents were a number called the *Political Science* and another entitled the *University Tribune*. These were papers put out by students of Nanyang University.³⁴

The trade union which produced the bulletin was the same one which has already been mentioned many times earlier, namely the one which consisted of restaurant and

32 Statement of PANG TOON TIN, para. 98.

33 Statement of PANG TOON TIN, para. 101.

34 Statement of CHIA YAM FEI, para. 69.

catering workers. The publication first appeared in 1960. As has already been noted in the discussion of the welfare and recreational operations of the union, the language class and the choir which it sponsored were factors which contributed to an enlargement of its influence and membership. This other factor, the published bulletin, was another reason why the union could appeal to people and attract new members into its fold.³⁵

In the analysis given below, it can be seen that the methods which the Malayan communist movement employed to get to the masses so as to obtain the opportunity to recruit them into the movement were meticulous in detail and painstakingly executed. Thus, the movement, in the first place, made use of relationships which it already had with the masses, or in other words existing friendships, for the purpose; and, in the second place, in the event that there were no such relationships, it would create the required friendships through various means. The different ways of creating friendship were to promote the welfare of, or provide recreation for, the masses. These efforts were often infused with political propaganda. Sometimes the method was straightforward indoctrination in order to sway the masses into accepting communism. It has also been shown that the more organizations the movement had, the easier it would be for it to create friendships.

The means whereby the Malayan communist movement sought to extend its influence were successful to a large degree in achieving its objectives. But they could have produced even greater results if they were not confronted with certain circumstances which exercised an inhibiting influence upon them. The beginning of the armed struggle depleted the reservoir of the movement's manpower in the island due to a large number of personnel being transferred into the jungles in the Peninsula. In January 1950 the Singapore organization was found to consist of only a score of members of the Party and 300 or more of members of the Singapore People's Anti-British League.³⁶ During that month, a directive from higher echelons was sent to the Singapore organization ordering extra effort

35 Statement of TAN BANG KIAT, paras. 88-91.

36 Statement of HO LUNG, para. 119.

to be put into expansion work.³⁷ The order was dutifully complied with. By 1954, when the military struggle came to a close and the political struggle began, the membership of the Party had risen to two hundred or more, a tenfold increase.³⁸ By 1957, when the League was dissolved, this organization was said to have grown to such a size that it consisted of not only all the expected kinds of people from the population, but even some members of a certain religious order.³⁹ Yet, according to a government officer specializing in communist affairs, if something had not happened to the communist setup in Singapore in 1950, the rate of growth of the movement in the island during that period could have been even more impressive. This setback was the fact that the leading organ in the island was destroyed in 1950.

The next phase of the development of the movement witnessed an even greater enlargement of the membership of the movement than in the previous phase. In an unpublished government study, "The Communist Party of Malaya: Organisation in Singapore from 1960 to 1968," it was stated that at the height of the political struggle, which was in 1961, the number of members of the Party had increased to between three and four hundred. Another statement informs that the number of persons involved in the various subordinate organizations of the Party had been augmented to at least more than a hundred thousand.⁴⁰ This demonstrated the extent of success following the persistence of their effort and their skill in mobilization. Yet this achievement pales when compared to what happened previously in the years 1945-48, the time of "peace". During the phase, 1954-66, the communists, though able to operate above ground, could only do so without revealing their true identity, hiding behind the names of organizations belonging to other people, which had a legal status. On the other hand, during the years 1945-48, they themselves enjoyed recognition from the government, with the result that they could go about legally in their own right. Estimates of the numbers

37 Ibid.

38 According to a government specialist on communist affairs.

39 Statement of ANG TUAN KIM.

40 According to the same governmental specialist as cited in footnote 38.

involved in the movement are not available, but it is felt that they were considerably more than a hundred thousand for all the different types of organizations taken together. When they had to hide behind masks, they had to be very cautious in what they did. This acted as a brake on the speed of their movement's progress. Yet at the same time they were able to make considerable headway.

It must be borne in mind that the important fact is that for the Malayan communist movement to flourish it must always have unhindered, direct contact and friendship with the masses. This is of more than ordinary consequence to the movement: it is vital to its system.



III: THE MECHANISM OF ABSORPTION INTO THE MOVEMENT

As indicated earlier, the purpose of exploiting the factor of friendship with the masses was to create the opportunity to fill the movement with the required manpower. In order to be able to understand how manpower was absorbed by the movement, it is necessary to have some prior knowledge of the make-up of the movement. It has already been pointed out that the Malayan communist movement, in so far as Singapore was concerned, was made up of the segments comprising the CPM itself, its satellite and its front organizations. For a proper understanding of the process of absorption into the movement, it is necessary to examine further the internal structure of each of these component parts of the movement.

First, the CPM itself. In the period under review, the highest organ in this body was the Central Committee which took charge of affairs in all Malaya, that is, Singapore and the present Peninsular Malaysia. Below the Central Committee were various State Committees or Town Committees, which had responsibility over the various states and major towns in the country. Subordinate to a State or Town Committee were a number of District Committees. Subordinate to each District Committee were a number of committees, each controlling a number of branches. Finally, subordinate to each branch were a number of cells. Every member of the Party had to belong to one of these organs. If he happened to be the leader or, in communist terminology, central figure of an organ, he would be called Secretary. The term Secretary was used for all organs except the cell. In the case of a cell, he would be simply known as a leader. Anyone who held the rank of a leader of a cell or above would be considered a cadre of the Party. Anyone who did not hold any of such ranks would be considered an ordinary member of the Party. It was mandatory that any person joining the Party serve a period of probation before he would be confirmed in his membership in the Party. During that time he would be called a probationary member of the Party. Under certain circumstances, before a person was admitted into the Party as a probationer, he would be treated as a sympathiser of the Party first.

The only effective satellite organization which the movement had, it will be recalled, during the years of the

movement under survey, was the Singapore People's Anti-British League. The League was organized on the same lines as the Party except that the highest organ it had was only a District Committee and that it did not have probationary members but only sympathisers. The reason for the League not having an organ higher than the District Committee was that the members constituting this committee were at the same time members of the CPM with District Committee rank in that organization. As District Committee members of that organization they came under the control of the Singapore Town Committee. It was through them that the League was directed by the CPM. This connection explains why the League was a satellite body of the Party. The reason that there were no probationers in the League was that this grading was thought to be unnecessary. The steps in the membership structure in Singapore from bottom to top appear to have been sympathiser, full member of the League, cell leader, member of a Branch Committee and member of a District Committee. This was the hierarchy in theory. However, in practical terms, persons who were taken into the League started off as sympathisers, then became ordinary members of the League but never attained any rank higher. If they proved suitable they would be taken directly into the CPM at that stage to become probationary members of that organization. In the discussion that follows only the two ranks of sympathiser and ordinary member will therefore be examined.

In the case of the front organizations, there were some which were large and some which were small. The large ones would each have a central committee, then branch committees, then perhaps also subbranch committees and then ordinary members. The small ones would have first a committee and then ordinary members. Anyone who sat on a committee was regarded as a cadre of the organization. For present purposes, so far as the front organizations were concerned, only the distinction between cadre and noncadre membership need be borne in mind.

At this juncture it would be timely to elaborate upon the idea of absorption. It has been said that absorption could be a long drawn-out process. We should note that the absorption process, as observed from available data covering the period under study, started off first with personal association and initial involvement in the overall movement, followed by subsequent transfers within the framework of the overall organization. What is further implied in this

concept of absorption is primarily the vertical movement of manpower first from the masses into the front organizations, then from the front organizations into the satellite organization and finally from the satellite organization into the CPM. It also includes the same level-by-level upward movement of manpower within the internal structure of each of these types of organizations or segments of the movement. The transfer of manpower from an inferior organization to a superior one could be termed recruitment into that particular superior organization. And upward movement within the internal structure of an organization could be called promotion. We should thus distinguish between recruitment into a body and promotion within that body. In the present discussion, however, regardless of whether it was movement between organizations of differing status or an upward movement within an organization, all movements are brought under the general term of absorption to facilitate analysis. The justification for doing so was that the principles which governed movement of either type, and which will be shown shortly, were no different from one another.

It has just been said that absorption of manpower into the movement, in so far as it is understood to be a transfer of personnel from one segment of the movement into another, was from the masses into a front organization, and from a front organization into the satellite organization, and finally from the satellite organization into the Party. This statement must now be qualified by pointing out that this kind of absorption had occurred occasionally and not all the time. During the phase of military struggle, as has been pointed out in the last chapter, the movement had very few front organizations. In the event when absorption of persons into the movement took place in an environment in which there were no front organizations, then the absorption was straight from the masses into the Singapore People's Anti-British League and then into the Party. In the next place, during the phase of political struggle, as has already been explained, the League was dissolved in 1957. Therefore, during the period from 1957 until 1966, absorption of manpower from a front organization into the Party was direct and did not go through the intermediary stage of a satellite organization. It was in this kind of situation when a person who was to be absorbed into the Party would be treated as a sympathiser of the Party first before he would be treated as a member of the Party on probation.

It has also been indicated that there was a relationship of inferiority and superiority among the three different segments of the movement. It has been said that the front organizations were inferior to the satellite organizations, and the satellite organizations themselves inferior to the Party. It has also been mentioned that the front organizations were less close to the Party than the satellite organizations. The former were also less antagonistic to the established authorities than were the Party itself, the satellite organizations or the armed force of the movement. We shall later in this chapter try to explain why this relationship among the different segments in the movement existed. It will be now useful to review briefly certain concepts to help in the understanding of the problem.

From the moves upward in the communist hierarchical organization it will be seen that this actually comprised a gradation made up of three ladders placed one on top of the other. Within each of these ladders were a number of separate rungs. Upward movement of personnel was guided by certain criteria - the concepts of dedication, character and ability.

Dedication meant different things to the different segments of the movement. In order to understand what this amounted to, it is necessary to know what the CPM set out to do in Malaya. The CPM first aimed to remove the British administration from the country. The removal of the British was only a political change. The communists did not envisage that, during the first stage of political action, they should go further than just this. Consequently, for a time after the British administration had been removed, the economic system in the country would remain the same, that is, a capitalist one. After some time, when the situation warranted it, the communists would seek to replace capitalism with socialism. The socialist system would be allowed to function for a while. Then finally when the communists thought that they were strong enough to do so, with or without force, they would replace socialism with communism. The communist programme of action was thus a three-stage programme.

The front organizations were made up of the nonpolitical bodies (such as the trade unions) and the political parties. Judging by what was written in their constitutions, the nonpolitical bodies were set up for nonpolitical aims, and were not pledged in any way to the

removal of the British administration from the country. They were supposed to work only for the nonpolitical aims to which they were committed and for which they were designed. An example of this is seen in the trade unions seeking the improvement of wages and other working conditions for the workers. Membership in such front organizations as trade unions did not entail any political beliefs or commitments. If there was any political belief, it need only be manifested as a commitment to socialism.

The open political parties, however, were all generally committed to a plan of not only attaining independence for the country but also of substituting the capitalist economic order with a socialist one.

Apparently, dedication to the aims of the movement meant to members of the front organizations, both nonpolitical and political, only a belief in socialism at the most. In other words, to be a member of a front organization, a person had only to be dedicated to the ideals of what noncommunists normally would regard as socialism. He need not believe in communist ideals in this instance.

The Singapore People's Anti-British League by its constitution was to work for only the goal of removing the British administration from Malaya, namely, the minimum target of the programme of action of the CPM. Dedication in the League, therefore, referred only to the removal of the British administration.

The CPM was itself dedicated, of course, to the final aim which it had set for itself, that is, the attainment of a communist state. This was the most important aim, and dedication to it was the *sine qua non*.

The absorption of personnel into the various segments of the movement was done according to these different criteria. Dedication, as defined here, was the first quality a person must possess before he would be taken into the movement.

It has been stated that there was a relationship of inferiority and superiority among the different segments of the movement. From the viewpoint of dedication, this hierarchy of relationships can now clearly be seen to have existed between the nonpolitical bodies of the front organizations, the Singapore People's Anti-British League

and the CPM. There is, however, a problem of distinction between the political parties of the front organizations and the League. The difficulty is that whereas the political parties of the front organizations were dedicated to socialism, the League was dedicated only to recovering sovereignty for the country. However, in spite of this, the League could still be regarded as nearer the Party than the political parties of the front organizations, merely by the fact that the League had been established and was controlled by the Party itself, whereas the political parties of the front organizations had been established by other people and only infiltrated by Party members. From an organizational point of view the League was regarded as superior to the political parties of the front organizations. The League was more a creature of the Party than were the political parties of the front organizations.

Dedication in the CPM itself did not mean only a theoretical subscription to the idea of communism but also a certain manner of behaviour when a person was a member of that Party. In the latter part of 1949, the Party issued a document with the title *Resolutions on Strengthening the Party Nature* [of Members]. Party nature in other words was dedication, and the purpose of issuing the document - at a time when the armed struggle between the communists and the British administration was extremely intense - was to heighten the dedication of members of the Party. According to this document, the dedication of a member of the Party was shown in two sets of behavioural manifestations. In the first place, if he was dedicated he would be loyal to the Party, he would subserve his interests to those of the Party and he would obey the Party absolutely. In the second place, he must continuously seek to improve himself which meant that he must assiduously study the theory of Marxism-Leninism, and accept criticism from others as well as criticize himself for his shortcomings. In short, he must behave as a perfect tool of the Party.

Next to dedication, another aspect of personal qualities which were considered by the manipulators in the absorption process, was character. Due to a lack of Party documents on the point, the concept of character, as defined by the Party, is less clearly seen than the concept of dedication. What follows has been gathered mainly from a reading of the statements of ex-detainees and detainees.

The first aspect of character was trustworthiness or reliability. This requirement seemed not to have been taken in its general meaning, but with reference to the fact that a person absorbed should not be an agent of the government. Character, when defined in this way, merges with dedication. An agent of the government would be the opposite of a person who was dedicated to the Party. Character in the second place was held to mean the lifestyle: whether the person concerned lived a life of propriety or whether he was fond of wine, women and song, or whether or not he was a member of a secret society or was a common criminal, and so on. Thirdly, character would include what might be called a person's "style of behaviour." This term referred to whether a person approached other people on a basis of arrogance or humility, of generosity or harshness, or of honesty or deceit. The concept of character as defined here was applied to all segments of the movement, although with differing degrees of severity.

Another criterion by which a person would be judged acceptable or rejected as insufficient by the communist movement was whether or not he was capable. As in the case with the first aspect of the concept of character, the concept of ability here should not be understood in its general meaning, such as whether a person was naturally intelligent or naturally industrious and so on. Ability here would have to be defined with reference to the specific requirements of the Malayan communist movement. According to a government officer specializing in communist affairs, there were also several components in the concept of ability. In the first place, ability meant vocational skill. The movement was one which involved the masses. The masses came from different walks of life. Therefore, the operators of the movement must themselves have versatility in occupational expertise before they could approach the masses.

Secondly, ability meant being adept in propaganda work. In Chapter II it has been pointed out that when the communist movement attempted to lay a bridge to the masses, it would rely, among other things, on moulding the minds of those who were to be cultivated as friends. The need to establish contact with the masses was urgent because the need to absorb manpower was itself urgent. Therefore skill in disseminating propaganda was regarded as an important skill which an operator should possess.

It has been explained too throughout the last chapter that hand in hand with propaganda efforts, the movement undertook welfare and recreational operations. Such operations required the skill of organization. Organizational skill would be required too in the matter of the absorption of manpower. The deployment and training of manpower would also necessitate organization. In other words, the movement, taken in its entirety, was premised upon organization. If there was no reservoir of organizational skill, the movement would have been impossible.

The last facet of ability was leadership. After manpower had been organized, it had then to be led. Leadership could be exercised in any or all of these fields, namely the administrative, the military and the political. The movement was an establishment, which meant that administration was involved, hence administrative leadership. The movement waged military warfare against the authorities, hence the need for military leadership. The movement needed political direction, hence capability in the field of political leadership was vital.

All three segments of the movement understood the concept of ability in the sense as it is explained here, but their insistence upon this standard as one of the criteria for manpower absorption varied.

Dedication, and, to a lesser extent, character, were qualities which were sought in all the ranks and in all the different segments of the movement. Ability, on the other hand, was important only in so far as the cadres of the different segments were concerned. In other words, dedication was the minimum personality standard required for absorption purposes in the communist movement, character was the intermediate standard, and ability constituted the upper standard. Since there were these different criteria by which manpower would be absorbed by the movement, persons making their way up the hierarchy of the movement would be assessed on their suitability for acceptance at every step of the ladder which they were climbing.

It is now proposed to examine how the absorption of manpower into the communist movement actually took place. It has been stated earlier that the role of the different segments in the process shows that absorption, firstly, was from the masses into a front organization, then from the front organization into the Singapore People's Anti-British League, and finally from the League into the Party.

It could also be a more direct movement from the masses into the League and from the League into the Party. The process could also be from the masses into a front organization and then from the front organization into the Party. The one event which was common to all the three variations of the absorption process was the final movement into the Party. In explaining the actual working of the method, we shall firstly study all the three variations of the process in the order in which they have been described above. We shall also examine the mechanism of the absorption process beyond the point of a person's initial admission into the Party.

From what has been said about the hierarchies in the Malayan communist movement and the criteria by which manpower was absorbed by the movement, it is quite clear that entry into the movement was the easiest via the segment comprising the front organizations. And within this segment itself, the requirements of the nonpolitical bodies were moreover less stringent than those of the political parties. With the front organizations which were of a nonpolitical nature, the practice was practically one of open entry for persons for which the organization was designed. Thus, for example, a tailor could join a tailors' union. He would just have to say that he wished to join the organization and he would be accepted without any trouble, since the union's constitution was drawn up for people like him. In fact, the attitude of such organizations was one of being afraid of people not joining, of anxiety lest the membership was too small. The political parties were a little more selective than the nonpolitical bodies because they had political goals, and only people who were prepared to get involved in politics could be accepted.

In mid-1952, a certain alumni association by the name of Ai Tong planned to hold a concert at the end of that year. For this purpose, it contacted the alumni of the school for help, and in the end persuaded about a hundred of them to render their services. The group held practices. Just before the concert was staged, an official of the association, probably a person belonging to the communist underground who had been responsible for persuading the old students to participate in the show, decided to make one further move in his plan to absorb manpower. He and his assistants talked to the participants of the concert to persuade them to become members of the association. The result of the adventure was that

During the recruitment drive, nearly all the participants in the concert joined the Ai Tong OBA [Old Boys' Association].¹

The association subsequently became one of the most active cultural organizations in Singapore.

Sometime in 1955 a political party, the People's Action Party, planned to form a branch in one of the election wards in Singapore. Recruitment was begun. A certain person desired to become a member. He went to see the officer who was in charge of the office of the party in the said ward, and what took place later, in his own words, was:

When we [he and a friend] arrived, we told "A" [man in charge of the office] that I wanted to join ... "A" then gave me an application form. I filled it on the spot and handed it to him. I also paid \$4 entrance fee. "A" was the recommender in my application to join the party²

The procedure for joining was simple and straightforward. However, this particular person who joined this organization had already earlier shown how he stood politically. Just a while ago, a General Election had been held in the island. The individual in question had helped in the electioneering work of the party in the ward.

After a person had joined a front organization, he could move on to become a cadre or office-bearer of the organization. In order to achieve this, he would have to earn the respect of his fellow-members, or in other words, build up prestige for himself among them so that they could elect him to office. He could build himself up in the required way by showing that he had one or more of the qualifications required for deeper absorption into the movement.

There was the story of a person who joined another cultural organization, the Kong Yong Old Boys' Association

1 Statement of ANG ENG CHONG, paras. 83-85.

2 Statement of CHAN CHONG KEEN, paras. 41-46.

and achieved success:

My activities in the Kong Yong OBA began ... when I enrolled in the Malay class sponsored by its literacy section Simultaneously I ... joined the table tennis team I frequented the O.B.A. premises in the evening, I make many new acquaintances and got along with them. I often borrowed books from its library and slowly became enthusiastic about the activities of the O.B.A. I never missed any opportunity to take part in their occasional gatherings:- General meeting, tea-party, picnic and winter³ campings.

My enthusiasm ... gained me a position in the O.B.A. I was elected a committee member in 1959⁴

What counted in the favour of this man, according to what he himself said, was his "enthusiasm". However, he was also a person who later on became the Secretary of a branch of a political party, namely the Barisan Sosialis, and stood as a candidate in the 1963 General Election on behalf of that party as well. He was a teacher by profession.⁵ Not unexpectedly, the view that a person was capable and able to handle a position of responsibility entrusted to him was more important than the mere fact that he was interested in the office.

In 1959 a General Election was held in Singapore. A person who had joined one of the branches of the People's Action Party was given charge of electioneering work of the party in the constituency covered by the branch. After the election was over, he wished to become the Secretary of the branch. He eventually got what he wanted. He said that

... my manifestations [that is, performance] during electioneering were good and I had a standing among the masses.⁶

3 Meaning end-of-year camps.

4 Statement of CHIA YAM LOONG, paras. 35-38.

5 Statement of CHIA YAM LOONG, paras. 62 and 97-100.

6 Statement of CHIA YAM FEI, paras. 96-98 and 102.

In the context of absorption into a political party, the contrast between this person and the other in the prior example, whose contribution to the same organization was also in electioneering, was that the first person headed all electioneering work whereas the other only assisted in it. This difference could have been due to the fact that at the time when the electioneering work had to be done the person involved was already a member of the party unlike the other. This meant that one had seniority over the other, or it might also have been because the former was more capable than the latter. In fact, the former had been rated by his colleagues as a person who was "capable" and whose "cultural level was comparatively high."

From a nonpolitical front organization or from a political one, a person could be taken into the Singapore People's Anti-British League. An example of absorption into the League was the case of a member of an old boys' association:

... He was then an office-boy in the school. He was unable to continue his secondary education because of his parents' financial difficulty. From our association, I realized that "A" was progressive in his thinking "A" was also in possession of some proscribed books In view of "A's" leftist ideology, I had an interest in him ... he was also very active in the Ai Tong OBA

... I placed "A" under my direction and cultivation I supplied him with Freedom News to read⁷

The qualifications of this person who joined the League were that, firstly, he came from a poor family and was only a school messenger by profession. His proletarian background was in fact an asset, and stood him in good stead in the eyes of the League and the Party. He was already leftist-inclined which would mean that at least he did not entertain friendly feelings towards the British authorities. Finally, he was active in the association which meant that he was prepared to take

7 Statement of ANG ENG CHONG, paras. 65 and 66.

practical action for what he had faith in. His dedication to the ideology of the League was, therefore, not doubted, and he was absorbed. He was made a sympathiser of the League.

Freedom News was a newspaper published by the Town Committee of the CPM in Singapore. Anyone who had become a sympathiser of the League would be given this publication for reading.

The same person a year later made the grade from being a sympathiser to become a full member of the League. He was thus absorbed a step further into the movement "... because of his good manifestation."⁸ However, what this good "manifestation" or performance was, the record does not say. Usually, a sympathiser of the League had to do the minimum of two things: pay his monthly subscriptions to the League regularly and carry out his political studies conscientiously. Beyond that, he could be asked to try to recruit other people to become sympathisers of the League. The person here concerned should have satisfactorily fulfilled at least the minimum requirements imposed upon him. He probably contributed more, in terms of dedication and service, to the old boys' association in which he was active. This kind of voluntary service was looked for in potential full members. All of this further demonstrated his interest in the League and the association.

The next step upwards in the hierarchy of the movement was moving into the CPM. This person also succeeded in taking the step. The League, as we have already noted, was dissolved in 1957. The order was given that when the League was dissolved, those members of the League who were "good" could be absorbed into the Party. This person was one of those who were so treated.

The main point which counted in his favour was that he had absorbed four persons into the League. In a document, his superior praised his achievement in recruiting these subordinates soon after he became a full League member.⁹ This achievement was important if it

8 Statement of ANG ENG CHONG, para. 66.

9 Statement of ANG ENG CHONG, paras. 67 and 68.

is recalled that an obsession of the movement in Singapore was to augment its ranks. The act showed that he could bring about results in his work for the movement, which proved that he had in mind the interest of the movement. Perhaps he was also regarded as able, a virtue which was however not yet expected of him at this stage.

Just before he was actually admitted into the Party, he was told to read up the manifestoes of the Party and a book titled *How to be a Good Communist* written by the Chinese communist leader, Liu Shao-ch'i. The manifestoes enunciated the political programme of the Party. Liu Shao-ch'i's book talked of the necessity of a communist being able to show allegiance to his Party, put his own personal interests behind those of the Party, and accept without any question all instructions from the Party. If he could subscribe to all these, he could thus accept the final goals, besides the intermediate ones, of the Party, and was willing to become an absolute instrument of the Party.

His superior said:

After reading [the texts] he told me that he strongly supported the CPM's cause: he expressed his desire to become a CPM member and pledged that he would be loyal to the Party.¹⁰

He was made a member of the Party on probation.

What has just been described illustrated one variation consisting of the three steps involved in the absorption process: firstly, from masses to front organization, then from front organization to the League which was a satellite organization, and finally from the League into the Party itself. Another variation was to step from masses into the League and then from the League

10 Ibid. The text says that the subject read the publication "Towards the making of a Communist Cadre". This undoubtedly was a mistranslation of *How to be a Good Communist* by Liu Shao-ch'i. It is known in many cases that Liu's book was read by persons who were targeted for absorption into the Party, like in this case, or who were already absorbed and were on probation.

into the Party. This was a two-step process. What follows is an illustration of the two-step mechanism.

In the early 1950s, a certain worker became a member of the League. Half-a-year after that he was told by his superior to maintain regular contact with those of his friends who were of good conduct and progressive thinking and, if possible, introduce them to the Singapore People's Anti-British League.¹¹

The man obeyed the instructions, and what happened later was reported by himself:

... I was helping at the City Council canteen ... I came to know of a colleague called "A". He came from the Federation According to him, his parents were shot by the army while tapping rubber Thus he hated the government and always abused it when talking to us. I felt that he was an ideal object for development. I began to contact him more and more and told him that I was also dissatisfied with the British Government I reported about "A" to "B" [his superior], who said that we could develop him if what he said was true. "B" asked me to understand him further before developing him. After about a month's contact, I found "A" an honest person and I believed that his story was not fabricated ... I asked him whether he would like to join an anti-British organization if there were one in Singapore. He at once replied in the positive¹²

Subject "A" was then introduced to subject "B" who was the superior of the worker who gave the quotation. The purpose of this introduction was to consider subject "A" for absorption into the League.

The important thing to note about this incident was the method used in selecting the target for absorption. He was noticed for his hostility towards the British Government. That identified him as entertaining sentiments

11 Statement of TAN BANG KIAT, para. 10.

12 Statement of TAN BANG KIAT, para. 11.

which were similar to those of the League. This was the first condition that qualified him to be absorbed into the League. Secondly, his feelings were assessed to be genuine before he was actually absorbed. This was to make sure that he was not putting up a pretence and was not an agent of the British Government trying to infiltrate into the League. This part of the assessment pertained to one aspect of the person's character as defined for the purposes of this chapter, that is, freedom from police connections. The recruiter had been told to look out for persons who, besides being "progressive" in thinking, were also of "good conduct." It is almost certain that this person was a man who did not gamble, drink or womanize though the record is silent on these points.

If this example is compared to the previous example of the man who was recruited from an old boys' association into the League, it can be seen that the method used in identifying and assessing a target for absorption was the same in both cases. Only the environment in which the person was chosen was different, one being in a place of work and the other in a front organization.

After a person had become a sympathiser of the Singapore People's Anti-British League, his route to the Party via the League was no different from that of a person who had come through the first, three-step, variation of the absorption process. As this was the case, it is not necessary here to give illustrations of the movement from the grade of a sympathiser to the grade of a member of the League, and from the grade of a member of the League to that of a probationary member of the Party under this variant of the absorption mechanism.

The last variation of the absorption process, the reader will recollect, was movement from the masses into a front organization and from a front organization into the Party. Movement in the initial phase of this variation was exactly the same as movement in the first part of the first variation of the mechanism, illustrations of which have already been given a little earlier. It is therefore also unnecessary to deal further with this question here. However, a demonstration of the movement from a front organization into the Party can be usefully given.

Absorption from a front organization into the Party under the third variation of the absorption mechanism was often immediate, but under certain circumstances, it

might have to be through an intermediate stage comprising that of a sympathiser. There were also some examples of the kind of absorption involving stepping directly from front organizations into the Party. The third variant, involving a longer process, from front organization membership to sympathiser stage of the Party and then on to probationary Party membership, is also known.

A good illustration of a person being made a member on probation by the CPM from a front organization is that of a woman recommended to join the Party by her lover who was a communist. The person who accepted her into the Party was the superior of her lover. Her story was told by this superior:

... she lived in Toa Payoh where she grew vegetables to eke out a living. She participated in the activities of the Toa Payoh PAP branch and was actively engaged in the rural welfare work of the branch. During the 1957 Singapore City Council elections and the 1959 General Elections, she took part in the electioneering activities of the PAP. She also attended the cultural and educational class conducted by the PAP branch.

In 1958, she and "A" were in love and "A" recommended her to be recruited as a probationary member of the CPM. I agreed to this recommendation¹³

The qualifications of the woman were, firstly, her poverty, secondly, her involvement in work beneficial to the movement, and thirdly, her readiness to improve herself by going to adult education classes. Her political nature seemed to be suitably strong.

If this example is compared with that of absorption from the League into the Party, it can be seen that the grounds for absorption in both cases were in substance no different. Criteria for upward movement were essentially similar in these two sets of illustrations cited.

Whether a member of the masses was absorbed into the communist movement from a front organization via a

13 Statement of CHAN HOCK WAH, paras. 197 and 198.

satellite organization, or through a satellite organization, or directly through a front organization, he could, if he was suitable, in the end be drawn into the CPM. After he had been thus drawn into the Party, he would next move upwards within the Party.

The person who was at the bottom of the structure of the Party was the member on probation. While on trial for confirmation of his Party status, such a person would have to prove that he could measure up to the expectations of his superior in three things. These were, in the first place, practical work, secondly, the correction of any personal traits which might be considered to be defects in his character, and, thirdly, political studies.

There was a person who worked in the catering trade. In 1958, he was absorbed into the Party from the Singapore People's Anti-British League as a member on probation. In about the middle of the following year he was confirmed in his party membership. When he was informed of his confirmation, he was at the same time told that

Although I was poor in study, I was leading a simple serious life and had the spirit to work for the mass revolution.¹⁴

What he had been given for his studies, according to himself, were some documents on the subject of Party discipline - they were to teach him how to obey the Party - and the text of a speech by J. Stalin. He had been required to comment on what he had read, but as he said:

Because of my low education level, I could not give any comments properly ... I had used all my energy to read those documents, but still could not understand them.

As can be seen from what his superior said to him on his confirmation, this shortcoming on his part was not held against him. The event demonstrated that intellectual capacity was not yet an attribute of primary importance at this stage of absorption. However, in 1963, when there was a possibility that he would be fielded as a candidate in a coming General Election on behalf of a certain political party, he was instructed not to accept the nomination even

14 Statement of TAN BANG KIAT, para. 58.

if he was chosen because he "was not up to it." At this level, intellectual capacity was deemed to be a matter of consequence. That he led a "simple serious life", on the other hand, put him in the good books of the Party. He was thought of as a person free from indulgence in the pleasures of life. What counted most in his favour, however, was his "spirit to work for the mass revolution." The particular person had been active as an Assistant General Affairs Officer of a union for catering workers, and prior to that he had also been a committee member of another union representing the same profession.¹⁵

The rank senior to the ordinary member in the Party was the cadre. A cadre could be of any grade, but compared with the ordinary member of the Party he was quite a distinct sort of person. In the examples given earlier of cases of absorption from ordinary membership into cadre membership of front organizations, it has been shown that the quality of ability was, among other things, a reason for the absorption. This quality of ability was what distinguished the cadre from the ordinary member whether it be in a front organization or in the Party itself.

Though very loyal to the Party, he cannot go far because he does not have a good knowledge of Communism.¹⁶

The above was a comment made of a member of the Party who was the brother-in-law of one of several top communists in Singapore during the phase of political struggle covered by this study. The first thing to note about this man was that he was very loyal to the Party, which meant that he was very dedicated and the second thing to note was that he had no theoretical knowledge, which meant that he was in a way deficient in ability. This case shows up very clearly the point that all things being equal, it was the Party member who could handle a job with greater expertise who would outpace the other in the absorption process. The person commented upon here was a labourer by profession, and had some experience in fishing. But he had had only

15 Statement of TAN BANG KIAT, paras. 32-35, 47-58 and 302.

16 "Brief Notes on Personalities mentioned in LIM HOCK KOON's statement," No. 159 in LIM HOCK KOON's statement.

a primary education which probably was the reason why he did not have a grasp of the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism and of Mao Tse-tung Thought.

Regarding the problem of those who had more technical knowledge winning the race, the Party itself in fact had made the following admission:

The majority of the ordinary membership of our Party has come from the worker class whereas most of our state committee members and central committee members were originally students. Since the time of the Sixth Enlarged Meeting of our Central Committee which took place in 1939, about sixty per cent of the membership of the various levels of committees have come from the schools.¹⁷

This statement was made in a booklet which was used as a text for the training of members of the movement and which was discovered by the authorities in 1974. The statement, of course, described the situation in all Malaya and not just in Singapore alone.

Finally, there was the question of absorption up the various grades of the cadre rank. In March 1948 the Party issued a document called *Resolutions on the Reorganisation of the Party* which, as its title indicates, laid down the guidelines by which the machinery of the Party was to be overhauled to prepare it for the imminent armed struggle with the British administration.

One of the things dealt with in the circular was the question of the number of years each member of the Party must have had in the Party before he could be absorbed into the different grades of cadreship. The stipulations were given in detail and are reproduced below.

<u>Number of years in the Party</u>	<u>Grade which could be attained</u>
1	Branches Committee (that is, member of a committee overseeing several branches)
3	District Committee member
5	State/Town Committee member
7	Central Committee member

17 In a CPM text used for the training of cadres, *The Building of the Party* (page 12), date and publishers unknown.

The varying requirements for the different grades were to ensure that the movement of personnel was based on the criterion of "manifestations", or performance, which would indicate a person's qualities as compared to those of the other candidates for office.

A young person became a probationary member of the Party in a small town in Johore around September or October 1946. Early the next year he came to Singapore to study in a certain Chinese secondary school. As a result of this change in the place of living, he lost contact with his organization. However, at the end of the year, his relationship with the Party resumed. At the same time he was confirmed in his membership in the organization as well as made a member of the Branches Committee in charge of activities in the school. In mid-1949 he moved up the ranks of this committee to become its central figure. A few months after that, he was further absorbed into an organ which had control over all the Branches Committees in the schools. This organ was called the Student Committee, which clearly had a status equivalent to that of a District Committee. Sometime during the next year he was given the responsibility of editing a publication, *Student News*, which was brought out as the mouthpiece of the student movement. A few months later, he was elevated further in his status by being made the central figure of the Student Committee.

Towards the end of 1950 the communist organization in Singapore consisted of the Town Committee - the so-called leading organ in Singapore referred to in the last chapter - and under it were the Student Committee, the committee in charge of shop assistants and trishaw riders, the committee in charge of rural areas, the committee in charge of the party newspaper and a courier post.

The Town Committee was the overall directing organ, and the subordinate units, that is, the Student Committee and so on, were the machinery which actually handled work in the different areas of activities. Among all these units, the first three, namely, the Student Committee, the committee in charge of shop assistants and trishaw riders, and the committee in charge of rural areas, were the ones which got the manpower or the personnel for the movement. A significant fact about them was that the Student Committee was the strongest of the three, or, in

other words, students formed the majority of the membership in the movement. According to one source, the reason for the predominance of the students was that while the violence of the armed struggle frightened away others, it actually attracted the students into the communist movement.

Before the end of 1950, all the members of the Town Committee were arrested by the authorities with the result that the Student Committee stood out even more clearly, when measured against the other sections, as the vanguard of the movement in Singapore. Then at the end of 1952, the unit responsible for the rural areas was also destroyed, and in mid-1954 that for shop assistants and trishaw riders also came to an end. This man, who headed the Student Committee as its central figure since mid-1950, was arrested in January 1954, but he was succeeded by a subordinate and the unit continued to function. When the phase (1954-66) of political struggle opened, it was the personnel under the Student Committee which made the greatest contribution in the creation of the whole set of front organizations which became the instruments of the struggle and absorption in the new phase.

The development of the student movement in Singapore during the phase of armed struggle is very much intertwined with the political career of this person. From the middle of 1950 until early 1954, when he was arrested, the movement was completely in his hands. The success of this aspect of the movement was a clear indication of the capacity of this communist as a clandestine operator.

From late 1953 until the day of his arrest in early 1954, he also edited *Freedom News*, his predecessor in this post having been transferred from Singapore.¹⁸ The tenacity and skill of this individual is one indication of the level of effectiveness which could ideally be attained in the sifting-out and quality-grading process of absorption.

The system by which absorption of manpower in the Malayan communist movement took place, as explained above,

18 Statements of WONG MAU CHOONG, *passim*; HO LUNG, paras. 121 and 122; TOH CHOON SUI, para. 12; ANG TUAN KIM, page 7; "The Activities of the Malayan Communists in Singapore during the Different Periods after the War," para. 17; and comments on these sources by a government official.

was a clear and straightforward one. Two components of the absorption mechanism need to be brought to mind. On the one hand, there was the structure of the three ladders comprising the three segments of the movement placed one on top of the other. Each ladder was further divided into separate rungs needed in the upward motion of absorption. These steps reflected the hierarchy of the movement. The other component consisted of the different sets of recruitment and assessment criteria, each of which consisted of a number of items, which a person must possess if he were to scale the heights of the hierarchy.

It has been seen that at times people making the ascent need not climb the whole combination of all three ladders, but rather just a combination of the second and the third ladders or a similarly shortened combination of the first and the third ladders. It has also been noticed that for people to become ordinary members of the movement, all that they needed to have was dedication and some measure of character, but for those who aspired to be leaders they had additionally to have ability.

This system of manpower absorption, in the eyes of the communists themselves, had to be a mechanism which ensured that the best available people were taken into the movement. However, the facts of life are that what is hoped for may only sometimes be achieved. The ideal is not always attained. In the Malayan communist movement, as things actually turned out, there were people who made themselves popular amongst others in the movement, but there were also instances of people who failed to evoke such warm feelings among their colleagues.

From early 1954 until the third quarter of 1965, the communist organization in Singapore was under the charge of a man who seemed to be an ideal cadre of the Party. His qualities approximated what was thought to be ideal. The description available about him is brief, but it summarizes the character of the man quite adequately. What was said of him follows:

... [he] came to Indonesia many years ago and had been living the life of an exile going through all sorts of hardships

It was also reported that at the time when he went away to Indonesia from Singapore, he was suffering from tuberculosis. A further description of him was:

... [he] was a man of high learning and was proficient in three languages, namely, Chinese, English and Malay

The result of all of which was that

"A" [a subordinate of his] has a great respect for him.

The man was both dedicated and capable.¹⁹

This kind of person was one sort of cadre the Party had. The Party had also a different sort of member. The subordinate who had great respect for the ideal man described above, was himself, in the words of one of his own subordinates, not quite so good:

... Throughout his underground life so far, I do not think that he has undergone any hardship. His manner and behaviour is more of that of an intellectual or petty bourgeois. Because of his position in the Party, he seemed to make some personal sacrifices such as parting with his wife and child. But deep inside his heart, he was unwilling to depart from them. He likes personal glory and prestige and is very conscious of his position in the organization. He is a bit on the showy side. Thus, he does not command very good respect from the old underground cadres

The man was disliked for his pretensions to being very devoted to the cause of the Party when actually he was not. His hypocrisy was discernible, and he was disliked also for his style of behaviour.²⁰

As the League and the front organizations were but creatures, or minor reflections, of the Party, what could be discovered as strengths or weaknesses in the Party were also mirrored in these subordinate bodies.

With communists as with ordinary beings, it takes all sorts to make the world.

19 Statements of LIM HOCK KOON, paras. 369-372; HO LUNG, para. 125.

20 "Brief Notes on Personalities mentioned in LIM HOCK KOON's Statement," No. 104, and para. 371, both in LIM HOCK KOON's statement.

IV: DEPLOYMENT OF MANPOWER RESOURCES

The purpose of the entire process of absorption by the Malayan communist movement was to utilize manpower optimally. The pattern of such usage or deployment is an issue of consequence to a fuller understanding of the communist movement.

The different uses to which manpower in the movement in Singapore were assigned were both simple and clear. The clue to what these uses were can be seen from what has been said in the previous chapter about the constitution of the organization in Singapore towards the end of 1950. To recapitulate, the organization at that time consisted of a Town Committee, which was in overall control of all activities in the island, and under it a number of units or sections which were each in charge of a separate field of activity. These units or sections were, it will be recalled, a committee which was in charge of student affairs, the Student Committee, a committee in charge of shop assistants and trishaw riders, a committee in charge of the rural areas, a committee in charge of the party newspaper and a courier post. These different units or sections were indicators of the different uses to which manpower in Singapore was harnessed by the movement. Needless to say the Student Committee signified usage in the student field or, in communist terminology itself, the student movement. In similar fashion it can be deduced that manpower was utilized for activities among workers in the city. It was deployed also both amongst workers as well as farmers in the rural areas. For in the rural areas of Singapore were found not only farmers but also workers. Very frequently farmers were part-time workers and workers were part-time farmers. The committee in charge of the party newspaper indicated manpower usage in propaganda work. The courier post indicated usage in communications. These different fields of activity represented the range of utilization into which a member of the Malayan communist movement in Singapore could be fitted.

The departmentalization of the different fields of activity as shown by the units or sections, which were, in fact, mostly committees, immediately under the Town Committee was indicative of only broad categories of usage to which manpower could be committed. These units or sections, except for the courier post, were all of

District Committee rank. If specialization of manpower functions was seen at the level of the District Committee, then at lower levels, namely at the Branches Committee level, there was even greater refinement in specialization of functions.

At one time the Student Committee was known to have its subordinates, that is various lower-level committees and cells, in three secondary boys' and three secondary girls' schools. In such a situation, it is apparent that the first criterion which guided the deployment of a worker for the movement would be the sex of the person in question. Thus, in its simplest form, a girl would be assigned to a girls' school and a boy would be placed in a boys' school.¹

During the early part of 1950 the unit, which was responsible for the labour movement, was not restricted in its power and influence to only shop assistants and trishaw riders. At that time, this unit controlled other categories of workers besides shop assistants and trishaw riders. The other categories of workers enmeshed in its network were reported to be engineering, rubber, and construction workers, carpenters, domestic servants, and persons who made a living with the Harbour Board, the Naval Base and in the military facilities in the Alexandra Road District.² Allocation of personnel to these different areas were based on different considerations.

At the end of 1949, the so-called rural areas were redemarcated as to include Geylang Serai, Jurong and Bukit Timah.³

There were no subdivisions under the committee for the party newspaper or under the courier post. Within the former, however, a distinction could perhaps be made between those persons who could do the intellectual content or literary part of the work and those who performed

1 See the first chart in Appendix I of "The Communist Party of Malaya: Organization in Singapore from 1960 to 1968."

2 Statement of GAN SIEW THAM, page 7.

3 "The Activities of the Malayan Communists in Singapore during the Different Periods after the War," p. 10.

mechanical functions. The intellectual content function would consist of writing editorials, editing and related work, whilst the mechanical part would involve the handling of printing machines, distribution and other chores.

It is to be noted that work in the student, worker or peasant sectors of the movement was regarded as organizational work. This contrasted with work on the party newspaper and work on the courier post which, as has already just been pointed out, were regarded as propaganda work and communications work respectively.

The focus of work in the three fields of students, workers and rural people was on the organization of manpower in these fields for the overall purposes of the movement. This organizational work ranged from befriending people, absorbing them to deploying and training them. It in fact amounted to the mobilization and management of manpower resources for the total aims of the movement.

When the five units or sections under the Town Committee, namely those Party organs for student, worker, rural, propaganda and communications work, were contrasted with one another, the distinction in function and their nature of work could be clearly seen. As just mentioned, the student, worker and rural units or sections concentrated on the organization of manpower, whereas the propaganda and communications units or sections concentrated on their specialized functions of producing Party publications and involving in courier duties. However, in each of the three fields of student, worker and rural activities in which work was regarded as mainly of an organizational nature, there were also some propaganda and communications effort involved. It was said in the unpublished government study, "The Activities of the Malayan Communists in Singapore during the Different Periods after the War," that in mid-1949 the Student Committee had persons who brought out *Student News* for the student movement, and the unit or section in charge of workers also published *Workers' News* for the worker movement. And these two organs, for purposes of communication with the Town Committee and the organs subordinate to them, had also to allocate personnel to become couriers.

In the same way, the organs inferior to those of District Committee rank would also have to engage in activities of all kinds found to be necessary for their purposes. Some of these were on an ad hoc basis.

The different kinds of activity in which the movement was involved in its different fields of operation must be borne in mind when discussing the problem of usage of manpower in the movement.

What has so far been explained about the different ways in which manpower could be employed in the Malayan communist movement was said with reference to only the CPM itself. Besides the question of the deployment of personnel of the Party, there was also the question of the deployment of the personnel of the Singapore People's Anti-British League and the front organizations.

First, the question as regards the League.

The range of activities which were open to the members of the Party were also available to personnel of the League. In connection with this, a distinction again has to be made between those parts of the Party under the Town Committee which engaged in organizational work and those which were responsible for other duties. Those units which did organizational work undertook absorption of personnel into the League from the different fields in which they worked, that is, the students', workers' and rural sectors. Personnel of the League who were thus absorbed into that organization were as a rule deployed in the same places from where they originated. Those parts of the Party which did no organizational work, namely the propaganda unit or section and the courier post, did not undertake the absorption of manpower for the League, but personnel from the League could be assigned to such departments to help them out in their duties, should this be necessary.

The front organizations were infiltrated and controlled or at least influenced by those personnel of the League or those units of the Party which handled organizational work. Consequently, whatever field of activity which these personnel or units could busy themselves with, the front organizations which they created or infiltrated would mirror their activities. Unlike personnel from the League, a satellite organization, no one from the front organizations could be assigned to help in the propaganda or other organs of the Party because members of the front organizations were exposed persons whereas offices of the Party were all underground.

Concerning the question of the utilization of the front organizations, during the phase of political struggle

covered by this study, their scope was actually wider than that of the League or the Party. The League or the Party was confined to only the student movement, the workers' movement and the peasants' movement. However, judging from the data given in Appendix B in this study, the front organizations covered not only these fields but also included political parties, cultural organizations, hawkers' unions and a women's federation. Hawkers' unions, like student, worker or peasant organizations, covered only one occupational group in society, but the others were "umbrella" or comprehensive bodies. It can be seen that, as far as deployment went, the front organizations offered the movement a wide margin for manoeuvre.

The description given concerns the different ways in which manpower in the Malayan communist movement could be utilized. This was one aspect of the problem. Another aspect could best be put in a question. Given these different opportunities of deployment, what were the qualities which the manpower to be deployed must possess before it could be exploited? In this case, as in the case with the problem of absorption, the qualifications which were counted were dedication, character and ability.

The concept of dedication, it might be repeated, meant different things to different segments of the movement. However, regardless of what its actual content was to different kinds of operators, in so far as the way it was understood in each of the different segments was concerned, all the different kinds of operators must possess it before they could be entrusted with any appointment. The crux of the matter can be put simply and pragmatically. If a person commissioned to any assignment was not working towards the goal of the assignment, then what was the purpose of giving him the assignment? Consequently, dedication was an assumed factor in any appointee to an office when he was given the office.

Again, the factor of character in the case of deployment, as in the case of absorption, was a problem which would be attended to in the use of personnel after the question of dedication had been decided. Whether or not a person lived an acceptable way of life and whether or not he would make friends with other people or alienate them was something of importance especially when the person in question had to work in an organizational rather than in a nonorganizational capacity. In activities, which were of an organizational nature, he would have to

deal with people, and what people thought of him and how people would react to him had therefore a vital bearing upon the success or failure of his work.

Available evidence shows that in the assessment of dedication and character a thorough review of a person's quality in these respects was undertaken. Consideration would be given to reports on his past record in these respects.

After the dedication and character of a person had been assessed as satisfactory, the next attribute which would be looked for in a prospective candidate for office would be his ability. All the different aspects of this factor were of relevance to the problem of deployment. There appeared some kind of systematic examination or even formal meetings in the assessment of a person. The superior recommending a subordinate for deployment would sometimes have to put in a report. The person would first of all be examined on what vocational skills he had. This would determine whether he was suitable for the student movement, the workers' movement or some other movement. Secondly, he would be assessed as to whether he should be told to organize or to indoctrinate people. Thirdly, a decision would have to be made as to what level of responsibility he should be entrusted with in his duties or, in other words, how senior a placing he ought to be given.

Any act of assigning a person to a particular piece of work resulted from a consideration of what the needs of the movement were and whether or not the particular person who was assigned was in a position to fulfil those needs. In general, this constituted in fact a logical review of the movement's needs and the ability of any particular person to meet the needs of the movement in any particular aspect or aspects of its activities.

The description given above examines the general principles which governed the usage of manpower in the Malayan communist movement. It will now be shown how these principles were implemented in practice. The illustrations which follow will help to give a clearer picture of this. A word, however, has to be said about these examples. With regard to the factors of dedication and character, no instances are discoverable about them in so far as they applied to the front organizations and the Singapore People's Anti-British League. There are,

however, some instances of the assessment of dedication and character as they related to the CPM itself.⁴ With the third factor, ability, on the other hand, illustrations can be collected from all the three segments of the Malayan communist movement.

In mid-1959 the CPM in Singapore wanted to deploy a cadre to be cast in the role of a businessman. This person was envisaged

to lie low indefinitely among the higher strata of society ... [which] was a long term plan

... and the Party would have use [of him] one day.

In order that he could really get into the rich man's group and be acceptable as a member of the affluent social strata,

... [he] should also join some clan association where many Chinese businessmen frequented. In this way [he] could be accepted as one of them

In accordance with this plan, this man subsequently started a business with a capital of \$30,000, and after half a year he reported to his superior that

I was doing fairly well in my business

Later on, he did even better, and after some ten years in the new profession, he was found to be travelling quite often around the Malay Archipelago which indicated that he had already succeeded in building up some sort of small business empire, with its accompanying network of social links and business contacts, which would be useful in any case for the movement.

The danger of assigning any person to such a kind of mission was that after he had become successful in his new line, he could forget all about what he was really supposed to be there for. In fact, generally, the danger to the movement's aim increased in proportion to the increase in wealth of a person given such an assignment. When his

4 Some examples of these will be given later in this chapter

superior first delegated the man to go into his new "tempting" job, he had based his judgement on the fact that the man had originally come from a well-to-do family but had for the sake of his politics gone underground since 1953 and had lived a life of poverty and austerity instead of enjoying the various pleasures befitting a person of circumstances. It had also been recorded that quite frequently, he had helped his organization with financial contributions from his family funds.⁵ This man was chosen by his superior for the tricky assignment apparently because he was counted upon to be able to remember that a good member of the Party must always subserve his personal interests to those of the Party.

That a person was able to put the interests of the Party before his personal interests was a measure of the extent of his dedication to the cause of the Party. As in certain types of appointment the question of the degree of dedication of the appointees had to be carefully assessed and taken into account, so also in some other types of appointment, the problem of the character of those who were to fill up the vacancies commanded special attention.

During what was known to the communists themselves as "the years of peace," the period 1945-48, there was a movement to organize not only people from the more ordinary kinds of profession in society but also "public women" for the purpose of agitation against the government. According to one government source, who had personal knowledge of this incident, members of the Party who were deployed to work in this field were first assessed to be persons who had strong will power and were deemed unlikely to fall to material temptations before they were sent. It seemed that many of the operators turned out to be true to what was expected of them.⁶

5. Statement of CHAN YEAN FOCK, paras. 3-6, 103-107 and 128-134; and oral communications from governmental experts.

6. This illustration of the problem of character has been taken from evidence accrued in the period 1945-48. The reason for using this evidence is that in the years subsequent to 1948, data on work on "public women" does not appear to be forthcoming. However, manoeuvres of such a nature could possibly be a feature of communist activity in the future. The use of the above example is to demonstrate the manner in which various duties were allotted to operators in the movement.

Compared to dedication and character, the ability of the person concerned, as a factor influencing communist decision on manpower deployment, is mentioned much more frequently in the data available. This was so because dedication and character were, at this stage of the process, as a rule, questions which were usually already settled in the minds of the superiors, and were, therefore, rarely raised as fundamental problems. The ability of a person, however, was not taken for granted—hence its frequent mention in the documentary evidence made available for this study.

In so far as ability was relevant to the pattern of deployment, primarily, the aspect of personal ability which appeared to be given attention in assessments was the vocational skill of a candidate for office at this stage. The factors of dedication and character were first examined and approved, before a person came up for assessment on vocational skill. If the person had such skills suitable for use in the students' field, he would be deployed in the students' field. Similarly, if he had skills needed in the workers' field, he would be deployed in that sector, and if he had any skill relevant to any other field, he would be deployed in the optimal manner.

The utilization of manpower in the front organizations in accordance with the criterion of vocational skill can clearly be seen from the way these bodies were organized. Appendix B shows that these organizations, excluding the political parties for the moment, were made up of such types as student societies, trade unions, cultural associations, peasant unions, hawkers' unions and a women's federation. Any member of the front who had expertise in student affairs would be put in a student society and not in any other body, one who had familiarity with the conditions and aspirations of workers would be deployed in a trade union, and so on. The personnel who made up the membership of each of these various types of functionally specialized organizations were, in fact, members of the various professions, vocations or social groupings for which these different types of bodies were designed to represent. Thus, ultimately, the fact was that personnel were deployed in their own fields of knowledge or in the aspects of the movement directly related to their own social background.

The political parties were not organizations of a specialized nature in the sense that they embraced the entire spectrum of society, whereas a trade union catered

only to workers. The political parties had interests covering all fields. More often than not, their membership comprised the agglomeration of the recruitment of the different types of organizations such as student and trade unions. In the sense that the membership of a political party was derived from the memberships of the other different specialized types of organizations, it can be said conversely that the particular political party concerned deployed its personnel in the different professions or social groups in society on the basis of vocational skill.

In 1954 a certain building construction worker joined the Commercial and Industrial Old Boys' Association, a cultural organization. He had no particular cultural achievement or skill, and he joined the organization only because he was interested in cultural activities. Two years later, however, he moved off to join a union which was meant for building construction workers. In this new field, he had much to contribute as he was a member of the building construction trade. He subsequently rose to become at one time the General Affairs Officer of the union and at another time, its Vice-Chairman. This person's experience in the building trade made him of greater relevance to trade union work than to cultural work.⁷

What held good for a front organization applied equally so for the Singapore People's Anti-British League.

Early in 1949 a person of working class origin was absorbed by the Singapore People's Anti-British League. About a year later he was posted to a unit of the League, the duty of which was to carry out activities in factories, shops and other production centres as well as in trade unions. The unit was also interested in infiltrating the government's Police Department. This person had a work record relevant to the needs of such a unit of the League. When he was a boy he had helped his father in hawking roasted cuttle-fish, when he was older he became a trishaw rider, and when he was in his twenties, he had made his living by working in a rubber or some other kind of factory. His experience in the labour field was thus regarded as extensive.⁸

7 Statement of TNG YOONG CHIAW, paras. 8-13 and 29-38.

8 Statement of ANG TUAN KIM, pp. 2-8 and 11-12.

It has been said earlier in the chapter that at one time the unit or section under the Singapore Town Committee which was in charge of labour affairs had spread its reach to shop assistants, trishaw riders, engineering workers, rubber workers, construction workers, carpenters, domestic servants and persons who worked in the Harbour Board, the Naval Base and in the Alexandra Road District. Sometime very early in 1950 this unit or section held a meeting to decide on the method of assigning the different groups of activities to the charge of the different officials who were members of the unit or section. A man who also played a part in the Student Committee was told to be responsible for shop assistants. According to one source of information, this man was an assistant to his father in the latter's shop. Therefore, he had a good knowledge of the conditions of shop assistants.⁹ This was allocation of work within the Party again on the basis of professional expertise and personal working experience.

After a person had been allocated a specified area of activity on the basis of his vocational ability, he would next be assessed on his ability (or lack of) in organizational or propaganda duties in this area of activity. This decision would be made in accordance with the judgement of his flair or competence in organizational or in propaganda work.

There was an organization called "Restaurants, Bars, Eating and Coffeeshop Employees' Union" in Singapore in the late 1950s. This union represented workers in the catering trade. On one occasion an election of office-bearers of the unions was to be held. A certain canteen worker was approached by two of the serving officials of the union to become a committee member. After some initial hesitation the person accepted the offer. Subsequently, he was elected the Assistant General Affairs Officer of the organization. In later years, he also served as a General Affairs Officer and as Chairman. The duties of an Assistant General Affairs Officer or a General Affairs Officer was to manage organization and administration. When this particular person was requested to become an Assistant General Affairs Officer, the man who invited him had told him that

⁹ Statement of GAN SIEW THAM, pp. 6 and 7. Also oral communication from a government officer.

... they could not find anyone more suitable than myself [for the post].

Perhaps the quality which stood out in this person was his willingness to work. He probably could run about a great deal without making any complaints. Besides, he had actual experience in the catering trade.

Before he was elected to the leadership of this particular union, he had already been once elected to the executive committee of a similar union for the same trade. By then he had already made a name for himself among workers of his kind. Thus he had already established for himself a reputation for having the desired qualifications.¹⁰

Among the front organizations, the old boys' associations and other cultural bodies were instruments which specialized in propaganda. As has been explained in the chapter on friendship in this study, the vehicles for their efforts were music, dances and other cultural or literary activities. Many of the people who became members of these bodies were only learners in these arts but others were teachers or experienced practitioners of these art forms.

There was an "assistant," probably a general helper, of a newspaper who had joined one of the old boys' associations, the Ai Tong Old Boys' Association, in 1952. He was said to be "very fond of music, and was able to play all kinds of Chinese instruments." He went on to become responsible for the recreation section of the association, and one of its most important leaders. Through his work in this association he made himself so prominent in his propaganda activities that later he was selected to take charge of all music activities for a political party, the Barisan Sosialis.¹¹

The requirements of a political party were generally higher than those of the other front organizations. It has been said that the Barisan Sosialis made its appearance in 1961. It established many branches throughout the island. In one of these branches, a teacher was chosen to become the Secretary. A Secretary was a General Affairs Officer with responsibility over organizational and administrative matters of the branch.

¹⁰ Statement of TAN BANG KIAT, paras. 27-53.

¹¹ Statement of ANG ENG CHONG, paras. 83-89; and CHIA YAM FEI, paras. 150-152.

Prior to taking up duties in the Barisan Sosialis, this person had been the General Affairs Officer of an old boys' association. He was appointed to the office of General Affairs Officer of the old boys' association early in 1961, and for two years prior he was head of the literary section of the association. In recalling his activities in the association this person did not say much about his contributions to the association, but it seems that he did enough there to interest other people to make him an important official of a branch of a political party. One other thing which qualified him for the appointment in the political party was, in his own words,

... the ... experience which I had from the O.B.A. also helped me to a certain extent in the organization of certain activities in the Barisan Sosialis.

Experience, especially in this case organizing experience, was a valuable asset in any person assessed by the movement.¹²

While the above person was made the Secretary of a branch of a political party, another person, a little later, who also held the same position in another branch of the same party, was invited to take control of all propaganda and educational activities for the whole party at headquarters level. Education was considered an aspect of propaganda. He was offered the post because

... I [that was the man] was most suitable [for the assignment] in all respects.

He was viewed in such light as against other cadres of the party. A review of his past activities and achievements had singled him out from other candidates.

Thus this man had made his impression upon his friends while he also held the position of Secretary of a branch of the People's Action Party before the middle of 1961 in the same geographical area now covered by the Barisan Sosialis branch. It was in the middle of 1961 when the communists and procommunists left the People's Action Party to form the Barisan Sosialis that he left together with them

12 Statement of CHIA YAM LOONG, paras. 35-67.

and joined the new party. While he was an official of the People's Action Party, he had sponsored substantial literacy and educational activities in the branch for which he was responsible. This had attracted the people in the area to the branch. He seemed to have also achieved results in the branch in the indoctrination of the other cadres who were subordinate to him in rank. He was therefore a proven propaganda man.¹³

The apparent manner in which organizational or propaganda assignments were decided upon in the front organizations was followed by the Singapore People's Anti-British League and the Party as well. In 1950 representatives of the League in six secondary schools instituted the practice of calling what was known as Joint Meetings every month among themselves. The purpose of these meetings, according to one written source, was to make counter moves against another organization called the Overseas Chinese Youth Corps which was also active among students and which was encouraging them to return to mainland China.

The representatives of the Joint Meetings were divided into two sections, one being responsible for liaison in the schools and the other to engage in educational work and propaganda. The education and propaganda section was to bring out publications. The head of this section, according to another written report, was the "best writer" among all the subordinates of the central figure of the Student Committee at the time. It was known that the head of the liaison section was also competent in writing and speaking but compared to the educational and propaganda head he was not as good. The other man was therefore assigned an educational and propaganda role while he was assigned organizational duties, liaison work being classified as organizational work.¹⁴

Twice before, reference has been made to the unit or section under the Singapore Town Committee which, in early 1950, carried out activities among a broad range of people who can be classified as being workers. This

13 Statement of CHIA YAM FEI, paras. 101-104 and 137-156.

14 Statements of LIM SWEE GOR, paras. 10-13; WONG MAU CHOONG, para. 24; and personal communication from a governmental official specializing in communist affairs.

unit or section was actually called the Trade Committee. The representative from the Town Committee who supervised the operations of this committee at the time was a woman. The main purpose of the Trade Committee was to get workers organized for the purposes of the movement. According to one source, the woman was delegated this duty because she had considerable experience in organizational work. During the time when the Japanese were in Malaya, she was active in the mass movement. The mass movement was a general description of the student, workers' and other similar movements taken together. However, the details about her life during the war years cannot be ascertained. Other than acting as the supervising authority of the Trade Committee, this woman also officiated in the capacity of a member of the committee in charge of domestic servants.¹⁵

It has also been stated that there was a unit under the Singapore Town Committee which published a party newspaper. This paper was called *Freedom News*. Before 1951, this publication was brought out in both Chinese and English language versions, but apparently in 1951 the English version came to an end. The Chinese version, however, lasted until 1957.

In the previous chapter an example has been given of a man who probably could be regarded as an ideal cadre of the CPM. He was dedicated, of suitable character and technically efficient. Before this man became the head of all the communists in Singapore, he worked at different times as the editor of both the Chinese and English versions of *Freedom News*. It has already been pointed out that he was a well-read, well-informed person who knew three languages, Chinese, English and Malay. There was another facet to him, which qualified this person to be a propaganda man for the movement in Singapore. Before 1948 he had worked as a translator in a major Chinese newspaper in the city. He was therefore considered to be experienced in journalism.

He edited the English version of *Freedom News* during the time it was being published, and the Chinese version in 1951-53.¹⁶

15 Statement of GAN SIEW THAM, passim. Also comments by a government officer.

16 Statements of WONG MAU CHOONG, paras. 42-48; HO LUNG, para. 125. Also comments by governmental experts.

One final criterion which was used to judge a man's ability for purposes of deployment was whether the person concerned should be given heavier or lighter responsibility for the kind of work which he was assigned to do. If a more favourable view was taken of him, then he would be held more accountable for what he did. And if a less favourable view was taken of him, then he would not be blamed so much if things went wrong.

Earlier, the example of a catering service worker who was elected to become the Assistant General Affairs Officer of a union which represented his class of workers has been mentioned. Several years later, this person was also elected to become a member of the council of an organization which represented all extremist workers in Singapore working against moderate political parties. On being given this appointment, a friend of his who had great influence over him advised him to give up the job. The man, recalling the incident, said,

He [my friend] objected to my serving on the ... Council for fear that my knowledge, experience and ability were not good enough

This man, however, did not in the end resign from his post because there was a shortage of manpower on the council of the organization. His continuation in office, nevertheless, did not invalidate the principle that only certain persons were fit for certain jobs. Thus in instances where there was a lack of personnel of suitable calibre, the standards were lowered, albeit reluctantly.¹⁷

In the discussion of problems concerning the Singapore People's Anti-British League, the present study is concerned with only matters pertaining to the ranks of the sympathiser and ordinary member of the organization. As explained earlier, a person who had become a full member of the League and who was of suitable calibre would be absorbed straight into the Party. It is thus useful to remember that the League can be seen, as previously implied in the chapter on absorption, as a screening and training ground for the Party. Hence, the question of the degree of responsibility to which League personnel should be held for the kinds of operations they undertook, or in other words, the question of their promotion or otherwise, did not arise. In short, within the League there was no

¹⁷ Statement of TANG BANG KIAT, paras. 227. and 262.

question of promotion inside it except the elementary move from sympathiser to ordinary League member.

Regarding the degree of responsibility to be attached to individual office holders in the Party, however, there was a relevant account arising from events in October 1956 and September 1957 when the Malayan communist movement in Singapore precipitated head-on collisions with the authorities. This resulted in a great number of members of the movement being arrested. The losses cut deeply into the vitals of the movement. To regain strength, the movement had to do a considerable amount of basic work of absorption and deployment all over again. The CPM later assessed the blunders committed as being the result of what it termed "left-wing adventurism". The defeats were regarded as the responsibility of one man who had directed operations on the ground in Singapore since the beginning of 1954. After he was found to be thus wanting, the man responsible for the heavy losses was replaced as chief operator in Singapore by a friend of his. However, the person replaced was not reduced in rank in the Party or expelled from it. His mistakes were not deemed serious enough to warrant any other form of punishment except that of being relieved of his duties. He was probably sent away on other less responsible assignments. His dedication and character were unquestioned. It was his decision-making ability that was considered to be defective.¹⁸

From the examples given of the different ways in which manpower in the Malayan communist movement was utilized on the basis of different aptitudes, it should not be assumed that in operations each working individual was regarded as having only one kind of competence and consequently could be deployed in only one capacity. The fact was that very frequently, there were people who were good in many things at the same time. This fact was well recognized in the movement. When there were such people, the movement would at different times or at the same time make different demands on them. An outstanding instance

18 The case of WONG MENG KEONG. He was replaced by FONG CHONG PIK. The fact about the change in command has been gathered from a reading of the statements of LIM SWEE GOR, LIM SECK KIAN and LIM HUAN BOON, and "The Activities of the Malayan Communists in Singapore during the Different Periods after the War."

of such a situation was the example cited in the previous chapter which illustrates absorption from the ordinary ranks of the CPM to cadre rank. (See Chapter III footnote 18). It will be remembered that the person mentioned has had intimate knowledge of student affairs, that he engaged himself in organizational duties in the student movement, and that later he had become responsible not only for producing the newspaper of the student movement but eventually also the newspaper of the Party. At the time when he was arrested he was leader of the student movement as well as head of the propaganda machine. This is a prime example of a person with diverse abilities being given a number of different posts of responsibility in the movement.

In sum, the Malayan communist movement in Singapore, like any other type of movement or organization, always sought the best use of its manpower. In this it tried in every case to match each of its different types of need with the most relevant and suitable kind of personnel that it could mobilize and hold available for deployment.

In the previous chapter, the structure of the movement was looked at from a vertical or hierarchical point of view. For the purposes of the problem of the deployment of manpower, however, this structure will more fruitfully be seen in its horizontal or departmental aspect. This latter aspect of the structure indicated what the needs of the movement were. Generally speaking, the major needs of the Malayan communist movement in Singapore, as suggested by the previous discussion, were in the fields of organization and propaganda.

The qualities of person, which were of relevance to the deployment question were again dedication, character and ability. Ability seemed to be the most critical in the viewpoint of a person's superior. The attention of superiors was mostly focused on ability when assigning subordinates to various appointments. This appears clearly from the available records on this aspect of the problem.

It is intended now to assess briefly the extent to which the principles of deployment were successfully applied. Although the ideal of the movement, in so far as the deployment problem went, was to have always the square peg in the square hole, yet things did not always work out in the desired way. The records show that the mechanism never operated with maximum efficiency, despite the painstaking manner of its functioning.

A good case of a right man being put in the right place was the person who was assigned to work in the student movement and who subsequently came to lead the movement. The success he achieved proved the soundness of the judgement of the superior or superiors who decided his role for him.

On the other hand, examples of wrong or faulty appointments and decisions can also be easily found. The account of the person who brought disasters upon the movement in 1956 and 1957 and his being replaced by a friend in his job has just been mentioned. What happened to his friend who took over his duties from him afterwards was that the friend met with even worse defeats than he did. It was under the stewardship of the new man that the communists in Singapore parted company with the People's Action Party. One expert opinion was of the view that he should not have split with the People's Action Party. In his opinion, the man had made the wrong decision because he did not have enough combat experience as in the case of a communist who had gone through the Japanese occupation would have had. And, besides, he had not done enough reading of the writings of the classical writers of the communist ideology. In other words, he was not yet "sharpened" enough for the big task he handled. For the Party to have entrusted him with such a heavy responsibility was indeed putting the wrong man to the wrong use.¹⁹

Like any other organization, the Malayan communist movement sometimes achieved success but at other times met with failure. It met with failure despite its meticulous methods and painstaking approach in the deployment of its manpower.

19 Verbal comments on the case of FONG CHONG PIK by a government official.

V: THE TRAINING PROCESS OF THE MOVEMENT

Manpower, in order that it should yield maximum utility, has to be trained. Training in the Malayan communist movement was undertaken on a systematic basis.

In dealing with the absorption process it was described how a member could advance in the structure of the movement. The advance took a number of steps. As the person progressed he would be subjected to training at each step. Training was a prerequisite for each stage of absorption. The training scheme in the movement followed closely its ladder structure.

That members of the movement were given training was only one aspect of the problem of training. Another aspect of the problem was the content of the training to be given to the members of the movement. It has been explained both in the chapter on absorption and the chapter on deployment that the standards for judging people in the movement were dedication, character and ability. These three were qualities which the movement hoped to find in its personnel. Since these were what would make an operator "good" or acceptable in the eyes of the movement, they were also the qualities which the movement taught him to cultivate.

For the purpose of developing the dedication of members of the movement, the system of thinking or philosophy known as Marxism-Leninism, that is, communism, was inevitably transmitted, regardless of whether this was done in the front organizations, the Singapore People's Anti-British League or the CPM itself. It has been stated in the chapter on absorption that the different segments of the movement worked towards different tactical goals. The aim of teaching communism to both the front organizations and the League besides the Party was, of course, to persuade members of those two segments of the movement to come round to accepting the final strategic objectives of the movement, besides the immediate or the intermediate aims to which they had already subscribed. If such members of the movement could be so persuaded to accept the ultimate goals of communism, through indoctrination or training in Marxist-Leninist thought, they could then be made members of the Party itself besides being respectively members of the other two segments of the movement.

Regarding the question of what was taught to inculcate dedication of personnel in the different segments of the movement, invariably the message that came through was communism. This was regardless of whichever segment of the movement was concerned. However, a distinction was made as to which segment of the movement would be allowed to have access to materials of a general nature, which segment could be given data of a more confidential type, and which segment was to have the privilege of reading what might be regarded as the "innermost" thinking of the movement. To give an example of this differentiation, a student in, say, a school debating society could be given the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* to read but not *Freedom News* which was the official newspaper of the Party in Singapore. Someone connected with the League, on the other hand, would be permitted to have copies of the *Freedom News* but not *Resolutions on the Strengthening of the Party Nature [of Members]*. The latter was a Party document. Only a member of the Party could be included in the distribution list for the *Resolutions*.

Communism to the CPM was considered to include not only the enunciations of the so-called classical thinkers of the ideology, but also the application of this ideology and its further development in the Malayan situation. It was considered essential for a member to get deeper and deeper into the organization of the movement before he could be allowed to know more and more about such extensions of the ideology in the local setting. Commitment and access to privileged knowledge thus went hand-in-hand.

Regarding the qualities of character and ability, it has been explained in the chapter on absorption that they were given a uniform interpretation in all the different segments in the movement. The inculcation of these two qualities of character and ability did not, therefore, involve all the refinements and subtleties seen in the teaching of dedication. In dedication, there were multiple implications such as that involving the ousting of the colonial power, and a firm belief in and implementation of socialism, followed by communism.

Next to the question of what to teach in the problem of training was the question of how to teach. The answer to this other question concerning methods of training was a multiple one.

In Chapter III it has been said that to the CPM, among the many aspects and refinements of the idea of dedication, one that was clearly recognized was the acquisition of a knowledge of Marxism-Leninism. The other aspect of importance was the ability to accept criticism from others as well as to practise self-criticism of one's own shortcomings. These two vital aspects of dedication indicated the two ways in which training was conducted for members of the Malayan communist movement.

The acquisition of the required knowledge of Marxism-Leninism was gained through a planned process of learning. This aspect of the training process involved a leader leading a small group or cell, or even tutoring only one pupil, or a teacher giving class-like lessons in a more normal fashion. The reading of books and other materials, discussion, written work and the other activities normally associated with the teacher-student relationship were also adopted. The communists had a special name for this method of learning or technique of training, and it was *hsüeh-hsih*. *Hsüeh-hsih* simply meant study.

The method of criticism and self-criticism as a feature of training was unique to the communist organization. What it amounted to was simply trying to find fault with a person all the time. Actions, statements, and even personal attitudes were brought up for critical examination. However, the aim of such an act was not to condemn the person, but to bring him to a suitable frame of mind, whereby he would willingly and continuously upgrade his standard of work. This technique of training ran parallel to the technique of *hsüeh-hsih*.

According to available evidence, *hsüeh-hsih* was practised without exception by all the different segments of the movement. Criticism and self-criticism, on the other hand, were apparently to be found in use in only some of the front organizations. It is important to note that these were habitually carried out in the Singapore People's Anti-British League and the Party itself.

There was yet a third way in which the quality of the personnel in the different organizations of the movement was improved. This was what was called the rectification programme or movement. A rectification movement, unlike *hsüeh-hsih*, and criticism and self-criticism, which were routine occurrences, was conducted only on occasions

that warranted its use. It was something in the nature of a campaign. It would be initiated only when some fault or faults were found to prevail among the whole membership of an organization concerned, and its purpose was to correct this fault or faults. When a rectification campaign was launched it would be conducted as a combination of *hsüeh-hsih*, criticism and self-criticism, and would focus on the particular fault or faults which were to be highlighted and then eradicated.

During the period 1948-66, rectification movements, like criticism and self-criticism, were practised only among a few of the front organizations, but were mandatory in the Party.

Hsüeh-hsih, criticism and self-criticism, and rectification movements were the media whereby ideas and thinking which had to be brought home to the members of the movement were transmitted.

There was another question of the manner in which *hsüeh-hsih*, criticism and self-criticism, and rectification programmes were to be organized. This was a question of the organization of the teaching method. The solutions worked out were different for the front organizations on the one hand, and the League and the Party on the other.

First, the case of the front organizations in this aspect of the training process. So far as training in the front organizations went, it has to be understood, in the first place, that it was differently conducted for the ordinary members of the organizations on the one hand and for the cadres on the other. Obviously, the dividing line between the two kinds of training was that one was meant for a lower level of personnel and the other aimed at a higher level.

The "situations," as revealed by the sources which have been consulted for this study, in which training was given to the ordinary membership of the front organizations were of two types. The first type was the cell, or the study group based on larger numbers than the cell, and the second was study in a class which was the biggest kind of groups in this context.

In the case of training for cadres, the data available for use also shows two forms. These were the individual contact or personal tutorship and the study as a class.

It stands to reason that whatever ways were used to collect the ordinary members of the front organizations together for the purposes of indoctrination could also be used to bring together the cadres for the same purposes, such as the use of the cell method, but available evidence does not yield examples to illustrate this point.

It has been already noted also that there were differences in size among the various study groups or classes and other modes of educational grouping. Some involved a smaller and others involved a greater number of people. It will be seen later they differed also in their duration. Some lasted longer while the teaching period of others was for a shorter time.

In the case of the League and the Party, their administrative structures were at the same time the framework through which training was given to their members. It will be recalled that an explanation of these structures has been given in the chapter on absorption in this study. The feature of these structures of relevance to the question of training was the cell or the committee system. The cell or the committee was the context in which indoctrination of members was undertaken.

It should be noticed that sometimes, for various reasons, the members of a cell or a committee did not meet. When that happened, the leader of the cell or the committee would keep up contact on an individually separate basis with his subordinates, in which case individual cultivation would be undertaken. Individual rather than collective contact would also be used in the circumstance when a person had just been absorbed from a lower to a higher level in the hierarchy of the movement. In such instances the superior who had been responsible for absorbing the subordinate usually had no other subordinates to group together with the new man for study purposes. Hence the personal supervision or tutorship of the superior to the person absorbed.

Given the opportunity, the League and the Party would have preferred to organize studies on a larger group basis such as the class or even a school, including élite cadre training schools. They did not do so because of the fact that they were proscribed organizations, and it was not in the interests of their security to organize study groups and large classes which would inevitably bring them to the attention of the authorities.

How, in actual terms, training was carried out in the Malayan communist movement would be an important subject of study. It is now intended to examine some selected case studies of what actually happened in this training process.

The cell, as the group form in which people were assembled for indoctrination purposes, seemed to have been extremely popular in the student movement. The chapter on friendship in this study has quoted the instance of a student body, the Singapore Chinese Middle School Student's Union, which organized special classes for students to give them extra coaching in the school subjects in which they were weak. Rendering assistance in school lessons, however, was only the initial step in the process. After the beneficiaries had enjoyed the service and experienced the accompanying sallies into the arena of political discussions for a year or two, they would next be invited to join another kind of grouping which would devote more attention to the study of politics and less to the pursuit of academic work. Such a grouping was often called a *hsüeh-hsih* cell. A person who had thus been persuaded to take a part in a *hsüeh-hsih* cell would often continue to be a member until he left school.

In 1954 a boy joined a Junior Middle I class in a certain secondary school, the Chung Cheng High School, in Singapore. As his English was particularly weak, he became a member of a tuition group which received coaching in English as well as in Mathematics. However, he still failed in his English in the end-of-year examination, in spite of the help he had received. In 1955 he was retained and had to repeat the same standard in his school.

In 1956, he was promoted to a higher form, and in that year he joined a *hsüeh-hsih* cell. Recalling the event he said

Having been indoctrinated for about two years, I was ... invited ... to join the student Hsueh-hsih cell of my class in 1956.

There were six persons in the cell. Concerning the things he learnt in the cell, this boy stated

The contents of our Hsueh-hsih during that year was briefly about outlook of life and current problems, mainly on the defects of the Lim Yew Hock Government education policy.

The theme of "outlook of life" was meant to teach the members of the cell what view of life they should adopt. True to communist thinking, they were, of course, told that they should look upon life from the collective and not the individualistic point of view. This was the first introduction to communism. They were taught how to view and understand topical issues as "current problems" which actually meant current political and social problems and issues.

The person further said that in 1957 the same cell continued without change. However, in 1958, the cell was reconstituted with a new set of "friends," apparently resulting from a reshuffle of the different cells in the class or form in that school. Regarding the lessons taught during the year, the student recalled

- During one Hsueh-hsih session, our cell leaders talked to us about current problems and the good conditions of life in Communist China. Apart from meeting once a week for Hsueh-hsih, our leader also urged us to read some old issues of our school magazines, and to visit one another during our leisure to foster better relationship.

The tuition was still on "current problems" and a general knowledge of communism as exemplified by conditions in Communist China. The purpose of looking up old issues of the school magazine was perhaps to look up names of persons who could be visited and befriended. The advice was indeed given to visit and socialize with "one another". What this latter part of the *hsueh-hsih* programme meant was that the trainees should study and engage in befriending their schoolmates and in absorption work, that is, in contacting the masses and establishing personal ties and friendships so as to absorb manpower for the movement.

In 1959 the cell was again reconstituted, but the student said he could not remember what *hsueh-hsih* activities were carried out that year. In 1960 the members of the cell had already reached the last form or final year in school. The boy said that during that last year they held no *hsueh-hsih*, because they were each occupied with other student activities. In the following year, that is, 1961, practically every member of the cell stayed back to repeat his studies, some for the express purpose of cultivating students in the lower standards in order to

persuade them to join the student movement. However, the cell again in 1961 did not carry out much *hsüeh-hsih* or study among themselves.

The boy further stated that although in 1960 and 1961 the *hsüeh-hsih* cell for his class did not engage much in *hsüeh-hsih* or study, yet some of the members of the cell joined other cells to continue with *hsüeh-hsih*. He himself, for example, joined one which during 1960 studied what he called

... current affairs with special reference to the history and activities of the Singapore Rural Residents' Association (SRRA)

The class was also supplied with literature to read which were

publications such as University Tribune ... Political Science [Nanyang University student papers] and propaganda material printed by the SRRA

And the "extra" cell in the following year, according to the boy himself, was preoccupied with

... political discussions centred mainly on the Great Malaysia plan which was then the hottest issue.¹

Summing up what a student was taught in the *hsüeh-hsih* exercises in the environment of the school, the following things can be said: firstly, he was given a basic knowledge of Marxism-Leninism; secondly, he was taught the communist way of looking at current problems in politics, from the framework of the ideology which he had newly acquired; and, thirdly, he was taught the methods of undertaking student work. The areas covered were designed to inculcate at least the factors of dedication and ability in the participants.

It must be remembered that the Chinese Middle School Students' Union, though during its time the largest of such unions, was only one of the many student organizations

¹ Statement of TEO TECK SOON, paras 7-14.

found in the state. There were a great number of other student societies besides it. The lists of such bodies as stated in Appendixes A and B include only those which happened to have been disclosed in statements by ex-detainees and detainees, or have interested the authorities enough to have had them put on the register and therefore recorded. The *hsüeh-hsih* cell was not a monopoly of any student union, but was the business of all student organizations. It can therefore be imagined what an extensive activity *hsüeh-hsih* cells in the student movement was. Furthermore, *hsüeh-hsih* cells were fathered not only by student bodies, but by other kinds of organizations as well. For example, there is a report of an old boys' association, the Hua Kiau Old Boys' Association, having had such a cell in 1955-63.² The *hsueh-hsih* cell was not only widespread but seemed to be a very popular undertaking with students, particularly.

There was one other fact to take note of about the *hsüeh-hsih* cell in the student movement. The Singapore Chinese Middle School Students' Union, as already stated, was deregistered in 1956. The thing about the *hsüeh-hsih* cells sponsored by the union was that after the union was proscribed the cells did not die together with the union but instead went underground and continued to go about their activities. The same thing seemed to have taken place with the *hsüeh-hsih* cells of the other student organizations. Although such bodies might be put out of existence, yet the *hsüeh-hsih* cells which had been managed by them continued to thrive. *Hsüeh-hsih* cells among students were discovered even in the late 1960s. It can be seen that because of their small and personalized nature such cells were easy to hide from the authorities.

Study groups were also a popular way by which people came together for indoctrination. An illustration of this was such groups organized by an old boys' association, the Cheng Hwa Old Boys' Association.

During a certain year there was a large group under the charge of one of the officials of the association. When study was actually undertaken, this big group was broken down into six smaller groups, each consisting of several persons. A description of the way the study sessions was conducted follows:

2 Statement of LIM GUAN TUN, para. 6.

Members of the sub-group would meet ... about once a week to discuss ... articles ... in the "Chern Sian Pau" [the party organ of the Barisan Sosialis]. The important articles on current affairs were picked out by the leaders of the groups concerned and then explained to the members. Views were then sought from members and at the end of the discussions, the leader would sum up

Another thing was that

... Sometimes the sub-group leaders also lent progressive books to their members

"Aim in Life"

"Knowledge of [should be 'for'] Youth".

It was said that the overall leader of the group also once

... gave a talk on "Outlook of Life" to all members of the group

It is apparent that the things studied by the members of this association were no different from those studied by the members of the school *hsüeh-hsih* cells except in one respect. In this case they also learnt current affairs and the rudiments of Marxism-Leninism as with *hsüeh-hsih* cells, but they did not learn how "to make friends of people."³

Between the end of 1962 and the beginning of 1963, a branch of the Partai Rakyat first conducted what was called a current affairs class and then a *hsüeh-hsih* class for its members. The current affairs class dealt with only issues as they appeared in the daily news, whereas a *hsüeh-hsih* class would discuss more basic problems. What happened in this case was that the intention of the teachers of the class was to teach only current affairs. They tried that for half a year, and the enrolment dropped from fifty to thirty. They discovered that the loss of interest on the part of the students was due to the monotony of merely talking about current problems. They therefore changed over to talking also about more fundamental issues. So the class was converted from a current affairs class into

3 Statement of SIM TEONG HIOK, paras. 21 and 22.

a *hsüeh-hsih* class. The event was indicative of the kind of *hsüeh-hsih* which ordinary members of the front organizations were given through the mode of group assembly and teaching which was the class. The *hsüeh-hsih* approach appealed through its more intellectual content to the enquiring minds of the better-calibre young personnel.

Materials used in these training sessions were drawn from both the ordinary newspapers and the official organs of Partai Rakyat.

As to the content of the *hsüeh-hsih* lessons, they were:

... party policy, trade union movement, social problem and the problem of life and ideological training of members

The "problems of life and ideological training of members" would perhaps deal with the general purpose of life for a Marxist-Leninist. Under the heading of "social problem" there would be an explanation of what would be regarded as the shortcomings of the existing society. In "trade union movement" there would be a discussion on how it was proposed to correct such shortcomings as worker exploitation through the effort of workers themselves. "Party policy" would perhaps make clear how Partai Rakyat would spearhead the effort. The grounds covered were therefore comprehensive.⁴

In 1963 an active member of the Cheng Hwa Old Boys' Association was elected to the executive committee of that body. Although she was a willing worker, she was considered intellectually to be backward in the theory of the movement. Soon after she has assumed office the General Affairs Officer began to put her through a course of studies. After two years the teacher was changed, and another person took over her cultivation and "education". By 1966, due to the exposure she was given, according to herself, "I had already developed a clear understanding of the Communist struggle." The indoctrination effort proved to be a success in her case.

She said that the first man taught her current affairs, items of which were derived from the official newspaper of the Barisan Sosialis. The teacher also gave her the the following books to read:

4 Statement of PANG TOON TIN, paras. 80-84.

"Outlook of Life"
 "Aim in Life"
 "How Steel is Tempered"
 "Liu Hu Lan"
 "Ting Yau Chuan"
 "Work and Study"

She was also mobilized to take part in demonstrations.

The second man also taught her current affairs and gave her books:

"Daybreak in the River Side"
 "Mother of Revolution"
 "How to Reform Your Thinking"

She did not give any examples of the topic she studied for current affairs. The books which she read all pertained to the development of dedication, and the last title in the first list also touched upon the factor of ability.⁵

Cadre-training classes were a fashion for many of the front organizations. A typical example would be again taken from the Partai Rakyat. This was held for its cadres by the Partai Rakyat from sometime in 1961 until late 1962. The class had thirty students but became smaller later on. It was held once a fortnight. A number of people spoke to the students.

The content of what was taught, according to the person who was in charge of the class, was

... theory ... the future of trade unionism, workers' welfare, trade union organization, international situation and changes in the current situation

Theory would mean the theory of Marxism-Leninism. The three items which followed theory were all matters which concerned the workers' movement, and the last two items were current affairs topics. The three areas of study were in an ascending order of topicality. The most topical would be current affairs, those that followed would be gradually divested of their simple topical content and imbued with ideological themes and presentations.

5 Statement of SIM TEONG HIOK, paras. 17-19.

Looked at in another way, they could be regarded as designed to enhance the political commitment, ideological knowledge and the work skills of the students.

The purpose of this particular training class was very clearly stated by the man who managed it, a member of the CPM, who said

I carried out the directive of the Organization. I ... carried out general education in the Cadres Training Class and raised the theoretical level and political cognition of the Party Rakyat Cadres

Such a class was certainly not an aimless exercise.⁶

What has been described was *hsüeh-hsih* in the front organizations. If a member of a front organization happened to be targeted for absorption and later was actually absorbed into the Singapore People's Anti-British League, his political training in the movement would continue on a basis more intimately connected to the CPM. The first step in training in the League would follow when a person was assessed by the recruiter as material suitable to become a sympathiser of the League.

A certain young person was a member of a cultural organization, the Ai Tong Old Boys' Association. An official of the organization, who had been observing him and who had investigated his background, thought that he was good material for absorption into the League. The official made an approach to him, and began to feed him with suitable literature. In the words of the teacher himself, the following was what transpired

... At first, I lent him some ordinary books to read. When I discovered that he had great interest in reading, I began to supply him with proscribed ones such as the following:-

Dr. Norman Bethune
The Long March
Madam Curie

6 Statement of TNG YOONG CHIAW, paras. 107-110.

Subsequently, the person became a sympathiser of the League.

Very clearly, what the person had been taught through the selected or subversive literature was that he should devote himself to the antigovernment cause in the manner of the characters in the books. These people were shown to be thoroughly devoted to the cause of their own choosing and convictions.⁷

Another person, who came from Indonesia, was also a member of the same association. This person was, however, a little different from the previous one in that at the time when he was spotted as a likely target for absorption into the League, he had already on his own "read some communist books," and he knew "a lot of expelled students from the Chinese High School who went over to stay in Indonesia." Therefore, "his thinking was progressive." In this situation, the man who had spotted him decided that he could immediately be made a sympathiser of the League and need not go through the normal preliminary stage of reading and learning the leftist way of thinking. Consequently, he was absorbed, and his superior said:

... Since then I [that is, the man who absorbed him] gave him *Freedom News* to read

Freedom News, as has been already stated, was the official newspaper of the CPM in Singapore. *Freedom News* did not merely preach communism as such but preached the version of it as interpreted by the CPM.⁸

In other cases, when a person was thus absorbed to become a sympathiser of the League, he would be given also other things to read besides *Freedom News*. In this particular case, however, there is no information in the report about him which showed that he received other publications as well. The reason for this was either the report was inadequate on this point or this particular person was able to find his way among the more common kinds of communist literature so that his superior did not think it necessary for him to give him guidance in the matter.

7 Statement of ANG ENG CHONG, paras. 54 and 55.

8 Statement of ANG ENG CHONG, paras. 62 and 63.

In the same way as the sympathiser of the League was exposed to indoctrination, a member of the League was also exposed. A school student who had during his time become a member of the League said of the tuition he received:

... the study materials include "Freedom Press", "How to do the students work well", "On the training of ideological consciousness", "Secret organisations' by laws", and other booklets⁹

He and his friends met once a fortnight in a safe and convenient place to pursue their studies.

"On the training of ideological consciousness" was a work on communist theory. Since the person belonged to a clandestine organization, and since he was by occupation a student and therefore had to do work in the student field, he had to be well versed respectively with the "Secret organisation's by-laws" and the contents of "How to do the students work well". In the above statement, "Freedom Press" was actually *Freedom News* which supplied information on current political developments.

This man was made to upgrade his ideology and his work skills, and the latter included also the rules of underground operations which brought him nearer to the CPM compared to a mere sympathiser.¹⁰

Beyond the League was the Party. *Hsüeh-hsih* in the Party was taken even more seriously than in the League.

When a member of the League joined the Party, as has already been pointed out in Chapter III, he would first be regarded as a member of the Party on probation. A probationer had his scheme of study.

According to a government expert on the communist movement, the obligatory minimum that a member of the

9 Quotation marks indicating publications in this particular extract as well as extracts in this and other chapters are as found in the original statements and have not been changed in any way.

10 Statement of PANG TOON TIN, para. 9.

Party had to study and understand in order to pass his probation were two items: The programme and the constitution of the Party. Those who had the ability, of course, could learn more than just this. In one instance, a young person who joined the Party was required to read four texts:

... (a) "The Cultivation of a Communist Party Member"... by Liu Shao-ch'i ..., (b) a booklet on "The Mass Struggle And The Mass Line" ..., (c) a booklet on "Democratic Centralisation" ... and (d) "Programme of the Democratic Republic of Malaya"

Item (d) of the list was a document in substance no different from what was known as the programme of the Party. This item was the first to be studied because it explained the goals of the Malayan communist movement, or, in other words, what the movement was all about. It has been said that the CPM required a member, in the first place, to be loyal to the cause of the Party; and, secondly, he had to be able to put the interests of the Party before his own personal interests. If a member understood properly what the Party was striving after, it was considered that he would then be able to develop the required attitudes and virtues.

The proper English translation of item (c) of the student's syllabus should be "Democratic Centralism" instead of what was given in the records of the Chinese original. Democratic centralism was the principle on which the CPM was organized. As such, the purpose of learning it was no different from that of learning the constitution of the Party. It is to be suspected that this particular probationer must have read the constitution, but he did not mention it in his statement. Democratic centralism meant that the Party was organized on both democratic and centrist lines. As such, a member of the Party should have democratic rights in the Party, while, at the same time, he must show obedience to those who sat in office. However, in the actual state of affairs, perhaps due to the fact that the CPM was perpetually at war with its opponents, what came to be emphasized in Party life was that members of the Party must be obedient to their superiors and not that they should enjoy democratic rights. Thus the dictates of the struggle made it necessary to give priority to centralism over democracy. This point, it will be remembered, was equivalent to what was considered

to be the third aspect of the virtue of dedication of a Party member, namely, the virtue of being able to obey orders from the Party.

"The Cultivation of a Communist Party Member" should in fact read as *How to be a Communist*. This book was written not by Liu Shao-ch'i alone but also by another Chinese Communist, Chen Yün. Liu Shao-ch'i had another book entitled *How to be a Good Communist*. The student here did not mention this second book. Both the books talked about what the student himself called "the basic qualities of a Communist." These basic qualities displayed five aspects: unlimited loyalty to the Party, complete subordination of one's own personal interests to those of the Party, absolute obedience to the Party and its leadership, an adequate knowledge of the theory of Marxism-Leninism, including Mao Tse-tung Thought, and finally the capacity and resilience to accept constructive criticism from others such as leaders as well as equals and even subordinates. This last quality very importantly included the ability and willingness to subject oneself to self-criticism.

"The Mass Struggle and the Mass Line" taught that the struggle conducted by the communists was that of the masses and must be based on the masses. The actualization of this idea can be seen in the welfare, recreational and propaganda operations which the communist movement engaged in as described in the chapter on friendship in the present study.¹¹

The discussion above shows very clearly that the training of a probationary member of the Party focused on dedication. Ability was of secondary importance as compared to dedication at this stage.

The programme and the constitution were meant only for members of the Party, and not for those of the front organizations or the League. Indoctrination on these documents therefore constituted a new privileged step in the training schedule of persons belonging to the Malayan communist movement.

An interesting fact to note about this grade of training, that is, training at the threshold of the Party,

11 Statement of KOO YOUNG, paras. 8-11.

was that it was sometimes given to a person not after he had already joined the Party but just before he did. A number of cases had been reported that candidates for Party membership were given "manifestoes of the Party," which should be the same thing as the programme of the Party, and Liu Shao-ch'i's *How to be a Good Communist* to study at the time when their superiors were actively considering admitting them into the Party.¹²

An organization consisting only of ordinary members without leadership would not be a useful tool. Therefore, out of all the people it had absorbed into its fold, the CPM made strenuous efforts to raise at least a number of them to cadres. The man whose training during the period of probation in the Party has just been described was one of such persons who was groomed to play a more important part in the movement. His example was a rather revealing one, so it is useful to discuss it at some length.

The time span during which he was given the training to enable him to become a cadre of the Party was from about mid-1958 until mid-1959. That one year was right in the midst of the phase of political struggle which the Party was engaging in. Before joining the Party, when he was a student, this person had played a prominent role in student affairs, at one point being elected to become the President of a major student organization. This, however, was still-born because it failed to gain registration with the government. The person seemed to be best fitted to be utilized in the so-called open lawful struggle which, in other words, was the political struggle. His Party superior, therefore, decided to shape him up just for that purpose.

What the young man had to do in the open lawful struggle or the political struggle was only two things: firstly, mobilize the masses to build up the strength of the communist movement; and, secondly, use this strength in the struggle appropriately.

The person had already been taught how to go about the first task, as has just been explained, during his period of probation. But the lessons given at that time

12 Statements of ANG ENG CHONG, paras. 26, 58, 68 and 70; LIM HOCK KOON, paras. 109-110.

were probably only elementary. He was now given more. To enable him to solve this first problem, his superior further taught him, in the first place, to know who were the so-called masses who were to be mobilized, and who were not but were actually enemies to be attacked; next, what were the difficulties he would meet with in the attempt to mobilize the masses and how he could overcome such difficulties; and, finally, what were the techniques he should use when he made approaches to the masses.

Suggestions were also given to him on how he might go about his second task, that is of engaging the communist movement in struggles with the established authorities in an advantageous manner. That was to identify and select the most suitable method of struggle.

His superior spoke to him at great length. To point out to him who were the masses to be mobilized and who were not, his superior gave him a discourse on the different social classes in the Malayan and Singapore societies. He was told that there were four social classes, namely the proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie, the national capitalists and the "Malay feudal landlords, the local compradore bourgeoisie and the political agents of these classes." The first class consisted of "the workers, peasants and fishermen of all races." The second class were "the town-dwellers of all trades, the petty merchants, the intellectuals, the teachers, the smallholders, etc.", the intellectuals being either "Chinese-educated" or "English-educated"; and the third class were "essentially the business tycoons, rubber plantation owners and mine owners of the Chinese community." The student did not record the teacher as having given a breakdown of the fourth class. Perhaps this was thought to be unnecessary, as the components were apparent from the title of the group.

After having given an analysis of the different social classes, the teacher then went on to give his student the formula for mobilization. His idea was that the proletariat should be identified as one and the same with the Party itself, while the petty bourgeoisie and the national capitalists should be regarded as primary and secondary allies. The fourth class were the enemy of the other classes and the target of the struggle of the movement. His description of the proletariat was that

... they were most determined to carry out revolution, to overthrow the reactionary régime

and to fight for freedom and liberation. They were ... the main force of the struggle.

His advice about the second and third classes respectively were, however, only

... it was of paramount importance to win over the majority of the petty bourgeoisie to support or sympathize with the C.P.M. struggle [and] ... they should be the targets to be won over in our struggle.

What he said about the fourth class was that

They were, therefore, the same as the British colonial rulers - being an arch-enemy to the people of our country in their struggle for national liberation.

These talks on the topic of the social classes seemed to have been of definite benefit to the student. After he had finished the lessons, his comments on them were

... I had basically grasped the C.P.M.'s theory on the analysis of classes in Malaya. This enabled me to differentiate in my subsequent open activities between friends and enemies in the struggle, between those who could be won over and those who should be dealt with heavy blows

After having explained to his student how the masses ought to be mobilized, the teacher next went on to discuss the difficulties which would beset any attempt at mobilization work. There were two such difficulties. The first one was that the workers, who were mostly people of the Chinese race, and the peasants and fishermen, who came mostly from among the Malays, "had not been able to see eye-to-eye with each other for the last century." Only the Chinese were interested in the left-wing movement whereas the Malays were not. How was the gulf between the two races to be bridged? How were the Malays to be enticed into joining the communist cause? The second difficulty was that the CPM itself was supposed to lead the left-wing movement. But this Party was proscribed and could not come out into the open. How then was it to operate?

The teacher came out with firm answers to the problems. According to the report of the student, the following was the way which the teacher suggested the first difficulty could be overcome: members of the left-wing movement, mainly Chinese cadres, should learn to speak Malay and know Malay customs. After they had achieved this they should go and mix with the Malays. They should spread the communist ideology among the Malays. They should make converts among them and turn these converts into cadres. When a Malay revolutionary leadership had been formed, it should move into the Malay masses and spread the ideology among the Malay masses. The Malay farmer and fisherman could thus be brought round to communism. The teacher further said to his student that, although at the present moment the Malay farmer and fisherman were immovable in their traditional political habits, yet in the end they could be persuaded to communism. This was to give confidence to the student in the struggle for Malay involvement.

As to the second problem, the Party would solve it by having members infiltrate into the lawful open organizations to further communist purposes under the cover of these organizations.

These suggestions to overcome problems in the effort to mobilize the masses were also, as in the case with the analysis of the social classes, taken to heart by the trainee. He reported that in his subsequent political activities he took care to handle the racial problem in a positive manner, and he also understood the technique of working in the open struggle.

Finally, concerning the problem of how to make an approach to the masses, the trainer taught his pupil that he should firstly be concerned with, and work for, the welfare of the masses. Then he should do propaganda amongst them, and finally he should net in recruits from amongst them. What was shown to him was in fact what has been explained in the chapter in this study dealing with the methods which the communist movement utilized to create friendship and establish contact with the masses. The approach of being concerned with, and of working for, the welfare of the masses, according to the trainer, was as follows:

When a communist began his work among the masses, he should first turn himself into one of them. If he lived

among workers, he should have a knowledge of their work, their difficulties and sufferings as well as what grievances and demands they had. If he lived among farmers, he should likewise know how the farmers tilled their land, how they reared pigs and chickens, what costs they had to pay for their raw materials and foodstuff, what prices they fetched for their products, how they tried to eradicate pests, what their difficulties and sufferings were in life, and how they would like their conditions to improve. Only after the cadre had understood the masses in this way could he then proceed to seek to better their livelihood. His concern and effort to improve the livelihood of the masses would earn him their trust and he would then be able to lead them.

After a linkage had been effected with the masses, their indoctrination should be undertaken. The art of conducting propaganda among them should be practical and down to earth in approach. They should be won over by patient persuasion. Abstract doctrines should be illustrated by concrete examples drawn from the day-to-day experience of the listener. No attempt must be made to teach by command, by slogan or by an "unrealistic approach."

Finally, this was the method to be used in the act of recruitment. Wherever a good mass worker went, he must spot the active elements among the masses and convert them into mass workers like himself.

After the strength of the movement had been built up, it could then be put to use. The communist superior also gave his student firm advice on this problem. The way to use this strength, in the view of the Party, lay in

... concealing the competent cadres, reserving the strength, laying an ambush for a long time and waiting for the opportunity.

... the towns were places where the colonial rulers and the reactionaries concentrated their strongest forces and where mobilization was the easiest. Thus, in a struggle, it was wrong if we carried out any rash and hasty move for this would easily expose our strength. Efforts should be made to conceal the cadres and minimize sacrifices as far as possible. Citing the task of leading a strike as an example ... if the strike was

supported only by a minority of progressive workers and the overwhelming majority of the workers could not accept the call to go on strike, this would imperceptibly expose to the reactionaries the progressive elements among the workers, with the result that the reactionaries would be able to deal with these workers easily ... to go on strike in this manner would inevitably end in failure

Therefore, the correct thing to do was to hold out patiently and deliver the blow only when the real opportunity came. It was a matter of being infinitely patient and striking when the iron was hot.

The course of training which this person went through prepared him thoroughly for the mission he was assigned to. Later on he became one of the most effective activists in the open political struggle. He eventually rose to become a top leader of one of the infiltrated political parties. Almost ten years after he had finished his training, he recollected:

Although the contents of my study were by no means comprehensive, they had nevertheless given me the basic knowledge that a party member should acquire. This training had helped me a great deal in my work subsequently and I must say that I had been able to put into practice of what I learnt.

During the period of my open activities ... it was not possible for my superior to give direction or analysis on every major event. When some problems arose in the absence of directives from my superior, I had to rely on the theoretical knowledge I had acquired and decide on the course of action In this light, it can be considered that my superior had succeeded in grooming me to be an efficient Communist front worker.

The kind of training which was given to a person who was going to become a cadre of the Party, as just described, seemed to have been designed to arm the trainee with the basic equipment he would need to carry out his activities as a cadre. This was the take-off point. Indeed the assessment of the trainee himself of what he had gone through seemed to confirm the accuracy of this impression. What a

cadre would learn further as he progressed in his political career would be through experience of the problems constantly facing him. He would have to be able to devise solutions to these problems which would assuredly arise to challenge him as he carried out his duties. How this took place is now described.

It would be useful to take the example of the young teacher again. He finished his indoctrination course as a new member of the Party, it will be remembered, in the middle of 1959. Just before that he became active in the open political struggle. By 1963 he had made his way to the leadership of a branch of a political party. The position he assumed in the party posed to him the problem which he had not faced before of managing subordinates. He turned to his communist superior for instructions. The man consequently gave him another talk and the points made were as follows:

He should be free of arrogance in his attitude towards his subordinates. He should behave with modesty. Should he discover any shortcoming of a personal nature in any person, he should not criticize that person in public. Instead he should try to talk to him quietly in private. He must not get involved in personal clashes. Should he be consulted over such matters, he should maintain an attitude of impartiality and try to work out solutions satisfactory to all sides. He should also avoid being involved with groups and cliques.

The student said that the lesson benefited him immeasurably. He reported

Armed with this advice, I managed to win over and unite those officials who came into contact with me both in the ... Branch as well as the ... C.E.C. [i.e. Central Executive Committee] ... I did not antagonise anyone who worked with me. In fact, I felt that most of them had a very high regard for me as their leader.

What he was taught was, of course, the proper style of behaviour befitting a communist office-bearer, which, it will be recalled, was one aspect of the personal quality of character.¹³

¹³ Statement of KOO YOUNG, para. 78.

It is beyond doubt that the person, whose political training has been described here, later became a cadre of the Party, but what actual rank or ranks he held at different times could not be ascertained.

Chapter III has given an explanation of the different grades of cadreship in the Party. Ideally speaking, the description of training given to the cadres of the Party which will follow from here should take account of all activities for every grade of cadreship, but this is an impossible aim. The reason for the shortcoming is lack of data. What are available are sketchy statements about a few persons who held a Branches Committee or a District Committee rank, and nothing beyond.

It is now proposed to take a look at how these members of the Party carried out their *hsüeh-hsih* according to the needs of the work they had in hand.

There was a Branches Committee which functioned in a certain school around 1950. At that time what the communists in Singapore were required to do were, firstly, to carry out acts of sabotage and create turbulence in the island in order to distract the attention of the British administration from the war in the Peninsula, and, secondly, to mobilize manpower, and financial and material assistance to help in the war.

The Singapore Town Committee was charged with the execution of these plans, and it took action through its subordinate organs. The task of the said Branches Committee was to carry out orders from the Town Committee. The study which the Branches Committee engaged in was, in the words of the records, therefore:

To study Resolutions of the Singapore Town Committee

As the Singapore organization was under the command of the Central Committee, the said committee at the same time also undertook the study of:

Central [Committee] Propaganda materials.

What is said here, however, is all that is known about the resolutions of the Singapore Town Committee and the propaganda materials emanating from the Central Committee.

There is no information about the details of these documents and sources.¹⁴

In the chapter on deployment, mention has been made of the Trade Committee, which was an organ of District Committee rank under the Singapore Town Committee. Early in 1950, during one of its meetings, the committee made a study of the document *Resolutions on Strengthening the Party Nature* [of Members]. The contents of this document have already been explained in the chapter on absorption. Its purpose was to heighten the dedication of Party members to the Party. It has been said in the same chapter too that this directive was issued at a time when the war between the CPM and the British administration was being conducted ruthlessly. Members of the Party, especially members who had already achieved the rank of a District Committee member, had to be persons who were devoted to the cause of the Party. However, in view of the requirements of the war, the Party considered such a standard to be insufficient. Therefore, the *Resolutions* were made. The Trade Committee had a new task, and it engaged in *hsüeh-hsieh* to answer to the new task.¹⁵

In Chapter III, it has been explained that there were three variations of the absorption process in the Malayan communist movement during the years 1948-66. To recapitulate, the first variation was from the masses into the various grades of a front organization, from the various grades of a front organization into the various grades of the Singapore People's Anti-British League, and from the various grades of the League into the various grades of the Party. The second variation was from the masses into the various grades of the League and from the various grades of the League into the various grades of the Party. The third variation was from the masses into the various grades of a front organization and from the various grades of a front organization into the various grades of the Party.

The description of training for the different levels in the movement as given earlier follows the structure of the hierarchy, that is, starting from front organizations

14 Statement of WONG MAU CHOONG, para. 28.

15 Statement of GAN SIEW THAM, pp. 16-18.

up to the Party itself. This constitutes the absorption process as it relates to the first variation. No description of absorption in the second variation is necessary because it is largely similar to that of the first variation, except that one link, namely, the front organizations, is missing. The difference between the first variation of the absorption process and the second variation was that in the former there was a front organization between the masses and the League and in the latter there was none. Training in the second variation was exactly the same as training in that part of the first variation after the point of the front organizations, or, in other words, the training pattern in the second variation repeated that of the first variation after the point of the front organizations. Therefore, when the training pattern under the first variation is understood, then that of the second pattern will also be understood. In fact, many of the examples which have been quoted above in the description of the training pattern under the first variation were about persons who became members of the movement through the second variation of the absorption process, that is, from the masses into the various grades of the Singapore People's Anti-British League, and from the various grades of the League into the various grades of the Party, and not through the first one. Yet they have been used to illustrate the training pattern under the first variation of the absorption process precisely because of the fact that the training pattern under the second variation was but a repetition of that under the first variation after the point of the front organizations.

The second thing to be said here is that the grading which came in between the front organizations and the Party in the third variation of the absorption process was not something to be found in the other two variations. It was the grading of the sympathiser of the Party.

Regarding the question of indoctrination, there was a stage of training for a person who had been targeted in a front organization to become a sympathiser of the Party but had not yet become one. There was another stage of training for a person who had become a sympathiser of the Party. As these two stages of training under the third variation of the absorption process were not something to be found under the first or the second variation of the absorption process, examples of them should ideally be quoted here to show what they were like. However, desirable though it may be, it is not possible to carry this out

because such examples are not to be found in the data available for the use of the present study.

It has been said earlier in this chapter that training in the League and the Party could take place in the context of a cell or committee, or in the two-man context of the meeting of the teacher and the student. In the description of training in the League and the Party given above, no distinction has been made between the two variations of the exercise. The distinction has not been made because the variations did not have any influence on what was taught which is a more important question to this study than the question of form. Whatever might have been the context in which training took place the substance of the training was the same.

The long list of examples given above of training mostly illustrate only one aspect of the training process. This aspect was *hsüeh-hsih*. Besides this, there were also the aspects of criticism and self-criticism, and the rectification movement. A description will now also be given of these other aspects of training. However, examples which can be found of them are very few.

The executive committee of a certain student society was reported to have carried out *hsüeh-hsih* amongst themselves. At the same time, they also "held criticism and self-criticism session[s]." What the things were which came under this minor inquisition, however, were not recorded.¹⁶

There was also an instance of the practice of criticism and self-criticism in the Singapore People's Anti-British League. The issues at dispute, in this case, are clearly shown in the records.

I have arguments with "A" on all sorts of things, ranging from Communist theory, Lysenko's theory of genetics to literature. Finally all these disagreements came to a height ... and I was asked by the leading committee to engage in self-criticism. I refused this, and it led to violent arguments and quarrels, one being in which "B" tried to attack me with a knife and [the] other stopped him.

¹⁶ Statement of TEO TECK SOON, para. 18.

Figuratively speaking, the person whom others found fault with, in this instance, not only refused to look himself in the mirror but also refused others showing him the mirror. What happened in the end to him as a member of the League was not known. Probably he was just conveniently forgotten.¹⁷

An example from the Party itself which concerned a member who was on probation reads as follows

In early 1959 ... "A" was involved in an affair with a married woman ... [my superior] directed me to tell "A" to stop his affair with the woman. However, he did not listen. He insisted on marrying this woman. Since then our relationship became strained Not only did he not change for the better his attitude [became] worse as time went by

The person was eventually struck off from the membership list of the Party. His character was found to be not up to the standard expected of him.¹⁸

The Trade Committee, which was a subordinate organ of the Singapore Town Committee, has already been referred to many times before. Like those of other committees, the members of this committee also at times took part in the intellectual gymnastics of fault-finding. A sample of such a pastime reads

"A" criticised "B" that the burning of the Michelin's Tyre Factory was not properly planned, and investigation to start the fire was not sufficient (The two comrades responsible were rather nervous - the factory was not completely gutted.) "B" and "C" also spoke.

After this we proceeded to criticise each other's work. "D" [the leader of the Committee] criticised "A" seriously, saying that he was not austere enough and very fond of gambling, and he was not positive in his work. She stated that

17 Statement of J.J. PUTHUCHEARRY, para. 10.

18 Statement of ANG ENG CHONG, para. 68.

"B" was too lavish in life and had no confidence in himself. "C" was too lazy to study [that is *hsüeh-hsih*].

The items put under the microscope in this instance were the work performance and aspects of the characters of the members.¹⁹

Although not clearly demonstrated by what have been cited above, criticism and self-criticism could generally be about any aspect of a member's personality, his dedication, his character or his ability.

Hsüeh-hsih, criticism and self-criticism were the daily meals to nourish the dedication, fortitude and the desire for improvement. Thus, metaphorically speaking, a rectification movement was an occasional banquet. Other than the CPM itself, a political party which was a lawful organization but which was nevertheless associated with the CPM, the Barisan Sosialis, also occasionally carried out rectification campaigns. One such campaign, according to good authority, was planned for some time in 1963. The particular defect which was to be purged from among the membership in the organization, according to the same authority, was "liberalism". The virtues to be taught against the defect were

... punctuality, patience, enthusiasm, responsibility, spirit of self-sacrifice, criticism and self-criticism, in one word, the qualities of a good cadre.

If the "method of thinking and working" of the members could be thus changed, then it was expected the "efficiency of Party work" would be improved.

The campaign eventually, however, was not launched because, in the end, the organization did not have sufficient manpower to manage it.²⁰

Between 1953 and 1954, a rectification movement was actually carried out within the CPM in Singapore. The vices among the membership to be eradicated were also "liberalism"

¹⁹ Statement of GAN SIEW THAM, page 12.

²⁰ Statement of CHIA YAM LOONG, para. 76.

and another called "heroism". Why such items were considered to be vices by the Party was explained by the Party itself:

For those who clamoured for liberalism, it was difficult to get them to abide by our rules and regulations and therefore took the study of communist doctrines lightly according to their whims and fancy. Such people were difficult to manage and train. For those who clamoured for heroism, it was difficult to control them from "showing off" either by way of speeches or actions. Such people were dangerous to the security of the organisation. Moreover, they were also proud and would not accept criticism and self-criticism and Party education. Whether it was for mass activities or for activities within the Party, such people were no good because they could not just be compatible with other people - such people were the first to waver and could probably make a 180 - degrees turn with ease.

In other words, liberalism was bad because it meant indiscipline and unwillingness to *hsüeh-hsih*. Heroism was undesirable because it led to exposure of Party secrets, unwillingness to improve oneself, inability to get along with people and untrustworthiness.

The conduct of the campaign took the form of unit leaders themselves first reading up relevant literature required for the purposes of the campaign. One of the unit leaders reported thus:

I should be equipped by the study of documents such as "Cultivation of Thought", "Cultivation of Youths", "Cultivation of Politics" and Mao Tse Tung's "Movement of Rectification"

After this had been done, the leaders should then organize *hsüeh-hsih*, and criticism and self-criticism for their subordinates. The said leader further reported:

I should organise "hsueh-hsih" with subordinates with the books mentioned ... above. In addition, I should conduct cell meetings with my subordinates to practise "criticism and self-criticism" in order to

show the weak and strong points of my subordinates. Then I should ask them to intensify their strong points and rectify their weak points. Finally, each individual should write a report on her own ideology.

The final thing the unit leaders had to do was exemplified in the following:

I should then collect the reports from all my subordinates, write my own recommendations on each and every one of the reports and submit to my superior.

The purpose of this was to enable the top leadership to come to decisions on the suitability of the various members of the Party.

The result of the assessments of each and every one of the members of the Party could be purges. However, in the case of this unit, the reports on the movement by the leader, parts of which have been extracted here, the anticipated purge did not take place. Everyone passed the examination.

When this particular campaign came to a conclusion, the leaders of the Party made the remark that "although this movement was not carried out satisfactorily, it had achieved some results."²¹

Summarizing then, the aim of the Malayan communist movement in conducting training for its members was to develop in them the essential personal qualities of dedication, character and ability. This training was conducted through the means of *hsüeh-hsih*, criticism and self-criticism, and through rectification movements. These in turn were channelled in different ways through which people could be assembled for such purposes. Such groupings ranged from two-man personal contacts, involving just the teacher and the student, up to gatherings comprising dozens of people. There was a pattern in the system.

As in the case with absorption and deployment, there were amongst those involved both complete and less than complete realization of the purposes of training. There are still today members who had gone through the

21 Statement of LIM SWEE GOR, para. 155.

indoctrination process during the two previous phases of the postwar development of the movement and who yet persist in the activities which they deem to be their cause. And there are also those who have given up politics and have returned to the more peaceful pursuits in life. Instances of both these types of people may easily be quoted but for good reasons will not.

Similarly, there are many examples of people being converted to the communist faith, who, before their conversion through the training given by the movement, were morally degenerate, reading pornographic literature, debauched and addicted to heavy drinking. After the change they led simple lives.²²

There were also persons who had already become full members of the Party, and were therefore considered to have at least attained a certain standard of "good behaviour," suddenly reversing their standards of conduct and even embezzling Party funds.²³

In the example given in the present chapter of the kind of training for a member of the Party who was earmarked to become a cadre, it was seen that a man's working ability could be enhanced as a result of the indoctrination he received. Equally common, there were instances of persons who just could not manage difficult communist texts.²⁴ No uniform result of the training effort could be expected.

The practices of *hsüeh-hsih*, criticism and self-criticism, and rectification movements, which were continuous activities, constituted in fact a programme aimed at the improvement of technical ability, and sustenance of morale, for those dedicated to the movement. Thus they could be recognized as institutions of continual training and personnel quality upgrading of benefit to the movement. Although the ideals of the indoctrination process might not have been achieved in the cases of many members of the movement, yet without such practices the objectives would have been realized to an even more restricted extent. These institutions to upgrade and to

22 Statement of CHENG YUIT TUNG, page 4.

23 Statement of GAN SIEW THAM, page 8.

24 Statement of TAN BANG KIAT, *passim*.

uplift standards were an assurance of at least some degree of attainment of the objects of the movement.

Regarding the question of the different ways people were collected together for the purposes of training, it has already been observed that members of the League or of the Party had never met in the form of a group larger than the cell or the committee. This arrangement was not to the advantage of these organizations. For the movement as a whole, apparently during the period under review, no single member of the movement in Singapore had had the opportunity to attend formalized communist training schools. These facilities were not available to the Singapore personnel at that time. If some kind of more formal schooling system had been possible for members of the movement to gather together for tuition, the effectiveness of the process could possibly have been greater. It was hindered in its efforts to upgrade the quality of its personnel by the clandestine nature of its operations. So far as the question now under discussion was concerned, the Malayan communist movement in Singapore, despite great effort, did not achieve the ideal due to the various constraints already mentioned.

Nevertheless, taking the training effort of the Malayan communist movement as a whole, it can be seen that it was planned and systematically channelled, and nothing haphazard.

VI: CONCLUSION

The foregoing describes and discusses the various aspects of the manpower system in the Malayan communist movement. In the first place, this study shows how the movement got in touch with the masses from whom it had to draw the manpower it needed. Secondly, it shows how after friendship had been laid the desired kind of personnel were drawn or absorbed into the movement. It has dealt in some detail with the upward and inward movement within the overall organization. Thirdly, it points out how personnel were put to use or deployed. Finally, an examination was made of the training process. In order that such chosen instruments should cut better, they were sharpened continually on the whetstone of communist ideological and practical training.

The method of approach to the masses lay in making use of any existing friendships or personal ties resulting from familial, work or neighbourhood links, which the movement or its members had already established with the masses. If a standing relationship was absent, the method was to build a bridge to the people by doing good turns in the rendering of useful service, the provision for recreational needs and, later, their indoctrination. The more extensively the movement could engage in such activities, the greater the harvest it would reap. Therefore, the basic attitude of the movement was to become as busy as possible on such matters.

Persons were absorbed into, and upwards in, the movement in accordance with its vertical or hierarchical structure. The speed of the process was also conditioned by considerations of the qualifications of the persons to be absorbed. The horizontal or departmental aspect of the structure of the movement defined the areas of activities in which the movement was interested. The manner in which personnel in the movement was utilized was in keeping with these different fields of activities. However, before a particular person was commissioned to perform any task, whether or not he was the man appropriate for the appointment was the question asked.

The training of the members of the movement was a continuous and persistent enterprise. There was training in every grade of the hierarchy in the movement. Students were taught the personal qualities which were beneficial

to the movement. Lessons were given in that form of activity known as *hsüeh-hsih*, which could be carried on an individual-to-individual or on a larger group basis. Persons were also constantly kept disciplined by the practice of criticism and self-criticism. Sometimes, undesirable behavioural patterns were eradicated by what were known as rectification campaigns.

The manpower system in the Malayan communist movement was a clearly structured one, with its entire organization oriented towards well-defined aims. It was a system which in many instances failed to attain the expected technical standard. But, at the same time, it was not an institution which was basically faulty. This latter point had been demonstrated if not by anything else, at least, by the fact of the very tenacity and persistence of the movement in the face of innumerable obstacles and in an environment which can be described as inimical to its growth and development.

Developments which have taken place after 1966 reveal that what can be seen in this study, that is, the method of the working of the manpower system of the Malayan communist movement during the years 1948-66, is not only of historical interest but relevant today. What happened in the past is still happening in the present. This emphasizes once again the tenacity and persistence of the movement and those imbued by its ideals.

Recognizing the persistence of the movement's efforts, it is intended to review briefly how this may reoccur. During the phase (1954-66) of the open political struggle, front organizations which were open instruments were used. But in the present circumstances this precedent cannot be followed due to the vigilance of the authorities. So the effort is entirely founded on such underground secret methods as those used in the phase of armed struggle. In such a situation the dictates of secrecy place great emphasis on personal contacts, such as the use of friendship in a clandestine fashion. Evidence of the repetition of this kind of effort is becoming available.

It has been stated by government officials who study the Malayan communist movement that in recent years documents have been discovered emanating from high places in the CPM instructing members to try to reestablish contact with brothers, sisters and other relations of both deceased

and living comrades to recover or rebuild "old territories". There is also a statement from a member of the Malayan National Liberation Front, one of the satellite organizations controlled by the CPM at the moment, that the person making the statement came down from the Peninsula to Singapore some time in 1970 to carry out terrorist and related activities. One of the things he did was to look up, and recontact, certain friends who had studied with him in the same university. He approached them to join his organization. Both these two pieces of evidence point to the fact that the movement still makes use of existing friendships to try to absorb manpower.

The said member of the Malayan National Liberation Front came to Singapore in 1970. Before that he had also once been sent to work in the Cameron Highlands. His mission there, in his own words, follows:

... "A" [his superior] told me that the organisation wanted me to go to the Cameron Highlands to work so as to get acquainted with the masses there and to expand the strength of the organisation.

... I was transferred to work in a vegetable farm named Kay Farm ... my main task was to befriend the masses, particularly the youths, for the purpose of talent-spotting the "progressive elements" for subsequent cultivation, and when conditions were fulfilled, eventually absorbing them into the organisation as members²

Apparently, what took place in the Cameron Highlands could also take place in Singapore. If the subject of this account did not also carry out the same activity in Singapore, other members of the organization could have done so.

This method of approaching the masses, as shown by the example above, was the second way in which the communist movement attempted to reach the masses. It

1 Statement of TAN LAI SENG, para. 92.

2 Statement of TAN LAI SENG, paras. 62-65.

was the method, it will be remembered, of bringing about friendships which did not previously exist. This second method whereby the communist movement would attempt to develop linkage with the masses is still practised today.

In the same way as the friendship exploitation mechanism of 1948-54 is again being used today, so too is the absorption system of those years still applicable to present circumstances.

Front organizations number very few today, if indeed there are any. The Singapore People's Anti-British League, a satellite organization, was in those days the Singapore branch of the Anti-British League which operated all over Malaya. This organization has since 1966 been revived in Singapore as the Malayan National Liberation League. And towards the end of 1968, a Malayan National Liberation Front, another satellite organization, also came into being. Absorption of manpower into the Malayan communist movement nowadays involves these organizations besides the CPM itself. There is also the absorption between the different segments. Thus, for instance, the top leaders of the Malayan National Liberation Front who did not previously belong to the CPM were reportedly absorbed to become members of the Party at the same time when the Front came into existence.

At the same time it can also be said with some certainty that the standards for sifting out people for absorption in the movement, that is, the assessments based on dedication, character and ability, have also remained constant. As an indication of this, the Malayan National Liberation Front stipulates that an ordinary member of the Front must have reformed in thought and gone through engagement in "coolie" work, and must have also carried out *hsüeh-hsih* before he could be promoted to cadre.³ The three criteria still appear to be accepted by the movement as the ideal assurances that the persons selected would be as close as possible to the best available for its purposes.

The kinds of activity engaged in by the Malayan communist movement as explained in the chapter on deployment was the result of the fact that the movement was engaged in an act of attempting to overthrow the existing

3 Constitution of the Front.

authorities and seizing power from them. The nature of its objectives and the strength of the governing power provided the environment which dictated the methods used and fields of activity engaged in by the CPM.

At the present moment, the Malayan communist movement comprises a group of people literally roaming the wilderness or hiding out secretly in the urban centres. Thus the activities in which it now indulges cannot, in their clandestine nature, be different from those in which it had adopted before. The structure of deployment in the movement therefore has not changed from earlier days until the present time. At the same time the techniques of personnel deployment, that is the way of judging which person is suitable for which particular job, must have also remained constant.

Since front organizations are virtually nonexistent nowadays, training is carried out only in the underground context as in the days of 1948-54. However, the content and method of training are very similar.

For instance, arrests of personnel of the Malayan National Liberation Front recently proved that *hsüeh-hsih* is still being carried out in the Front.⁴ Then, according to the constitution of the Front and the new constitution of the CPM itself which was adopted in 1972, the practice of criticism and self-criticism still continues. On the other hand, there have been no reports of rectification movements being conducted recently. However, in the late 1960s a cultural revolution, a small-scale replica of the one which took place in China at about the same time, was carried out among Singapore communists who were taking refuge in Indonesia.⁵ This indicates that the discipline needed to impose harsh measures still remains.

The basis in which people are collected, or contacted, for training is still individual-to-individual, through cells or in committees or small groupings. Data from the Malayan National Liberation Front has shown this to be so.⁶

4 Statement of TAN LAI SENG, paras. 71-72, 75-76 and 80-82.

5 Statement of LIM HOCK KOON, paras. 271, 301-307 and 350.

6 Statement of TAN LAI SENG, paras. 71-72, 75-76 and 80-82.

There is, according to several government officers, information that students are surreptitiously sent from Singapore to jungle camps in the Peninsula to attend classes for varying periods of time.

In brief, it is apparent that what has been learnt about the communist movement in Singapore during the period 1948-66 helps a great deal towards understanding how the movement conducts its operations here at the present time.



APPENDIX A: LIST OF FRONT AND SATELLITE ORGANIZATIONS
IN THE MALAYAN COMMUNIST MOVEMENT OPERATIVE
IN SINGAPORE, 1948-54

FRONT ORGANIZATIONS*

Student Bodies

Chinese High School: Students' Self-Governing Society
Chinese High School: Students' Mutual Aid Society
Chung Cheng High School: Choral Society
Chung Cheng High School: Debating Society
Chung Cheng High School: Literary Group
Chung Cheng High School: Students' Aid Society

SATELLITE ORGANIZATION

Political Party

Singapore People's Anti-British League

* Statements of NG SWEE LAI, paras. 3-5; CHAN YEAN FOCK, paras. 7 and 9; CHAN HOCK WAH, para. 10; ANG ENG CHONG, paras. 7 and 8; LIM HOCK KOON, paras. 36-42.

APPENDIX B: LIST OF FRONT AND SATELLITE ORGANIZATIONS
IN THE MALAYAN COMMUNIST MOVEMENT OPERATIVE
IN SINGAPORE, 1954-66*

FRONT ORGANIZATIONS

I Political Parties

Barisan Sosialis
Partai Rakyat
People's Action Party
Workers' Party

II Student Bodies

Art Association of 1953 Graduates of Chinese Middle Schools
Chinese High School Dramatic Society
Chung Cheng High School Dramatic Society and Folk Music Society
Nanyang University Biology Society
Nanyang University Chemistry Society
Nanyang University Chinese Language and Literature Society
Nanyang University Choral Society
Nanyang University Dramatic Society
Nanyang University History and Geography Society
Nanyang University Physics Society
Nanyang University Political Science Society
Nanyang University Social Science Research Society
Nanyang University Students' Union
Singapore Chinese Middle School Students' Union
Singapore Chinese Schools Students-Parents Friendly Association
University of Malaya Socialist Club
Yoke Eng Dramatic Society

III Trade Unions

Amalgamated Malayan Pineapple Workers' Union
Confederation of Singapore Engineering Tradesmen
Singapore Bookshop, Publication and Printing Press
Workers' Union
Singapore Bus Workers' Union

* List supplied by the Internal Security Department.

Singapore Catering Services, Staffs and Workers' Trade Union
 Singapore Chinese Primary Schools Teachers' Union
 Singapore Coffeeshop Employees' Union
 Singapore Commercial House and Factory Employees' Union
 Singapore Cycle and Motor Workers' Union
 Singapore Electrical and Wireless Employees' Union
 Singapore European Employees' Union
 Singapore Factory and Shop Workers' Union
 Singapore Fish Merchants' Employees Union
 Singapore General Employees' Union
 Singapore Gold and Silversmiths' Union
 Singapore Granite Quarry Workers' Union
 Singapore Hairdressers' Union
 Singapore Harbour Board Staff Association
 Singapore Industrial Workers' Union
 Singapore Marine Products Workers' Union
 Singapore Metal Box Workers' Union
 Singapore Metal Manufacturing Workers' Union
 Singapore Motor Workshop Employees' Union
 Singapore Rattan Workers' Union
 Singapore Restaurants, Bars, Eating and Coffeeshop
 Employees' Union
 Singapore Rubber Employees' Union
 Singapore Sawmill Workers' Union
 Singapore Ship Cleansing Workers' Union
 Singapore Tailors' Union
 Singapore Taxi Drivers' Union
 Singapore Textile and General Merchants' Employees' Union
 Singapore Transport Vessel Workers' Association
 Singapore Union of Brewery, Bakery, Confectionery,
 Canning and Drinks Workers
 Singapore Union of Workers of Board Building Industry
 Singapore Woodworkers' Union

IV Cultural Associations

Ai Tong Old Boys' Association
 Brass Gong Musical Society
 Cheng Hwa OBA
 Chin Kang OBA
 Chinese Kindergarten and Primary School OBA
 Chong Cheng OBA
 Chong Hock OBA
 Chung Cheng OBA
 Equator Arts Society
 Hong Wen OBA
 Kai Kok OBA

Kang Leh Musical Association
 Keng Chean OBA
 Keok Ming OBA
 Kong Chow School OBA
 Kong Yong OBA
 Kwong Fook OBA
 Lee Teck OBA
 Min Chu OBA
 Min Sheng Musical Society
 Pei Ching OBA
 Pin Ghee OBA
 San Shan OBA
 Sheng Hwa OBA
 Si San OBA
 Sing Lam OBA
 Soo Chuan OBA
 Tao Nan OBA
 Yeung Cheng OBA
 - Yin Shin OBA

V Peasant Unions

Singapore Attap Dwellers' Association
 Singapore Country People's Association
 Singapore Farmers' Association
 Singapore Rural Residents' Association
 Singapore Wooden House Dwellers' Association

VI Hawkers' Associations

Singapore Hawkers' Union
 Singapore Itinerant Hawkers' and Stallholders' Association

VII Women's Federation

Singapore Women's Federation

SATELLITE ORGANIZATION

Political Party

Singapore People's Anti-British League

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

I: Particulars of unpublished statements of ex-detainees and detainees

Name	Date of statement ¹	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known organizational status	Last-known professional status
Ang Choon Hock	8.1.71-(a) 1.2.71	12.12.70	14.12.71	Propaganda/Education Officer, Delta/Tiong Bahru Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Construction worker

1 There were many ways in which the dates of the statements of the various ex-detainees and detainees were recorded. These variations were found to be the following:-

- (i) The first variation is the entry of a relevant date in the title of a statement. Often the entry actually consists of two dates. The first marked the beginning of the recording of the statement. The second marked is the conclusion of it. A statement is usually not taken down in one day, but over a period of time.

Although, generally speaking, two dates appear together in the titles of statements, sometimes only one date appears. This might mean that the particular statement concerned was recorded in just one day.

This first way of dating statements is here designated variation (a).

- (ii) The second variation consists also of two dates, one at the beginning of a statement, in the section dealing with the personal particulars of the person concerned, and the other at the end of the statement and at a place where the officer responsible for taking down the statement affixed his signature. In this case, the first date indicates the beginning of the recording of the statement, and the second, the end of the process. This variation here is represented by the symbol (b).

- (iii) The third variation is when a particular statement carries a date only in its section covering personal particulars. Such a date, as under the second variation, shows only the time when the statement first began to be recorded. This variation is here called (c).

- (iv) The fourth way in which dates appear in statements is together with the signature of the officer

Name	Date of statement	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known organizational status	Last-known professional status
Ang Eng Chong	24.10.72 (f)	(Not detained. 3.8.72-(?) interviewed by Internal Security Department)		Member, CPM; Member, Propaganda Section, Central Executive Committee, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Manager, a construction company
Ang Tuan Kim	19.11.54-(b) 19.12.54	29.6.54	16.12.54	District Committee member, CPM	Farmer
Chai Ko Nyet	28.5.70 (d)	25.5.70	24.6.70	nil	Construction worker
Chan Chong Keen	25.10.65-(b) 4.12.65	8.10.63	29.12.65	Member, CPM; Paid Secretary of the Singapore Motor Workshop Employees' Union and Secretary of the English Section of the same union; Member, Paya Lebar Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapore; Member, Executive Committee, and Member, Labour Disputes Subcommittee, Singapore Association of Trade Unions	Trade unionist

taking down the statement. Such a date also marks the time when the officer finished his task. This fourth way is here represented as (d).

- (v) The fifth method by which statements carry dates is for the detainee himself, and not the officer concerned, to sign his own statement. The date appears under his signature at the end of the statement. This is variation (e).

(vi)

Finally, a statement can be found not to carry a date affixed by a government officer or the detainee himself, but by the typist who prepared the statement. This last kind of practice is called (f).

It should be noted that a statement by a detainee is usually taken over a period of time and not in one day. Usually where two dates occur, the dating can be presumed to be more accurate than in cases where only one date appears.

Name	Date of statement	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known organizational status	Last-known professional status
Chan Hock Wah	9.6.72 (f)	17.2.71	(Still under detention)	District Committee Member, CPM	Carpenter
Chan Kee Nam	18.8.54 (c)	29.7.54	2.3.55	Probationary Member, CPM	Fitter
Chan Weng Hsi	18.4.73 (d)	16.3.73	9.4.73	General Affairs Officer, Ocean Art Organization	Clerk
Chan Yean Fock	26.5.72 (f)	10.2.72	12.2.72	Member, CPM (actual rank believed to be higher than that of an ordinary member)	Managing director, a trading company
Chang Joo Phong	2.2.71 (f)	18.6.70	20.10.71	Asst. Secretary General, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Paid official, Barisan Sosialis Singapore; Proprietor, a small business
Chang Kiah Lin	16.4.71 (d)	4.1.71	2.2.71	Activist in Tanjong Pagar Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Carpenter in building industry
Cheng Yuit Tung	28.11.63 (d)	27.11.63	1.2.65	Member, CPM; Asst. Secretary General, Singapore Business Houses Employees' Union; Asst. Treasurer, and Member of the Labour Capital Dispute Subcommittee, Singapore Association of Trade Unions	Radio mechanic

Name	Date of statement	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known organizational status	Last-known professional status
Cheong Siew Nguo	5.3.72 (d)	13.3.68	5.6.72	(No formal position, but in charge of indoctrination of a few students)	Student
Chew York Chye	12.1.71 (d)	18.6.70	28.7.71	Liaison Officer, East District, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Unascertained
Chia Bak Song	nil	16.3.73	9.4.73	Member, Si Shan Old Boys' Association; Member Sembawang Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapore; Member, Singapore Equator Arts Society	Construction worker
Chia Siew Tin	5.8.71 (f)	21.1.71	22.6.72	Member, CPM	Housewife
Chia Yam Fei	12.2.65 (d)	2.2.63	29.5.65	Member, CPM; Secretary, Propaganda and Education Committee, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Teacher
Chia Yang Loong	10.6.67- 3.7.67 (a)	25.4.63	19.4.71	Official, Kong Yong Old Boys' Association; Secretary, Ponggol/Upper Serangoon Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Teacher
Chiam See Tee	28.5.71 (d)	16.3.71	17.9.71	Leader, a <i>hsüeh-hsih</i> cell; Member, another <i>hsüeh-hsih</i> cell	Cakemaker

Name	Date of statement	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known organizational status	Last-known professional status
Chiang Seng Ngiap	11.71 (a)	7.11.71	4.12.71	Asst. Propaganda and Education Officer, Green Bus Branch, Singapore Industrial Workers' Union; Trustee, Central Executive Committee, Singapore Industrial Workers' Union	Bus ticket inspector
Chng Yong Par	15.11.69 (d)	11.9.64	4.11.70	Sympathiser, CPM; Vice-Chairman, Bukit Panjang Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapore; Vice-Chairman, Cheng Hwa Old Boys' Association; Member, Bukit Panjang Branch, Singapore General Employees' Union	Odd-job man
Chong Koi Fatt	15.11.71- 22.11.71 (a)	7.11.71	14.2.72	Secretary, Bus Workers' Branch, Singapore Industrial Workers' Union	Bus conductor
Chow Kin Wah	26.2.72 (d)	22.6.70	21.7.70	Sympathiser, Malayan National Liberation Front	Student
Chua Say Guan	1.11.72- 20.11.72 (a)	30.10.72	21.11.72	Activist in Siglap Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Printer
Ee Ching Seng	31.3.70 (d)	27.4.64	17.6.70	Head, Publication Section, History and Geography Society, Nanyang University	Student

Name	Date of statement	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known organizational status	Last-known professional status
Eng Ah Gin	7.73-9.73 (a)	3.7.73	3.7.73	Member, a secret <i>hsueh- hsi</i> cell	Mosaic worker
Gan Siew Tham	16.5.50 (a)	3.4.50	3.8.50	District Committee Member, CPM	Assistant to father in business
Goh Lam San	nil	11.9.64	1.2.65	Vice-President, Singapore Shipping clerk Business Houses Employees' Union	
Goh Song Gim	15.1.70- 21.1.70 (a)	7.1.70	4.2.70	Asst. Treasurer, Tampines Construction Branch, Barisan Sosialis worker Singapore	
Hee Nam Fong	14.4.70 (f)	7.1.70	4.2.70	National Language Tutor and Asst. Officer-in-charge of Library in Headquarters, Partai Rakyat, Singapore	Clerk
Ho Lung	nil	5.4.58 (Surrendered unavailable) himself)	(Information unavailable)	Member of Central Committee and Central Figure of South Malaysia Bureau, CPM	Paid cadre, CPM
Hoa Poh Choon	17.4.70 (d)	31.1.70	22.12.70	General Affairs Officer, Clerk Tao Nan Old Boys' Association	
Jukri bin Parjo @ Warjo	12.2.65 (a)	27.1.65	21.6.66	Chairman, Partai Rakyat Singapore; Asst. Secretary, Singapore Industrial Workers' Union	Film projectionist

Name	Date of statement	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known organizational status	Last-known professional status
Kia Ba Ba	15.7.71 (d)	10.11.68	28.12.71	Culture and Education Officer, Aljunied Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Construction worker
Koh Pee Seng	28.1.72 (f)	7.11.71	11.3.72	Paid Secretary, United Bus Company Branch, Singapore Industrial Workers' Union	Trade unionist
Koo Young	23.6.67- 21.9.67 (a)	15.6.67	27.1.68	Member, CPM; Asst. Secretary General, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Paid official, Barisan Sosialis Singapore
Lam Chit Lee	27.4.65 (a)	27.4.65 (Surrendered himself)	10.11.65	Member, CPM; Member, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Secretary, Nanyang University canteen
Law Peia Sin	15.4.72 (f)	16.3.72	11.4.72	Member, Labour Party of Malaya; Member, a revolutionary organization in Kluang (name unascertained)	Rearing tropical fish
Lee Khiok Fong	8.4.70 (d)	12.11.68	18.7.70	Member, a secret <i>hsueh-hsi'h</i> cell	Kindergarten teacher
Lee Theng Sia	21.6.71 (d)	27.2.70	11.10.71	Member, Central Executive Committee, Sheng Hwa Old Boys' Association	Paid secretary of an association of shipowners and maritime traders

Name	Date of statement	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known organizational status	Last-known professional status
Lee Yew Thong	25.8.73- 5.9.73 (a)	23.8.73	22.9.73	Secretary, Malayan Workers' and Peasants' Liberation Front	Seaman
Lee Yuen Theng	10.2.70- 23.2.70 (a)	31.7.70	28.11.71	Chairman, Kwong Fook Old Boys' Association	Clerk
Leong K.S.	12.4.65 (e) ² 15.4.65 (e)	(Not detained)		Member, CPM	Teacher
Leow Fatt	27.9.54 (c)	29.7.54	10.10.55	Member, CPM	Blacksmith
Lew On San	11.6.70 (d)	5.6.70	30.6.70	nil	Odd-job worker in a construction company
Lew Yong	20.5.70 (d)	8.5.70	2.6.70	Member, Crawford Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Businessman
Lim Boey Tee	6.5.70- 23.5.70 (a)	26.4.70	22.12.70	Member, a discussion group	Electrician
Lim Fook Sin	7.4.71 (f)	12.12.70	9.9.71	Cadre, Tanjong Pagar Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Apprentice electrician

² Two statements by this person were consulted.

Name	Date of statement	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known organizational status	Last-known professional status
Lim Guan Tun	14.11.72 (f)	26.10.72 (Handed over/unavailable) to the Internal Security Department by the Criminal Investigation Department)	(Information unavailable)	Committee Member, Pasir Panjang/Telok Blangah Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Hawker
Lim Hock Koon	7.9.71 (d)	21.1.71	(Still under detention)	District Committee Member, CPM	Construction worker
Lim Huan Boon	4.12.69 (f)	2.11.53	4.11.53	Member, CPM; Assemblyman for Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Merchant
Lim Kok Hin	17.1.70 (d)	12.11.68	18.7.70	Member, a secret <i>hsueh- kesh</i> cell	Worker in motor workshop
Lim Joo Suan	28.9.71 (d)	18.6.70	28.12.71	Choir Instructor, Jalan Paya Subbranch, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Construction worker
Lim Meng Jow	nil	8.5.70	22.12.70	Member, Directing Cell, Nanyang University	Accounts clerk
Lim Seck Kian	13.4.65- 18.4.65 (a)	9.4.65	18.4.65	Member, CPM (actual rank/Teacher believed to be higher than that of an ordinary member); Chairman, Singapore Chinese School Teachers' Union	

Name	Date of statement	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known organizational status	Last-known professional status
Lim Shee Ping	2.63-3.63 (a)	4.2.63	28.12.63	Member, CPM (actual rank believed to be higher than that of an ordinary member); Paid Research Secretary, Singapore Business Houses Employees' Union; Hon. Adviser, Harbour Board Staff Association; Committee Member, Singapore Association of Trade Unions; Member, Central Executive Committee, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Trade unionist
Lim Swee Gor	18.9.62- (b) 26.9.62	17.9.62	27.10.62	Member, CPM (actual rank believed to be higher than that of an ordinary member)	Housewife
Lim Swee Hoe	18.6.73- (a) 4.7.73	12.6.73	11.7.73	Member, a secret cell; Leader, a second secret cell	Carpenter in building industry
Lim Noon Kiat	19.10.66- (a) 10.11.66	30.4.56	10.4.58	Member, Singapore People's/Student Anti-British League; Vice-Chairman, Nanyang University Week Working Committee, Nanyang University Students' Union; Member, Nanyang University Development Research sub-committee, Nanyang University Students' Union	

Name	Date of statement	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known organizational status	Last-known professional status
Loh Yang Whai	15.5.67- 16.6.67 (a)	20.4.67	19.5.71	Sympathiser, CPM	Accounts Clerk
Loo Cheng Hong	24.4.73- 10.5.73 (a)	16.3.73	30.8.73	Member, Hokkien Association, Brass Band	Army driver
Luk King Hang	12.1.70- 4.2.70 (a)	9.1.70	4.2.70	Chairman, Bukit Merah/Queenstown Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Port labourer
Neo Heng Cheong	9.3.72- 21.3.72 (a)	24.2.72	24.3.72	Head, Overseas Compatriot Library	Bank messenger boy
Ng Ah Lek	5.70 (a)	26.4.70	5.10.70 (Handed over to the Criminal Investigation Department by the Internal Security Department)	Member, a secret hsieh-hsieh cell	Employee of an electrical trader
Ng Swee Lai	21.10.72 (f)	20.8.72	16.9.72	Member, Singapore People's Anti-British League; Vice-Chairman, Bagan Api Branch, Permusjawaratan Permuda <u>/sic/</u> Indonesia ³	Businessman

³ This was an Indonesian and not a Singaporean organization.

Name	Date of statement	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known organizational status	Last-known professional status
Pang Toon Tin	6.6.65 (e)	2.2.63	17.1.66	Member, CPM; Vice-Chairman, Partai Rakyat Singapore; Paid Secretary, Singapore Bookshop, Publication and Printing Press Workers' Union	Trade unionist
Phang Say Mun	5.1.71- (a) 21.1.71	4.1.71	23.1.71	Propaganda and Education Officer, Geylang East Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Kindergarten teacher
Phua Hok Tian	15.5.70 (d)	9.5.70	21.5.70	Member, Executive Committee, Nee Soon Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapore; Sympathiser, Malayan Workers' and Peasants' Liberation Front	Army camp orderly
Pung Pek Song	23.4.70 (f) ⁴ 19.3.71 (d)	31.1.70	9.7.71	Committee Member, Kwong Fook Old Boys' Association	Businessman
Puthuchearry, James Joseph	10.2.63- 23.2.63 (a)	2.2.63	28.11.63	Adviser, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Trade unionist

⁴ Two statements by this person were consulted.

Name	Date of statement	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known organizational status	Last-known professional status
Sim Teong Hiok	20.3.70 ^(a) 17.4.70	31.1.70	9.5.74	Committee Member, Cheng Hwa Old Boys' Association	Private tutor
Soh Ben Ann	8.10.70 ^(a) 20.12.70	18.6.70	2.2.71	Vice-Chairman, Siu Poh Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Private tutor
Soh Chin Heng, Jacobus	5.65 (a)	29.4.65	10.10.66	nil	Stenographer
Tan Bang Kiat	5.2.70 (d)	8.10.63	21.11.70	Member, CPM; Chairman, Singapore Restaurant, waiter Bar, Eating and Coffeeeshop Employees' Union; Organizing Officer, Singapore Association of Trade Unions	Restaurant waiter
Tan Boon Chai	2.70 (a)	31.1.70	6.3.71	Chairman, Sheng Hwa Old Boys' Association	Clerk
Tan Jing Quee	28.1.66 (a)	8.10.63	4.5.66	Paid official, Singapore Business Houses Employees' Union	Trade unionist
Tan Kim Soon	13.5.70 (d)	8.5.70	21.5.70	Chairman, Sepoy Lines Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Goods delivery driver

Name	Date of statement	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known organizational status	Last-known professional status
Tan Lai Seng	4.707(a) 5.70	26.4.70	9.9.70 (Handed over to Criminal Investigation Department by Internal Security Department. Detention order by Internal Security Department cancelled on 5.10.70)	District Committee Member, Malayan National Liberation Front	Farmer
Tan Seah Chua	9.2.70- 15.2.70 (a)	29.1.70	27.2.71	nil	Owner, coconut plantation
Tay Giok Chai	26.12.70 (d)	11.9.67	22.4.71	Hsueh-hsieh student	Student
Tay Leong Biew	29.4.70 (d)	31.7.70	23.8.71	Second-in-charge of the Propaganda and Education Section, Cheng Hwa Old Boys' Association	Carpenter in building industry
Teo Lek Heng	13.7.71 (d)	25.5.69	22.10.71	Member, Swan Socks Branch Committee, Pioneer Industries Employees' Union	Factory worker

Name	Date of statement	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known organizational status	Last-known professional status
Teo Teck Soon	18.1.71 (f)	18.6.70	20.10.71	Head, Central Propaganda and Education Committee, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Paid official of Barisan Sosialis Singapore
Thandayubhabani, Sithiah	21.4.64 (d) 1.6.64	8.10.63	15.2.66	President, Singapore Association of Trade Unions	Trade unionist
Toh Choon Sui	1.12.52- (b) 12.12.52	26.11.52	8.10.53	District Committee Member, CPM	Brickmaker
Toh Han Boon	18.2.71 (f)	3.8.70	17.8.71	Treasurer, Tanjong Pagar Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Construction worker
Toh Siew Tin	8.12.71 (d)	27.2.70	12.2.72	Committee Member, Kwong Fook Old Boys' Association	Kindergarten teacher
Tng Yoong Chiaw	3.7.65 (a)	2.2.63	7.2.66	Secretary of Branch, CPM; Chairman, Geylang East Branch, Partai Rakyat Singapore	Worker
Wong Mau Choong	10.4.54 (a)	29.1.54	21.1.56	District Committee Member, CPM	Paid cadre, CPM

Name	Date of statement	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known organizational status	Last-known professional status
Wong Tai Peng	26.4.71 (d)	27.6.64	30.1.72	Asst. Publication Officer, Nanyang University History and Geography Society	Student
Woodhull, Sandrasegaran	17.6.63 (d)	2.2.63	1.2.64	Vice-Chairman, Barisan Sosialis Singapore; Adviser, Singapore General Employees' Union	Trade unionist

II. Documents and other materials of communist organizations

There are two subdivisions here: for unpublished and published sources. Published sources here mean those available to the general public. Unpublished sources, on the other hand, denote those documents which had a restricted circulation only among the membership of the CPM itself or its satellite organisations. Both published and unpublished materials could be hand-written, mimeographed or printed in the ordinary sense of the word.

1. Unpublished Sources

a. 錯誤的檢討.

(四中及五中全會決議要點)

一九四八年十一月十日南馬出版社出版, 出版地點不詳.

A Review of Our Mistakes.

(The Main Points of the Fourth and the Fifth Plenums of the Central Committee).⁵

Published by the South Malaya Publishing House, place unspecified, 10 November 1948.

b. 馬來亞爲自由而戰!

一九五四年馬共中央委員會在英帝勢力範圍內國家的共產黨工人黨第二屆代表大會上的報告.

Malaya Fights for Freedom!

A report made by the Central Committee of the CPM to the Second Representatives' Conference of Communist and Labour Parties of countries in the "British imperialist sphere of influence" in 1954.⁶

⁵ The Central Committee of the CPM.

⁶ Held in the United Kingdom.

c. 增強黨性的決定。

一九四七年七月馬共中央政治局通過。

一九四七年七月星洲自由出版社翻印。

Resolutions on Strengthening the Party Nature /of Members/

Adopted by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPM in July 1947.

Reprinted by the Freedom Press, Singapore, July 1949.

d. 關於整黨的決定。

一九四八年三月馬共中央政治局通過。

影印手抄本。

Resolutions on the Re-organization of the Party.

Adopted by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPM in March 1948.

Photostated hand-written copy.

e. 馬來亞革命戰爭戰略問題。

一九四八年十二月馬共中央政治局通過。

星洲自由出版社翻印，翻印日期不詳。

Strategic Problems of the Malayan Revolutionary War.

Adopted by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPM in December 1948.

Reprinted by the Freedom Press, Singapore. Undated.

f. 中央政治局對「馬來亞革命戰爭戰略問題」的補充意見。

一九四九年十二月十日馬共中央政治局通過。

星洲自由出版社翻印，翻印日期不詳。

Supplementary Views of the Central Political Bureau on

"Strategic Problems of the Malayan Revolutionary War".

Adopted by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPM on 10 December 1949.

Reprinted by the Freedom Press, Singapore. Undated.

g. 馬來亞革命的基本問題。

一九四七年十二月馬共中央政治局通過。

一九五一年七月一日紅星報翻印，翻印地點不詳。

The Basic Problems of the Malayan Revolution.

Adopted by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPM in December 1947.

Reprinted by the Red Star Press, place unspecified, 1 July 1951.

h. 馬來亞人民的燈塔。

一九五四年四月一日戰鬥快報社翻印，翻印地點不詳。

The Beacon of the People of Malaya.

Reprinted by the Fighting Express Press, place unspecified, 1 April 1954.

i. 黨的建設。

手抄本。

The Building of the Party.

Hand-written copy.

j. 目前的形勢和任務。

一九四九年六月馬共中央政治局通過。

一九四九年十一月一日星洲自由出版社翻印。

The Present Situation and Our Tasks.

Adopted by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPM in June 1949.

Printed by the Freedom Press, Singapore, 1 November 1949.

k. 爲爭取戰爭的更大勝利而鬥爭。

一九五一年十月一日馬共中央政治局通過。

手抄本。

To Struggle for Greater Victory in the War.

Adopted by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPM on 1 October 1951.

Reprinted by Freedom Press, Singapore. Undated.

1. 有關 城 市 (包括 星 洲) 工作的意見.
ROBK - RBON REOH - KRBD
手抄本.

"Views on Work in the Cities (including Singapore)."
Hand-written copy.

2. Published Sources

- a. 一個德才兼優的 (林江石同志) 無產階級革命家.
燎原出版社出版, 出版日期及地點不詳.

A Proletarian Revolutionary, Outstanding Both in
Dedication and Abilities - Comrade Lin Chiang-shih.
Published by the Prairie Fire Press, place and date
unspecified.

- b. 馬共中央關於馬來亞當前形勢的聲明.
一九五六年三月五日發表.
油印件.

A Statement on the Present Situation in Malaya by the
Central /Committee/ of the Communist Party of Malaya.
Dated 5 March 1956.
Cyclostyled copy.

- c. 馬來亞共產黨章程.
一九四七年六月三日第九次中央委員會擴大會上通過.
一九四七年七月十日星洲馬來亞出版社印行.

Constitution of the Communist Party of Malaya.
Adopted on 3 June 1947 by the 9th Enlarged Meeting of
the Central Committee of the Party.
Published by the Malayan Publishing House, Singapore,
10 July 1947.

- d. 星洲人民抗英同盟簡章.
一九四八年九月一日生效.
出版日期及出版社不詳.

Constitution of the Singapore People's Anti-British League.
Effective as from 1 September 1948.
Publisher and date of publication unspecified.

- e. 高舉武裝鬥爭偉大紅旗，奮勇前進！
馬來亞共產黨中央委員會紀念抗英民族解放戰爭二十周年聲明。
 一九六八年六月一日發表。
 一九六八年六月十九日香港新華社新聞稿。

Hold High the Great Red Banner of Armed Struggle, and
Bravely March Forward!
A declaration by the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of Malaya in commemoration of the twentieth
anniversary of the Anti-British National Liberation War.
Dated 1 June 1968.
Hsin Hua News Release, Hongkong, 19 June 1968.

- f. 高舉馬克思主義、列寧主義、毛澤東思想偉大紅旗，奮勇前進！
馬來亞共產黨中央委員會關於馬來亞共產黨成立四十周年的聲
明。
 一九七〇年四月二十五日發表。
 一九七〇年五月三日星洲陣綫報轉載。

Hold High the Great Red Banner of Marxism-Leninism and
Mao Tse-tung Thought, and Bravely March Forward!
A declaration on the fortieth anniversary of the
founding of the Communist Party of Malaya by the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Malaya.
Dated 25 April 1970.
 Reprinted in Chern Sian Pao,⁷ 3 May 1970.

- g. 學生工作怎樣做。
影印手抄本。

How to Do Student Work.
 Publisher and date of publication unspecified.
 Photostated hand-written copy.

⁷ Official organ of the Barisan Sosialis Singapore.

- h. 向偉大的革命先烈李良同志學習。

燎原出版社出版，出版日期及地點不詳。

Learn from the Great Revolutionary Martyr, Comrade Li Liang.

Published by the Prairie Fire Press, place and date unspecified.

- i. 悼念革命先烈。

燎原出版社出版，出版日期及地點不詳。

Remember the Martyrs.

Published by the Prairie Fire Press, place and date unspecified.

- j. 南島之春。

一九四六年一月十五日星洲馬來亞出版社出版。

Spring in the Southern Island.

Published by the Malayan Publishing House, Singapore, 15 January 1946.

- k. 「九一」革命烈士節歷史。

手抄本。

The History of 1 September, Revolutionary Martyr's Day.
Hand-written copy.

- l. 馬來亞人民民主共和國建國綱領。

一九四九年一月二十五日馬共中央委員會發表。

〔星洲〕自由研究會翻印，翻印日期不詳。

The Programme of the People's Democratic Republic of Malaya.

Announced by the Central Committee of the CPM on 25 January 1949.

Reprinted by the Freedom Study Society, [Singapore], undated.

- m. 馬來亞共產黨宣言。
爲實現馬來亞的獨立、民主、和平而鬥爭。
一九五五年十二月二十三日發表。
 油印件。

To Struggle for the Realization of Independence,
Democracy and Peace in Malaya.
A Declaration by the Communist Party of Malaya.
Dated 23 December 1955.
 Cyclostyled copy.

III. GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES*

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 "Communist Party of Malaya."
 "Supplement No. 1 to Basic Paper on the Malayan
 Communist Party - Malay and Indonesian Communists."
 "The Activities of the Malayan Communists in Singapore
 during the Different Periods after the War."
 (戰後星加坡馬共各個時期的活動。)
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 from 1960 to 1968," 1969.
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* These studies were made by the governmental authorities. In some instances, the names of authors are known, while in others, they are not. In any case, such names have to be omitted from this bibliography for security reasons.

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